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vPreface
This.publication. includes.a. selection.of.presentations. from. the.May.2013.
Latin.American.Security.Conference.hosted.by.the.Latin.American.Research.
Centre.at.the.University.of.Calgary,.jointly.with.the.Centre.for.Military.and.
Strategic. Studies,. the.School.of.Public.Policy. and. the.Canadian.Defence.
and.Foreign.Affairs. Institute..We.are.very.grateful. for. their. collaboration.
and.support,.as.we.are.for.the.very.generous.support.of.the.Social.Sciences.
and.Humanities.Research.Council.and.the.Defence.Engagement.Program.
of. the.Department.of.National.Defence..Foreign.Affairs.and.International.
Trade.Canada.very.kindly.arranged.for.Canadian.Ambassador.to.Colombia.
Tim.Martin. to.deliver. the.opening.keynote.address..Several. corporations.
provided.critical.financial. support. for. the. conference,. including.Agrium,.
Enbridge. International,. UBS. Bank. Canada,. and. Rainmaker.. Enbridge.
International,.Petrominerales,.Nexen,.CKR.Global,.Goldcorp,.Grantierra,.
NortonRose,.and.Yamana.Gold.also.facilitated.the.participation.of.panelists.
from.their.firms.
We. were. fortunate. to. have. had. the. participation. of. several. doctoral.
student.rapporteurs.who.prepared.executive.summaries.of.each.of.the.pre-
sentations.and.discussions.which.followed.the.presentations..They.included:.
Adam. Cahill. (History),. Clayton. Dennison. (CMSS),. Mariana. Hipolito. A..
Ramos. (Political. Science),. Elizabeth. Pando. (Political. Science),. and. Brenan.
Smith.(History)..
Overall.conference.coordination.was.handled.with.patience.and.skill.by.
Monique.Greenwood.Santos,.Program.Coordinator.in.the.Centre..She.is.also.
the. co-editor. of. this. volume..The.Latin.American.Research.Centre.would.
also. like. to. thank. the.Centre. for.Military.and.Strategic.Studies. for. its.col-
laboration.in.the.publication.of.the.conference.proceedings.
Stephen.J..Randall
Director,.Latin.American.Research.Centre
University.of.Calgary
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Introduction
Dr. Stephen J. Randall, FRSC,  
Director, Latin American Research Centre
The papers and presentations in this volume were part of an inter-national conference on Latin American and Caribbean basin se-curity issues hosted by the Latin American Research Centre at the 
University of Calgary May 2 & 3, 2013. The conference was co-hosted with 
the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and the School of Public Policy 
at the University of Calgary, and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Institute, also based in Calgary. The conference received very generous sup-
port from the Defence Engagement Program of the Department of National 
Defence, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
as well as private sector sponsorship from UBS Bank Canada, Agrium, and 
Rainmaker. The Centre is grateful to its co-hosts and its sponsors for mak-
ing it possible to draw together a range of academics and practitioners from 
Canada, the United States, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico.
The objectives of the conference were several. The first was to adopt a 
very broad approach to what was meant by “security.” We wanted to include 
but go beyond traditional notions of security which focus on the military 
and thus give attention to a range of human security issues, whether it be 
the impact of insecurity on violence against women, the role of illegal armed 
groups, organized crime, guerrilla insurgencies, youth gangs, or the impact 
which armed conflict has on the physical environment. A second goal was 
to include and learn from academic specialists, government officials, inter-
national agencies, NGOs and members of the business community with 
operations in the region. Perhaps inevitably there were gaps. Although issues 
relevant to Latin American indigenous groups were identified, there was no 
spokesperson from an indigenous community in the region. Nor was there a 
representative of organized labour from Latin America, both sectors which 
have been impacted by armed conflict in the region. The focus of the confer-
ence was on Hispanic and Portuguese Latin America. Of the English, French, 
and Dutch Caribbean only Trinidad and Tobago received appropriate atten-
tion, although that country’s security agenda was set in the larger framework 
of CARICOM (Caribbean Community). Since this was a Canadian-based 
conference, a third goal was to learn more about the evolution of Canadian 
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security policies in Latin America, what the policy objectives have been, 
where Canada has focused its attention and resources and in what ways 
Canada has made an impact.
Conference sessions thus dealt with: the evolving role of the military in 
the region; tensions between the ideal and the reality of the military’s func-
tion; the relationship between police forces and military; and the role of non-
state armed groups, whether guerrilla insurgents such as the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), paramilitary groups or narcotics cartels 
such as the Zetas in Mexico and Central America, or the youth gangs that 
have increased levels of violence from California to Panama. In all presenta-
tions there was an underlying or explicit recognition of the context in which 
security must be understood: pervasive poverty and inequality, race and 
class conflict, sexism, and for several countries in the region, most signifi-
cantly in Central America, among the highest rates of homicide in the world.
To set the stage for one dimension of the discussions, Hal Klepak 
traced the evolution of the inter-American security system from its roots in 
the early nineteenth century to the present. He stressed that hemispheric 
cooperation has been strongest in periods when the region faced a common 
external threat, fascism and Nazism in the 1930s and World War II period, 
or Communism during the Cold War, although for many Latin American 
countries the United States itself has been seen historically as a threat. In the 
absence of an external threat since the end of the Cold War and with waning 
U.S. interest and influence in the region, the inter-American security system 
has reached its weakest point since prior to World War II. Hector Luis Saint-
Pierre turned our attention to the Latin American military, outlining the 
traditional and evolving mission of the armed forces, with a focus on Brazil. 
He stressed the philosophical distinction between security and defence. As 
with other participants, Saint-Pierre noted the fact that threats are not solely 
state to state but rather derive from social, economic, and political challenges. 
Saint-Pierre viewed as unfortunate the blurring of lines between areas in 
which military forces appropriately belong, which is defence of the state, 
and areas in which police are the appropriate institution. Lucía Dammert 
concentrated her analysis on the evolution of military-police relations in the 
region. She outlined the factors which have led governments and civil society 
to turn to the military rather than the police to deal with criminal activity, 
in particular the general corruption and inefficiency often associated with 
police forces and the high degree of personal insecurity felt by many Latin 
American citizens in their daily lives. Dammert argued that police reform 
has been largely ineffective, and Saint-Pierre cited instances in Brazil where 
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the police had undermined the efforts of the military to deal with criminal 
activity. Commentator Hendrik Kraay suggested that since the military was 
already very actively engaged well beyond its traditional role of defence of 
the state, the need was to find ways to minimize their impact.
Canadian Ambassador to Colombia Tim Martin in his opening keynote 
address echoed Dammert’s stress on the sense of citizen insecurity in the 
region. Martin noted that among the factors accounting for Colombia’s re-
cent success in meeting its security challenges were: a strong and profes-
sional military and police; a coherent and progressive package of social 
and economic policies including a victims-based restitution policy; and 
international and regional support. Ambassador Adam Blackwell, Secretary 
of Multidimensional Security at the Organization of American States (OAS), 
reinforced Dammert’s data on violent crime, noting the impact that the illicit 
economy has had on financing criminal enterprise, with homicide rates and 
rates of gun violence increasing. He indicated that some estimates identify 
some 900 gangs in Central America alone. Like Dammert he noted the extent 
to which citizens feel insecure as the result of the high crime rates. In a paper 
prepared subsequent to the conference, Colombian scholar Bernardo Pérez 
Salazar identified organized crime as one of the critical areas in which multi-
dimensional security in the Americas has not been successful since the adop-
tion in 2003 of the Mexico City Declaration by the Organization of American 
States. Pérez suggested that the ineffectiveness in dealing with organized 
crime has been particularly problematic in areas that he identified as “under-
governed,” in other words those areas in which weak states have failed to 
establish a credible and effective political and military/police presence. Pérez 
referred to all non-state actors criminalized by the state-centric multidimen-
sional security doctrine. In his paper, he criticized the view that the state 
is necessarily the best actor capable of providing governance goods and 
services. His paper also dealt critically with “development agendas” focused 
on strengthening state military and policing capacity as the main corner-
stone of state-building. His specific focus was the case of Colombia, where 
counterinsurgent, antinarcotic and stabilization doctrine and operations 
have been applied for decades with increasing troop density, to no avail. 
Thomas C. Bruneau provided an insightful and comprehensive analysis of 
the challenges that threaten civilian control of military forces in the “new 
democracies” of Latin America. He outlined a number of the preconditions 
that must be established to ensure an effective civil-military relationship, the 
most important of which he suggested is that power must reside with elected 
civilian decision-makers with military subservient to the civilian power. In 
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his estimation only Chile and Colombia at present have achieved an effective 
institutional structure. Presentations provided analyses of the impact on so-
ciety of the militarization of the war on drugs in Mexico during the Calderón 
government. Zulma Y. Méndez demonstrated the correlation between the 
intensified military operations in the Ciudad Juárez area and the dramatic 
increase in the killing of women. María-Cristina Rosas observed the lack of 
continuity in the development of a national security strategy in Mexico dur-
ing the last several administrations. She noted that President Vicente Fox’s 
national security strategy made no reference to narcotics trafficking and the 
cartels, whereas the national security strategy of the Calderón government 
identified narcotics and organized criminal activity as a national security 
threat and “federalized” as well as militarized the war on drugs, paying 
little attention to state and municipal authorities. With Calderón’s successor, 
President Enrique Peña Nieto, the strategy shifted to a policy of “Mexico in 
Peace” with a greater emphasis on protecting human rights and reducing the 
high levels of violence.
Several papers and presentations dealt with the challenges posed by 
organized crime, paramilitary groups, youth gangs, and the few remain-
ing insurgent groups in the region, the most significant of which is the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the longest standing major 
insurgency in Latin America. The Colombian government and FARC have 
for some time been engaged in negotiations with a view to a peace accord. 
Former Colombian ambassador to Canada and former Colombian peace 
commissioner in earlier negotiations with FARC, Alfonso López Caballero, 
expressed some degree of optimism about the current negotiations, not-
ing that, in contrast to previous peace negotiations, FARC faces too many 
pressures internally and internationally not to negotiate in good faith. At 
the same time, he noted the divisiveness in Colombian society and political 
circles over the ultimate treatment of FARC in a final settlement, with some 
factions perceiving FARC as simply a brutal terrorist organization, opposed 
even to negotiations let alone a smooth and liberal transition into civil so-
ciety for FARC insurgents. Ambassador Martin echoed López Caballero’s 
optimism about the peace negotiations.1 Greg Purdy and José Miguel Cruz 
offered sobering reflections on organized crime and violence. Purdy stressed 
the transnational nature of organized crime and its destabilizing impact. 
Like Cruz, Purdy underlined the extent to which pervasive corruption, 
whether among military, police, intelligence or civilian officials, has contrib-
uted to the ineffectiveness of government policies. Purdy noted, for instance, 
the failure of Colombia’s intelligence agency DAS as the result of corruption. 
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Given the massive levels of wealth generated by organized crime and the 
comparatively poorly compensated civilian and military personnel, it was 
not surprising that corruption should be so pervasive. As well, as Purdy 
pointed out, organized criminal organizations in countries with high rates 
of unemployment and inequality can be both sources of employment and 
socio-economic levelers. Cruz was pointedly critical of mano dura policies 
that have been pursued by most Central American governments in dealing 
with organized crime. He cited the increased levels of violence in Central 
America when mano dura policies have been pursued. Military and police ag-
gression were matched by aggression from target groups, resulting in a gen-
eral escalation of violence. Cruz distinguished between insurgent groups, 
which need to maintain some degree of support from civilian populations, 
and organized criminal groups which have little need to do so. He noted, as 
well, the effectiveness of state institutions in some countries and their failure 
in others, such as the contrast between the situation in and policies pursued 
by Nicaragua versus Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In the case of 
Nicaragua the Sandinista governments in the 1980s worked to dismantle il-
legal armed groups and to establish a reasonably credible, independent, and 
non-corrupt police force which enjoys the confidence of Nicaraguan civilians. 
Ambassador Adam Blackwell concurred with Cruz’s assessment, stressing 
that the problem of insecurity is not necessarily more security. Mano dura, 
he noted, has been tried and found wanting; heavy-handed military and 
police tactics and tough crime legislation have not resulted in lower levels 
of violence and lower serious crime rates. Rather, he advocated a human-
istic approach, with a focus on crime prevention, alleviating the conditions 
which give rise to crime, deterring youth from joining gangs in the first place, 
and providing more support for the victims of crime. Like other panelists, 
Blackwell also stressed the importance of reducing impunity for those who 
commit crimes, including crimes of corruption by officials and crimes of vio-
lence perpetrated by police and military. Without addressing impunity it is 
not possible to create a context in which citizens have confidence in the state, 
its agencies, and officials.
Pablo Policzer and Elizabeth Pando-Burciaga noted the extent to which 
youth gangs, especially in Central America, constitute a threat to security, 
the rule of law, and the capacity of states to maintain effective governance. 
He identified the important difference between the pandillas and the maras, 
the former of which were formed by youth returning to their countries after 
the end of the Central American civil wars in the 1980s. The latter were 
largely the product of the more than forty-thousand youth gang members 
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deported to their countries of origin from the United States after 1996. The 
estimated numbers of members of such gangs in Central American countries 
range from 70,000 to 200,000. Policzer and Pando-Burciaga noted that Central 
American countries have responded to youth gangs with three not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive policy options: mano dura, delivery of public goods 
(mano extendida), and dialogue. He noted the challenges associated with 
direct dialogue: the legitimization of illegal actions and violent offenders; 
and the difficulty of dialoguing with often non-hierarchical, decentralized 
groups and multiple parties.
Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer, Vice Chief of Defence 
Staff, Trinidad and Tobago, drew the attention of participants to the parallel 
challenges in the Caribbean basin. He emphasized that many of the small 
Caribbean island nations suffered not only from the legacy of colonialism 
and dependence but also from the lack of resources to deal with high crime 
rates and corruption associated with trafficking in narcotics and arms as 
well as money laundering and cyber-crime. He added that those problems 
are compounded by the fact that institutions are weak and leadership in the 
region tends to pursue policies and strategies which are not adequate to at-
tain their goals. He expressed some degree of pessimism about the capacity 
of the region to surmount these obstacles without major institutional reforms 
and significant external assistance from Canada, the United States, and other 
nations along with the private sector and civil society.
Several presenters addressed the issue of multinational cooperation, and 
their assessments were not uniformly positive. Former U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Frank O. Mora, noted that the last time a large number 
of countries in the hemisphere reached a major regional agreement was a 
decade ago with the 2003 Mexico City Declaration on security. Mora noted 
the resistance to U.S. initiatives in the region, for instance in response to pro-
posals for the way in which militaries respond to natural disasters. Mora had 
little positive to say about the effectiveness of either the OAS or CARICOM, 
both of which he identified as “chattering organizations” which promote 
idealistic agreements but leave them largely unfunded and ineffective. Part 
of the problem, he noted, is the weakness of state institutions and of many 
of the states themselves, lacking the strength and authority to make effective 
multilateral commitments and leaving multilateral challenges to the small 
number of stronger states to address. Another part of the problem, in his 
view, is the continuing resilience of narrow conceptions of sovereignty which 
make it difficult to reach meaningful multilateral agreements and commit-
ments at a time when the challenges that confront the region are challenges 
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without borders. For Mora there is a need to develop a new framework or 
set of institutions capable of addressing these complex problems, but he 
did not express optimism that such a framework would emerge in the near 
future. Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue ex-
pressed equally pessimistic sentiments about the value and performance of 
multinational institutions and the quality of multilateral delegations. Hakim 
echoed Mora’s analysis that such collective commitments as the 2001 Inter-
American Democratic Charter have not been effective in defending democ-
racy, citing the recent examples of Venezuela and Paraguay. He suggested 
that there is not even a clear consensus about what constitutes democratic 
norms, making it virtually impossible for the OAS to do more than engage in 
endless debates and send fact-finding missions when disputes arise.2 Hakim 
also noted the fragmented nature of economic relations in the hemisphere, 
with the region divided into camps. He noted that eleven countries have free 
trade agreements with Canada, the United States, and the European Union. 
Brazil has resisted overtures from North America and instead leads the 
seven-country Mercosur.
The concluding session at the conference was a roundtable with senior 
security officials and representatives of Canadian companies active in Latin 
America. The session was intended to explore the concrete and practical se-
curity challenges companies operating in the region face, how they respond 
to those challenges, and how they interact with their host communities. The 
conference was fortunate to have on the panel a number of individuals with 
Canadian police and intelligence operations experience as well as company 
officials responsible for corporate security, corporate social responsibility, 
and international business development. 
As noted earlier, one objective of the conference was to explore aspects 
of Canadian security policies and engagement in Latin America. Having for 
most of the Cold War years distanced itself from the region as a U.S. sphere of 
influence, Canada and its governments have been far more active in security, 
political and socio-economic development since joining the Organization of 
American States. Elections Canada has played an important role in helping 
to draft electoral laws and monitoring elections along with other regional 
and international agencies. Canadian military forces participated in ONUCA 
(UN Observation Group in Central America, 1989-92) and ONUSAL (UN 
Observation Group in El Salvador, 1991-92). The former operation was pri-
marily a verification and peace observation mission, in particular focused on 
the demobilization of the U.S.-backed Contras. The latter began primarily as 
a human rights monitoring mission but expanded into involvement with the 
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demobilization of certain military and police units which had been identi-
fied with severe human rights violations. In 2006 the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade established a Secretariat for the Americas 
Strategy announced by the Conservative government. In 2007 during a 
Latin American tour Prime Minister Stephen Harper identified the Americas 
as a policy priority and called for a re-engagement with the Americas. In 
Santiago, Chile, the Prime Minister identified three broad areas of policy 
focus: strengthening and promoting freedom, democracy and human rights, 
and the rule of law; building strong, sustainable economies; and meeting 
security challenges, including environmental and health risks. In the 2007 
Speech from the Throne the Harper government made a clear commitment 
to strengthening the Canadian security capacity.3 Canadian military, policy, 
and intelligence agencies have been increasingly active in the Caribbean and 
Latin America in the past decade. Canadian forces were from the outset part 
of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and Canadian police 
forces, especially the RCMP, have worked closely with their counterparts in 
the Caribbean and Latin America. The Canadian Security and Intelligence 
Service has officers placed in several key Latin American capitals.4 Canada 
has been an active participant in the Defense Ministerials of the Americas, 
hosting the 2008 meetings in Banff, Alberta. Canada also sent a strong dele-
gation to the Central American Security Conference in Guatemala in 2011, 
including a small civil society delegation. Canadian naval forces have also 
participated in the U.S.-led multinational Joint Interagency Task Force oper-
ating out of Key West engaged in narcotics interdiction in the Caribbean. 
In 2011, for instance, HMCS St. John’s participated in the recovery from a 
semi-submersible of a cargo of cocaine with a street value of US$180 million. 
The task force involves eight Latin American countries, plus the Netherlands, 
France, Spain, and Canada.Canadian Major-General D. Michael Day out-
lined for the conference participants some of the significant and basic issues 
relevant to the Canadian strategy for engagement in the Americas. He identi-
fied the current Canadian defence practices and the role of the Department 
of National Defence and Canadian Forces in the region. He contended that 
Canada’s approach needed to be hemispheric and global in scope since the 
challenges are global, not just regional in nature, and he noted that some of 
the lessons learned about combating narco-terrorism in Afghanistan could 
be applied in dealing with comparable issues in the Western Hemisphere. He 
stressed that Canadian security policy in the Caribbean and Latin America 
had to be developed within a climate of budgetary restraint. He noted the 
broad definition of what is considered a security challenge, including nat-
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ural disasters, illegal migration flows, border security, transnational crime 
and organizations, violence, drug trafficking, and the security of Canadians 
abroad. Major-General Day noted the value of Canadian contributions to 
peacekeeping and monitoring, education, training, exchange programs, and 
partnerships with other agencies and governments in the hemisphere. 
Ambassador Martin focused less on Canada’s military engagement and 
more on its contributions to peace and security programming in Colombia, 
where Canada has contributed some $32 million toward improving long term 
security by working with institutions that seek to safeguard human rights, 
citizen’s freedoms, and the rule of law. Canada has contributed to the import-
ant Colombian government’s land restitution program, to the Organization of 
American States’ support for the demobilization of illegal armed combatants, 
to the OAS peace mission (OAS-MAPP), and the project seeking to assist the 
victims of violence. Canada has played a particularly important role in sup-
porting the identification and removal of anti-personnel mines in Colombia 
and Central America as well as encouraging and supporting the Colombian 
government’s advisory role in Central American conflict resolution. 
The implications for Canadian policy of these security challenges in 
Latin America are numerous. It was evident from all presentations, even 
those which did not explicitly address Canadian policy, that high levels of 
violence in Latin America, organized crime, the lingering guerrilla insurgen-
cies and the various factors which give rise to those phenomena, and chal-
lenges associated with the quality of governance necessitate a higher level 
of commitment to the region than has traditionally been the case. Analysts 
note that the Americas Strategy has not resulted in any significant increase in 
foreign aid to the region, although there has been more focus on the security 
agenda by the Canadian government working bilaterally and multilaterally 
through the United Nations and the Organization of American States. It was 
also observed that the increased private sector investment in the region com-
bined with growing trade ties have implications for the image of Canada in 
the region and necessitate a close and effective working relationship between 
government and the private sector to ensure that international standards 
pertaining to the environment and human rights are observed. 
University of Calgary
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Notes
1 Ed. Note. In late May 2013 FARC and 
the Colombian government reached 
agreement on a number of agrarian 
issues.
2 Ed. Note. In June 2012 the Paraguay 
legislature removed leftist President 
Fernando Lugo from power. The 
United States and OAS Secretary 
General Insulza opposed the sus-
pension of Paraguay from the OAS. 
Venezuela, then still under President 
Hugo Chávez, and the other Bolivar-
ian republics sought suspension as did 
eighteen other hemispheric countries. 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico 
among others opposed. In contrast, in 
2009 the OAS suspended Honduras 
for what it argued was the uncon-
stitutional removal of President José 
Manuel Zelaya.
3 Stephen J. Randall, “Canada’s National 
Security Challenges in the Caribbean 
and Latin America,” Foreign Policy for 
Canada’s Tomorrow 7 (Toronto: Cana-
dian International Council, June 2010). 
4 Ed. Note. The conference did not 
address the security issues of Haiti 
which remain serious challenges.
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Building Security, Peace, and 
Prosperity in Colombia: The Role of 
Canada
Ambassador Tim Martin, Canadian Ambassador to 
Colombia
Introduction
It is always a great time to be the Ambassador of Canada in Colombia, but now more than ever as our Colombian friends are in the process of moving from a dark past into a bright future. But it is a complex moment, 
extremely demanding for the Colombian leadership, and it is a moment with 
implications for their Canadian friends in the public and private sectors. It re-
quires putting the victims of Colombia’s armed conflict at the centre of public 
policy. It involves Canadian investments to grow the economy responsibly 
and rapidly. It means doing all this in areas where there is still armed conflict 
and the presence of the state is inadequate. With the multi-faceted challenges 
it faces, one could say Colombia contains many of the security issues con-
fronting the region as a whole. What makes Colombia so instructive is that it 
is facing these challenges with three great assets:
• a strong and professional military and police; 
• a coherent and progressive package of social and economic 
policies including a victims- based peace policy; and
• international and regional support, not least in the fight 
against transnational organized crime.
Our relationship with Colombia is vital and dynamic because Canada 
and Colombia share many interests. We have a solid and growing relation-
ship that spans all three goals of Canada’s engagement in the Americas, 
which are: 
• to increase mutual economic opportunity;
• to strengthen security and institutions that safeguard free-
dom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; and
• to foster lasting relationships. 
Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 9, 2013
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These goals are at the core of our ongoing partnerships with friendly 
countries like Colombia as we work together towards a more prosperous, 
secure and democratic hemisphere. Our relationship with Colombia is one 
that we value greatly and that has been important in deepening our engage-
ment in the Americas. 
There are two themes I would like to focus on in particular. Firstly, the 
Colombian progress we observe in achieving security, human rights, and 
economic opportunity for its citizens; and secondly, the role and contribution 
of Canada as part of our engagement in the Americas. However, let me note 
that insecurity has been very costly for Colombia, and implementing solu-
tions is an urgent matter.
The human rights of Colombians have been badly violated by the armed 
conflict which is arguably the biggest challenge for contemporary Colombian 
governments. The military confrontation with the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and with the National Liberation Army (ELN) 
are the primary and best known drivers of the armed conflict, though greatly 
diminished in strategic terms over the last decade. At the same time, success 
in the form of dismantling the country’s paramilitary groups has brought 
new challenges with it and the actions of criminal bands, known as BACRIM, 
are responsible for many abuses.
The proliferation of an array of emerging BACRIM groups following the 
end of the demobilization of the paramilitaries in 2006 remains a major chal-
lenge for President Santos’ security efforts and the implementation of some 
of his flagship policies. Following the demobilization process, these groups 
have consolidated their presence in between 10 percent and 20 percent of 
the country’s municipalities and have managed to maintain between 2,000 
and 3,500 members for the last four years. Their pragmatic nature has also 
led them to reach temporary local cooperation pacts with the FARC and the 
ELN. Although drug trafficking remains their main source of income, some 
of these groups are heavily linked to local delinquent gangs involved in 
small scale extortion, retail drug dealing, illegal mining, and contraband. In 
some cases, their resilience has become an obstacle for the implementation of 
assistance to victims of the armed conflict.
In fact, it is often observed that that there are three dimensions to the 
Colombian security challenge: the guerilla, the BACRIM, and common crim-
inality. As a result of its armed conflict, Colombia has among the highest 
number of displaced people in the world, at some four million. 
Among the most vulnerable groups have been human rights defenders, 
those in the vanguard of land restitution for the displaced, and children. 
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Also, Colombia has the highest number of landmine victims in the Americas 
and the second highest in the world after Afghanistan. In 2012 the country 
reported 479 victims, of which fifty-two children were injured and twelve 
were killed by landmines. 
With respect to labour rights, there have been great advances. As a mat-
ter of fact, our Free Trade Treaty has a side agreement on labour. But there 
is much more work to do because Colombia has been qualified as one of the 
most dangerous countries in the world for union leaders.
Poverty is also an issue and its reduction is a major concern of Colombian 
policy makers. In 2012, 34.1 percent of Colombians were living in poverty and 
10.6 percent in extreme poverty. While remarkable progress has been made, 
the presence of the Colombian government remains uneven and limited in 
certain rural areas, especially those areas affected by armed conflict. As a 
result, the Colombian state has not yet fully completed its task to protect and 
provide basic services to all Colombians. 
It is a work in progress and Canada continues to promote and support 
efforts to address the situation. For example, Canada is among the top donors 
to the programs of the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees in Colombia and we pay particular attention 
to Colombia’s progress in meeting its human rights commitments such as 
UNSC resolution 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict.
Why It Matters to Canada
The kind of insecurity we see in Colombia and its consequences also matter 
because of Canada’s interest in and commitment to working with partners 
towards regional and international security. The fact is, Canada is a country 
of the Americas, and this is our home. Insecurity anywhere in the Americas 
poses threats to our friends and neighbours across the hemisphere, but also 
to Canada and Canadian interests; including tourists, businesses, diaspora 
communities, and investors. What happens in the neighbourhood has an 
impact on everyone in the neighbourhood. 
We have found that working with Colombia, and with our other neigh-
bours in the Americas, to prevent and address crime inside their borders is 
beneficial to us all. It enriches their security and also prevents crime from 
flowing into other countries. We do this because we recognize the import-
ance of supporting a country’s own efforts and in recognition of the inter-
connectedness of our hemisphere. 
It is a truism that durable solutions to security problems cannot be 
achieved in the absence of good governance and the rule of law. And here 
building security, peace, and prosperity in colombia
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it is very important to recognize progress and momentum, as well as the 
potential for Colombian leadership through demonstration in the region. 
For example, President Santos has made Colombian accession to the OECD 
the first priority in his international agenda. This is not because he wants 
Colombia to be on the list of rich countries. He calls it “the club of best prac-
tices.” This commitment to good governance, at the very top is a key enabler 
for all the rest that has to happen.
Colombia is walking the talk and examples abound. Colombia has an 
open and liberalized economy. Tax reforms are being implemented to in-
crease formalized employment and competitiveness without changing the 
government take. Specialized agencies have been created to reduce poverty 
and eliminate extreme poverty, and Colombia has successfully encouraged 
responsible foreign investment and improvement in the distribution of 
royalties for the benefit of all Colombians. Colombia is also contributing to 
international good governance efforts already. It is active in the anti-money 
laundering work of the OECD and has, with Canadian support, established a 
contact point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
What Colombians and Canadians are discovering is that we have shared 
values that cement our relationship and our ability to work together. We 
agree that any vision for economic and social development needs practical 
expression in sensible public policies, both domestically and internationally. 
Moreover, this focus on good public policy is a healthy contrast to other gov-
ernments in the region who prefer ideological and populist approaches. 
For this reason, the continued success of Colombia is in our interest, 
as is its growing capacity for regional and international leadership. The 
Ministerial and Summit of the New Pacific Alliance in Cali, Colombia in May 
2013 (of which Canada was an observer) is another good example of this posi-
tive Colombian leadership in our hemisphere. In other words, the success of 
Colombia matters, not just to Colombia, not just to Canada, but also to the 
region as a whole. 
Canada’s Contributions to Peace and Security in Colombia
Over the last six years, Canada has contributed some $32 million in specific 
peace and security programming in Colombia. And these projects have gen-
erated very important results. Here are some of the areas where we have 
been investing in peace and security.
Since its initiation in 2005, Canada has supported the transitional justice 
process initiated by the Government of Colombia with the Peace and Justice 
Law. This law gave rise to the demobilization of ex-combatants and the estab-
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lishment of institutions for assistance and reparation of victims of the armed 
conflict. Restitution mechanisms have been created including a Center for 
Historical Memory, fast-track methods for investigation of conflict-related 
crimes and institutions to assist victims. 
While only fourteen sentences have been rendered against former com-
batants, on the subject of truth, much has been accomplished. Over 77,000 
victims have participated in criminal proceedings against former combat-
ants. For example, demobilized paramilitaries have confessed to a total of 
25,757 homicides and 1046 massacres. These are chilling numbers, but estab-
lishing the facts of these cases is critical for Colombia to move on, and for 
families to know for certain the fate of missing loved ones. 
In June 2011 the Victims and Land Restitution law was approved, thanks 
to which 157,800 victims have received reparations. This is a shining example 
of the State of Colombia taking responsibility to address the problems of the 
armed conflict as it affects the citizens of Colombia.
Many observers of the armed conflict in Colombia say that the issue of 
land contains the roots of the conflict and the seeds of peace. Canada was 
among the first supporters of Colombia’s effort to redress massive issues of 
dispossession with policies and programs to return land to their rightful 
owners. Like so much of Colombia’s efforts, the high level of policy ambition 
corresponds to the great depth of problems the state needs to address. Our 
role has been to help the Government of Colombia bring its policies closer to 
the client. This has involved the opening of “store-front offices” around the 
country for victims of dispossession to open their files, complete their cases, 
and have them forwarded to specialized judges for decision. The first judicial 
decision was handed out in October 2012 restituting sixty-five hectares to four-
teen families. The process is accelerating, and there are currently some 34,000 
claims registered for 2.2 million hectares of land. The task is daunting, but it 
is also inspirational to see Colombian officials rolling up their sleeves to find 
ways to make this work and to see Colombian farmers who were displaced 
stepping up to claim their rights and re-establish their roots in their land.
Canada was among the first in supporting international verification 
of demobilization processes, and our support continues to this day. Here 
the unsung hero is the Organization of American States (OAS) Mission to 
Support the Peace Process (MAPP), which has been on the ground and do-
ing a low profile, field-based effort that has been critical to the success of 
demobilization so far. More than 51,000 combatants have been demobilized. 
Much more has to be done and the processes for addressing the challenges 
of eventual demobilization of FARC and ELN fighters are yet to be defined. 
building security, peace, and prosperity in colombia
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The OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process has not only played an 
oversight role, but has also strengthened institutions along the way that will 
help sustain the effort in the long run. Our contributions to the OAS MAPP 
and to the government entities charged with addressing the needs of victims 
of the conflict have been important expressions of Canadian efforts to im-
prove security and to do so for the long-term by working with institutions 
that will protect and safeguard citizens’ freedom, human rights, democracy, 
and the rule of law. 
A very good news story from 2012 involves work of the OAS and the 
Colombian humanitarian de-mining battalion of which Canada is a major 
supporter. It is a remarkable example of cooperation in which OAS civil-
ians work with communities to identify mined areas for clearance by the 
Colombian military. In this case it is an unarmed and specially uniformed 
humanitarian de-mining battalion. The headline of this good news story was 
certification of the Municipality of San Carlos as the first mine-free munici-
pality in Colombia. The best news is what demining enabled in terms of the 
return of 286 families to their homes, land, and schools. 
Of course, the top of mind peace and security issue today is the negotia-
tions to end the armed conflict between the Government of Colombia and 
the FARC, the major insurgent group in the country. These are taking place 
according to a carefully designed and agreed agenda witnessed by Norway, 
Cuba, Chile, and Venezuela. The five issues under discussion are very 
specific. They are:
1. Rural development and agrarian reform;
2. Citizen participation and guarantees for political opposition;
3. End of conflict provisions including a cease fire, demobiliza-
tion, disarmament and reintegration;
4. A solution to the issue of illicit drugs; and
5. Victims and reparations.
The specificity is significant. These negotiations are not about all aspects 
of Colombian policy, but rather they are about the five agenda items, nor is 
there a cease-fire. The Colombian security forces continue their efforts to se-
cure all territory and citizens at the same time as the negotiations take place 
in Havana.
Canada has formally communicated to the Government of Colombia 
Canada’s policy to support President Santos’ entry into negotiations. At the 
same time, FARC remains on Canada’s list of terrorist organizations. If these 
19
tim martin
negotiations prove to result in an agreement, and the greater percentage of 
FARC combatants reintegrate into licit activities, then we are on the verge 
of the end of armed conflict in our hemisphere. And if they do not, we have 
good reasons to be encouraged by efforts focused on victims, the broad 
deceleration of the armed conflict, improvement in human rights, and the 
momentum of Colombia’s strategic policy directions.
And there is another piece of good news: Colombia is now a mentor on 
regional security, which Canada is a part of as well. We are working with 
Colombia to share its security sector expertise with Central American coun-
tries struggling with weak government institutions, limited government 
reach throughout the countries, and the increasing presence of transnational 
organized crime and the violence associated with it. 
The security situation in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, 
particularly as a result of transnational organized crime and illicit drug traf-
ficking and its associated violence, poses a significant challenge to the hemi-
sphere. Nobody knows this better than Colombia, which has learnt valuable 
lessons through hard won advances and, with Canadian support, is sharing 
its expertise with Guatemala and Honduras. A trend has been observed in 
which Guatemala and Honduras are preferred entry points for the move-
ment of illicit drugs northward from South America. Colombia is providing 
expertise and training to help the Guatemalan and Honduran authorities 
interdict this illicit traffic on land, on sea, and in the air.
Intelligence sharing at the regional level is a critical dimension of 
staying a step ahead of the criminals. In this respect, Canada is providing 
$1.5 million in funding for Interpols Regional Intelligence Gathering and 
Criminal Analysis project which provides specialized regional training for 
law enforcement officers in Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean to 
effectively gather and analyze criminal intelligence and data as they relate 
to illicit narcotics. Sharing real-time information among countries is an es-
sential element in the successful investigation and prosecution of crimes. 
Canadian Contributions to Prosperity
Unfortunately, the scope of this discussion does not permit me to describe in 
further detail the work of the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) to prevent and protect children from recruitment by illegal armed 
actors, the new robust bilateral defense MOU we are implementing, the work 
of the RCMP with its regional counterparts, and the security work of the 
Canadian Navy in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. Instead, I will turn to 
the Calgary connection. 
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Canada views increased engagement through trade and commercial-
economic ties as one of the best ways to support positive change and growth 
in the Americas. With fifty-two Canadian petroleum and mining companies 
operating 240 projects in twenty-nine of Colombia’s thirty-two departments, 
the security environment involves significant policy implications for the 
extractive sector. Of course, in Colombia the big story is about oil. We have 
some nineteen Canadian exploration and production companies working in 
this sector in Colombia with a combined market cap of over $10 billion, most 
with their head offices right here in Alberta. 
Moreover, Canada’s role in Colombia matters. Some 50 percent of oper-
ated production and about 30 percent of net production in Colombia is 
thanks to Canadian companies in the context of over a million barrels a day 
production in the territory of the Republic of Colombia.
The role of resources in national development was the core message in 
Prime Minister Harper’s address to the Business Forum at the Summit of 
the Americas in Cartagena in 2012. He began by saying that “[…]resource 
development has vast power to change the way a nation lives. It is also 
something which is tremendously responsive to the actions of government. 
Today I want to talk to you briefly about how to maximize the value of this 
great industry for a country and its people.” Prime Minister Harper ended 
with an invitation: “[…]we believe in Canada that we have found the way 
to transform resource assets into a sustainable foundation for equitable na-
tional development. And it is also an area in which we are more than pleased 
to work cooperatively with willing partners for mutual benefit.”
Colombia is one of the willing partners, and we saw that here in Alberta 
and British Columbia just last month in a remarkable event in which the 
Colombian environmental and regulatory leadership came to Calgary and 
Fort St. John to see how we manage our sector in Canada. It is a source of 
pride that Canada was the destination for this innovation in regulatory dip-
lomacy. I believe it is also the beginning of an important new relationship. 
Why talk about the extractive sector and security in the same presenta-
tion? Two reasons come to mind immediately. Firstly, in a conflict affected 
country like Colombia, the imperative for corporate social responsibility is 
very strong. Moreover, many resource projects are in areas that have suffered 
from conflict and the attendant social tensions can linger long. Fortunately, 
Canada has a strong policy that integrates business and human rights. The 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights is a key piece and the 
Embassy of Canada as well as leading Canadian companies are active mem-
bers of the Colombian group promoting its implementation. It is called the 
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Mining and Energy Committee and it is chaired by President Santos’ national 
security advisor. 
Secondly, there is a new phenomenon that we might as well call criminal 
gold mining. This is illicit mining conducted by criminal organizations and 
sometimes with the collusion of illegal armed actors, providing working cap-
ital for future crimes. Criminal mining is visible in many areas of Colombia. 
Its primary visual manifestation is of large excavators aggressively mining 
alluvial gold and polluting rivers. What is not so visible is the unregulated 
use of mercury and cyanide for refining. There is an urgent need to replace 
criminal mining with responsible and formal mining that is inclusive of the 
artisanal miners who have been making an honest living for centuries from 
small scale mining. Here Canada is working to build dialogue around sus-
tainable solutions and looking for ways to help the Government of Colombia 
formalize and professionalize the artisanal sector. As part of our engagement 
in Colombia and in the Americas, we are working to improve responsible 
natural resource development by sharing Canada’s world-class expertise 
in corporate social responsibility practices. This is a critical and distinctive 
contribution by Canada to peace, security, and development in the region, 
and one that will expand as the new Canadian International Institute on 
Extractive Industries and Development (CIIEID) takes off. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to recall that it was six years ago that Prime 
Minister Harper launched Canada’s engagement in the Americas as a for-
eign policy priority. Today, our engagement in the Americas and in Colombia 
is stronger than ever. Canada is a partner in peace and security, a trusted 
investor and a reliable friend. Canada has been present and made the right 
kind of contributions at the right time while Colombia has made rapid and re-
markable progress. As Canadians, we have a stake in Colombia’s success and 
we are making a significant contribution through our development assist-
ance, peace and security projects, and through the investments of Canadian 
companies which are generating growth and opportunity for Colombians. 
In Colombia, Canada is working to build a stable foundation for our long-
term engagement and increased influence in the hemisphere. I hope you will 
agree with me when I say that Canada is the ideal partner for Colombia, our 
commitment is for the long-term, and the future is bright.
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The Canadian Military and Latin 
American Security Challenges 
Major-General D. Michael Day, Director General, 
International Security Policy, Department of National 
Defence, Canada1
Major-General Day shared his knowledge and experience as Director General, International Security Policy. Building on his recent travels throughout South America, Major-General Day addressed 
some of the significant and basic issues relevant to the Canadian strategy 
for engagement in the Americas as well as the current defence practices of 
Canada in the hemisphere, the Department of National Defence (DND) and 
Canadian Forces (CF) partnership in the Americas, security challenges, how 
DND addresses these security issues, and the creation and future of the 
Canadian Defence approach. Throughout his presentation, Major-General 
Day emphasized the partnership, cooperation, and dialogue between the na-
tions of Latin America and the DND/CF. Cognizant of operating in an “area 
of fiscal restraint,” Day argued that the best force is a tax-effective modest 
force. 
Major-General Day reiterated the importance of the region to Canada, as 
was evidenced by the Western Hemisphere strategy, one of only two official 
strategies of this kind (the other being the Arctic strategy). Major-General 
Day lauded peacekeeping, language courses, and military training pro-
vided in Canada, formal defence agreements in the region, and highlighted 
Canada’s participation throughout the Americas. He outlined a myriad of 
issues and practices to combat existing challenges such as: countering illegal 
migration flows; dealing with natural disasters; protecting Canadian tour-
ists; and addressing transnational criminal organizations, violence, and drug 
trafficking. 
Major-General Day espoused that cooperation and capacity-building 
were vital in the Caribbean, and South and Central America in addressing 
these cross border threats, stating that he believed there were only “global 
security issues not regional security issues.” Citing extensive visits through-
out the region by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Major-General 
Day described progress with DND/CF in training, education, exchange, and 
placement opportunities throughout the hemisphere, and recounted the 
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operations of CP Hamlet where partnerships, education, and training were 
advancing. 
Day noted that practices such as anti-narco-terrorism learned in 
Afghanistan were aiding in the Americas. He highlighted the importance of 
a hemispheric over regional focus, and identified Chile as a very impressive 
example of both a regional and global participant, crediting their worldview. 
Day again re-iterated the need for effective, meaningful, and long-term en-
gagement and partnerships in the region to combat threats, build capacity, 
and bolster relations. 
He concluded by admonishing that Canada’s role or involvement in the 
hemisphere would increase in the future, as the region was deemed signifi-
cant. His final section of the presentation illustrated the “main tenets of our 
(DND/CF) approach.” Here he shared current practices such as: coordinating 
and partnering with governments and governmental agencies for long-term 
relations; operating in a fiscally-responsible manner to ensure that relations 
are benefitting all parties involved; and lastly, he returned to a point which 
he had made earlier in his presentation—being attentive and aware of the 
“defence-security nexus.” Nevertheless, he admitted that while these meas-
ures did not constitute the total solution to the problems of the region, they 
were significant to the resolution.
Note
1 Summary of presentation prepared by Adam Cahill, University of Calgary.
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Introduction: Canadian Private Sector 
Engagement
Dr. Stephen J. Randall, Director, Latin American 
Research Centre, University of Calgary
In recent years the role of the private sector in Latin America, especially in the natural resource extraction industries, has become more complex and controversial. There have been pressures from host governments, local 
communities and countries in which companies are incorporated to ensure 
that corporate practices are in keeping with the highest standards of corpor-
ate social responsibility. One reflection of that broader societal concern with 
the role of Canadian natural resource extraction companies abroad was the 
focus on the mining industry, which such NGOs as Mining Watch brought to 
bear in 2011-2012 in support of Bill C-300. Bill C-300 was a private members bill 
tabled by Liberal Member of Parliament John McKay. The legislation, which 
its advocates argued was a response to allegations of human rights abuses 
and environmental damage inflicted by Canadian firms operating abroad, 
proposed giving the government authority to investigate complaints against 
resources companies operating abroad, and withholding public money from 
offenders. The bill came to a vote by Members of Parliament in 2012 and was 
defeated by a vote of 140-134. Some viewed the legislation as impractical, 
others as a missed opportunity.1 Whatever the reality, the fact that it gained a 
significant degree of support among legislators and a number of NGOs is an 
indication that the concerns are widespread and one can anticipate that civil 
society will continue to press for Canadian government attention to human 
rights and environmental challenges in the region.
In some contexts, especially in conflict zones, companies also face secur-
ity challenges. The closing panel at the conference brought together security 
specialists and company executives in the security and business develop-
ment areas from the oil and natural gas industry and gold mining to discuss 
the kinds of security challenges they face and how they respond to them. 
Discussion ranged from a focus on hard security, including relations with 
private security contractors, local militaries, and military consultants to 
corporate social responsibility, community relations, and popular culture. 
This section includes the presentations of only two of the panelists and brief 
references to the others.
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Among the speakers in the closing session, John Noyes, Director of 
Corporate Security for Goldcorp and a former RCMP officer, discussed the 
challenge of security management and the costs of social conflict. He noted 
that the rise of transnational criminal organizations particularly in Latin 
America has considerably increased security challenges, whether ensuring 
protection for employees and their families or company property. He ob-
served that companies such as Goldcorp recognize that they have to ensure 
that security operations are conducted in conformity with international 
standards and the protection of human rights. Mark Lalonde, Director, CKR 
Global Risk Solutions and a former Program Director of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia, echoed many of John Noyes’ assessments of the security 
environment in the region. Gary Finley, Director of Corporate Security for 
Petrominerales, a Calgary-based oil company which operates primarily in 
Colombia but also has start-up operations in Peru and Brazil, focused his 
analysis on the company’s security management programs. Finley reported 
that the company’s hard security challenges derive from the two leading 
guerrilla insurgencies, which have been defined since 9/11 at least as narco-
terrorist organizations, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and 
the ELN (National Liberation Army) as well as from criminal gangs which 
are largely restructured paramilitary organizations following the large scale 
demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) over 
the past decade. Paul Nelson, Director of Global Security at Nexen, Canada, 
focused his discussion on the company’s community relations and corporate 
social responsibility policies. He stressed that Nexen is committed to partner-
ing with community members and other stakeholders where they operate, 
building long-term trust by sharing information, consulting with stakehold-
ers about business decisions, and working collaboratively to understand the 
needs and expectations of local communities. Jeff Collins of Calgary-based 
Grantierra also emphasized the need of companies to work collaboratively 
with local communities in which they operate.
Terry Blevins, Mexico Security Manager for Yamana Gold, adopted an 
entirely different approach in his presentation in an attempt to explain the 
relationship between popular culture and narco-terrorism in Mexico. He 
stressed that government officials, military, police, and companies operat-
ing in Mexico need to understand the extent to which the images of drug 
lords have invaded popular culture in the country, impacting the hearts and 
minds especially of disadvantaged youth in society. A great deal of popular 
music, online videos, cinema, and even quasi-religious imagery glamorize 
the powerful lives of drug lords, creating a counter-culture of criminality. 
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Folk saints have emerged as “protectors” of those involved in the drug trade, 
whether it is “Santa Muerte” in Mexico City or “Jesús Malverde” in Sinaloa. 
Blevins indicated that “Jesús Malverde” images appear on both sides of the 
U.S.-Mexico border.2
Although Glenn Faass, Managing Partner of Norton Rose Group law 
firm in Bogotá spoke on an earlier panel, his discussion of the Rule of Law 
has particular applicability to the discussion of private sector operations in 
the region. Faass presented World Bank data on the extent to which Latin 
American countries adhered to the rule of law, with Chile not surprisingly 
the leading country in the region and Venezuela one of the weakest, with a 
ranking which placed it on a par with Chad and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. Faass presented data on levels of corruption and the ease of 
doing business in individual countries. He noted Colombia and Brazil have 
both shown considerable improvements in those areas in recent years. He 
added that although Brazil is considered a country where it is still chal-
lenging to conduct business, the country nonetheless has a comparatively 
low corruption ranking. Faass predicted that Mexico, Venezuela and to a 
slightly lesser extent Argentina, can be expected to experience economic 
challenges in the future unless they improve their rankings. Rule of Law is 
Figure 1. Jesús Malverde: protector and patron saint of drug traffickers. 
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only one of the six World Bank Governance Indicators. The others are Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption. The contrasts 
between Chile and Venezuela in the 2011 rankings are striking. Taking only 
two of the criteria, Control of Corruption and Regulatory Quality, the re-
spective percentiles for Chile are 91.9 and 93.4; for Venezuela by contrast they 
are 7.6 and 6.2. Colombia and Mexico are close in terms of regulatory quality 
(60.7 and 61.1 percentile respectively), but Argentina fares badly in the same 
category at 25.1 percentile.3
Notes
1 For the missed opportunity perspec-
tive see Penelope Simons and Audrey 
Macklin, Globe and Mail, 23 August 
2012.
2 See the work of Howard Campbell 
an Anthropologist at the University 
of Texas El Paso. “Drug Trafficking 
Stories: Everyday forms of Narco-
folklore on the U.S.-Mexico border,” 
International Journal of Drug Policy 16:5 
(October 2005): 326-33.
3 Ed. Note. World Bank Data is from 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/sc_chart.asp. Accessed 5 June 
2013.
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Challenges of Security Management
John Noyes, Director-Corporate Security, Goldcorp 
There are two main issues that concern the private sector on an ongoing basis; firstly, the challenge of security management and secondly, the costs of social conflict. There are the obvious costs of physical 
security, which are higher in remote locations, but above that there are costs 
that do not turn up as budget line items but that can impact operating costs. 
Regardless of industry, companies are spending more than ever on security, 
and the cost to protect our people, assets, and reputation are increasing, par-
ticularly as companies move into areas of higher risk in pursuit of economic 
deposits to mine. Security within mining companies is often seen as a cost 
center, and not something that contributes to production. This perception 
is slowly changing particularly as we move into more difficult regions in 
search of quality deposits. 
We have a duty of care to employees, especially expats. This has been a 
challenge in recent years with the rise in transnational criminal organiza-
tions particularly in Latin America. Executive protection and added security 
measures for families that were once considered perks are now essential, and 
substantially raise the cost of doing business. Associated insurance costs, 
plus vendors and contractors who refuse to provide goods and services in 
some areas, all impact our margins. In some areas the threat of extortion 
is now the principal concern for private sector operations, rivaling theft of 
copper and fuel, corruption, and internal fraud for preventative and investi-
gational resources.
The Challenge of Security Management
In past years, responsibility for security often fell to the Safety or Human 
Resources Manager who contracted a private security provider and ex-
pected them to hire, train, and supervise security personnel. Little consider-
ation was given to the need for contractors to implement security policies, 
procedures or rules of engagement such as Use of Force. Many companies 
now realize they cannot contract away their responsibilities to ensure secur-
ity operations are conducted in a manner that conforms to international 
standards and respects human rights. To that end, investment in proper 
supervision for proprietary and contract security staff, plus recurrent train-
ing, is essential.
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In many Latin American countries there are few enforced regulations 
for security companies, and many operators are unlicensed. It is very com-
mon for many contracted security providers to have an internal system of 
“deductions” subjectively applied to the front line personnel for costs (such 
as uniforms) and offences (such as dirty boots). Left unaddressed through 
supervision, this will impact morale and ultimately the service you receive.
The average uniformed security guards in many of the countries we 
operate have no more than a grade four to six education. After a short train-
ing course they are provided a shot gun (they may have been allowed to fire 
the weapon once) then told to protect our facility. It is unreasonable to expect 
these well-meaning, often locally hired, security guards to understand con-
cepts such as Use of Force. Most are not provided options, such as pepper 
spray or a baton, and training, such as in the legal parameters of their author-
ity or what is expected in respecting human rights. 
At Goldcorp we ensure security at our sites is managed by proprietary 
supervisors or managers that report directly to the mine manager. It is always 
challenging to find experienced security professionals to manage this func-
tion, and occasionally there is resistance to the additional personnel costs. 
Security, like safety, should be seen as an investment. It is value added 
when properly conducted in a manner that enables geologist and exploration 
crews to add resources and reserves, allows unencumbered site development 
and exploitation permitting, and ultimately takes a project through produc-
tion and into closure with minimal interruption. Investing in higher security 
standards pays dividends by attracting ethical investors and shareholders 
who demand compliance with the industry best practices and international 
standards. It also minimizes conflict with the communities in our area of 
influence. 
Cost of Community Conflict
Latin America presents unique challenges and opportunities to mining com-
panies, but there are often disconnects between the promotion of a mining 
project by national governments and the resulting negative reaction within 
local communities. Some of this can be attributed to an elevated awareness of 
mining companies’ Corporate Social Responsibilities programs and greater 
expectations for the benefits mining brings. Unrealized or oversold expecta-
tions often lead to conflict.
According to the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America, 176 
mining projects in the region are currently in conflict with 231 communities 
(March 2013). Community issues with mining companies usually focus on 
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allegations of insufficient community consultation, environmental damage, 
and human rights abuses. This is compounded by a lack of trust in a national 
government to enforce social and environmental laws, which provides fertile 
ground for anti-mining and social NGOs.
The widespread use of mobile devises and social media has facilitated 
the exchange of information to the extent where simultaneous protests can 
be organized from Canada to Argentina. A common theme for protestors 
is the lack of community consultation in accordance with International 
Labour Organization Convention No. 169 (ILO 169) and The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: this is the right to redress 
for lands, territories and resources that could be adversely affected and a 
commitment by the state to obtain the free, prior and informed consent 
of indigenous peoples before the approval of any project affecting their 
lands or territories and other resources. Countries experiencing the highest 
number of mining-related violent conflicts are usually those that lack the 
institutional structures to enforce the laws, or international conventions 
such as ILO 169, they have ratified. While companies do actively engage 
in community consultation, it is very common for NGOs to organize their 
own community consultations, which in many cases result in a rejection of 
mining.
Many of the conflicts mining operations face in Latin America can also 
be traced back to simmering, unresolved political, economic, social, and eco-
logical issues. A failure to recognize, map and address these issues before 
they arrive at the mine gate can lead to physical confrontation, costly losses 
in project development or production, and the need to spend time, energy, 
and money in response. 
Some of the costs most difficult to quantify are from lost productivity 
and those associated with the inability to pursue projects and opportunities 
for expansion as a result of company-community conflict. Additionally, ex-
penditures for further studies and reports, legal advice and staff time when 
conflicts arise affect the viability of a project.
In terms of lost productivity, a major mining project with a capital ex-
penditure of between US$3-5 billion can realize about US$20 million per 
week of delayed production if shut down. Even at the exploration stage, 
losses can be over US$10,000 for every day of delay in terms of wages, idle 
machinery, and production. The working assumption is that 5 percent of an 
asset manager’s time will be spent managing social risk, but in reality this 
can easily be over 10 percent for senior managers, and higher for department 
managers. 
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Companies operating in areas of conflict or weak governance must take 
additional steps to mitigate risk and promote a positive security environment. 
There are opportunities to strengthen government institutions, such as pub-
lic security forces, and to operate in a transparent manner. Implementation 
and adherence to international standard such as the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights should form the basis of the security manage-
ment plan. 
The ability to accurately assess risks present in a company’s operating 
environment is critical to the security of personnel, local communities, and 
assets. A multidisciplinary team needs to regularly consider security, pol-
itical/regulatory, economic, taxation, legal, corruption, environment, social, 
and industry specific issues and changes. 
By addressing real and perceived community concerns, and working to 
resolve disputes before they escalate, companies have an opportunity to re-
duce the risk of actions such as blockades, protests, anti-mining campaigns, 
legal suits or sabotage, thereby also reducing social conflict and the costs to 
the company. An early investment in appropriate security that is proportion-
ate to identified threats is money well spent. 
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Petrominerales: Security Management 
Programs in Colombia
Gary Finley, Director-Corporate Security, 
Petrominerales
Petrominerales is a Canadian oil company with corporate head office located in Calgary, Alberta. Our operations are primarily located in Colombia, where we have been working for nearly eleven years. We 
also have startup operations in Peru and Brazil.
My discussion will focus on Colombia where we have operations in 
various departments (or, as we know in Canada, provinces). Our Colombian 
head office is in Bogotá and the majority of our employees in Colombia, 
numbering some 200, are Colombian nationals. We also have four expatriate 
families residing in Bogotá. 
In addition, we have nearly two hundred personnel with contracted 
services, primarily located in field operations. Added to this personnel 
count, frequent visits are made to Colombia by corporate executives, en-
gineers, geologists, accountants, and various other professionals. Thus, our 
security management programs involve not only security for personnel 
and assets in Colombia but also protective programs for visiting corporate 
professionals.
In the context of security challenges and the private sector, there are 
practical and policy issues that form the framework of our security man-
agement programs. Firstly, it is important to briefly identify the risks that 
we have faced in Colombia over the years. These risks emerge primarily 
from three hostile elements that have been active in the country for many 
decades:
1. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s 
Army (FARC) is an international recognized narco-terrorist 
organization.
2. The National Liberation Army (ELN) is also an international 
recognized narco-terrorist organization.
3. BACRIM refers to criminal gangs of organized criminals 
restructured after the demobilization of some 32,000 paramil-
itaries of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
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Suffice it to say that all three organizations are active in illicit drug ac-
tivities, kidnappings, sabotage, extortions, and various other crimes. Risks 
for the private sector depend on what part of the country companies oper-
ate. In this regard, our risk assessment process at Petrominerales provides 
matrix guidelines for management decision on security measures required 
to mitigate risks.
Security Infrastructure 
In order to address these risks, we have developed a security infrastructure 
that is designed for preventive and responsive measures to protect person-
nel and assets. We have established three levels of security in our security 
management program in Colombia:
1. Security Department: At the outset of operations in Colombia, 
a security department was created within the company, which 
consists of several Colombian nationals who are employees 
of Petrominerales. They serve various functions in the se-
curity department, ranging from Security Manager to Field 
Coordinators. The principle of employee positions within the 
company was to obtain experienced Colombian nationals with 
police and military backgrounds, enhancing loyalty through 
employee benefit positions. As part of this department, we 
also have on retainer a retired general from the Colombian 
Army, who serves as a special advisor within our security 
department.
2. Security Contractor: Security services for Petrominerales are 
required in Bogotá and the field. These are guard positions 
in various locations, as well as bodyguards (or escoltas). The 
escoltas provide services for expatriate families living in 
Bogotá and for corporate visitors. Every two years several 
security providers in Colombia are invited to bid for services 
with Petrominerales. This tendering process is examined by 
the company Contract Review Committee who awards final 
contract.
3. Military Agreements: From the outset of operations in 
Colombia eleven years ago, we have maintained excellent 
relations with the Colombian military. This started in the 
Putumayo department, adjacent to Ecuador where FARC 
threats were, and still are, a concern. These high risk areas are 
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under mandated jurisdiction of the military. Private security 
companies, and certainly the Petrominerales security depart-
ment, are unable to address these high risk areas alone; thus, 
military protection is required for personnel and assets. 
Formal agreements for use of the military are arranged between the 
Petrominerales legal branch and the Ministry of Defence. Our Petrominerales 
security policy is very clear on how and why we use the military. Agreements 
are very transparent, set out in accordance with regulations by the Colombian 
government. These regulations recognize that the private sector, in high risk 
areas of Colombia, is unable to operate without military protection.
As a practical example, we are currently drilling in an area in South 
Meta that at one time was covered in coca plantations. Through success by 
the authorities these plantations have been destroyed, FARC narco terror-
ists moved out of the area and we were able to proceed with our drilling 
plans. However, families and sympathizers of the FARC remain in the area, 
as do FARC militants in nearby mountain sanctuaries. This creates a high 
risk environment whereby military protection is required in circumference 
areas around drilling locations. Within the drilling site itself, security guards 
and a Petrominerales Security Coordinator are established for close quarter 
security of personnel and assets.
Support for the military is in the form of logistical support for soldiers 
on assignment to Petrominerales. No company support is provided in ways 
that assist offensive efforts by the military against the FARC and ELN. For 
example, we constructed a large shower and toilet facility in one of the army 
division locations, where soldiers are based and on rotational assignment 
to Petrominerales operations. In addition, our retired general on retainer 
works closely with these soldiers, reinforcing such matters as human rights 
protocols. To reiterate, then, we have three levels of security management 
in our company: Security Department, Security Contractor, and Military 
Agreements.
Indirect Impacts of Risks on Private Sector
I have provided a very brief overview of how we manage security in 
Petrominerales as it pertains to the direct impact of risks. In other words, 
things we can do ourselves to protect personnel and assets. But what about 
the indirect impact of risks? This is a question I often ask personnel in our 
security department. What are those elements beyond our control that will 
have an impact on our safety and what can be done about it?
petrominerales: security management programs in colombia
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The oil industry consists of several segments, some of which an oil 
company has control over and others it does not. The following are a few 
examples that could pose concern:
1. Seismic operations are the initial stages of any oil operation, 
whether it is in Alberta or whether it is in Colombia. It is often 
the case, as it is for Petrominerales in Colombia, that we do 
not assume security management responsibility for seismic 
operations. They are contract providers and experienced in 
conducting their seismic operations, often in areas where 
inhabitants are unfamiliar with oil companies. As well, with 
limited security presence, these seismic contractors are vul-
nerable to attack from hostile elements.
2. Other contractors working for the company have similar lia-
bilities. Water trucks, oil tankers, and equipment movements 
may come to the attention of hostile elements.
3. Another example involves soft targets, such as unguarded 
pipelines and utility sector infrastructures, which are often 
attacked. These FARC and ELN attacks are another example of 
the indirect impact of risks against the company. This threat 
is very real at present, as the FARC undergo peace talks with 
the Colombian government, their venue of negotiations being 
in Cuba. Yet as these peace talks unfold, FARC have escalated 
their attacks on pipelines in the Putumayo to unprecedented 
levels during February to April of this year. (For example 
52 attacks this year as compared to 13 for same period last 
year). Likewise, the ELN has committed pipeline attacks in 
other areas of the country, hoping to get on the peace talk 
bandwagon. This recent escalation of attacks on soft targets 
I identify as “political statements.” These terrorist groups feel 
they can gain negotiating advantages through such criminal 
acts. 
But what does this all mean for Petrominerales and similar Canadian 
interests operating in Colombia? It means that security management is often 
beyond our control. We can provide assistance to seismic companies arran-
ging for military liaison and we can mentor contractors on effective security 
management. 
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At the end of the day if something happens to these companies, it hap-
pens to us. An attack on a seismic company or an oil tanker creates a busi-
ness interruption of essential services. Likewise, attacks on pipelines, all of 
which cannot be guarded by the authorities, may create storage backups and 
bomb damage repairs—all of which may also create a business interruption 
for Petrominerales. First and foremost, we would not want anyone killed or 
injured in these incidents. Secondly, business interruptions often have a very 
detrimental effect on the financial side of our business.
In conclusion, there is a very real security challenge for the private sector 
in Colombia, including Canadian interests. Before any Canadian company 
considers doing business in the country it is very important to conduct a 
due diligence process of risk analysis. Security management will be required 
in varying degrees, dependent upon threats expected in different parts of 
the country. The private sector can do much within their own control to 
develop effective security management programs, and in this way risks can 
be mitigated for personnel and assets. I am proud that we in Petrominerales 
have been successful in that regard during the past eleven years. However, 
nothing is cast in stone and surprises are frequent. Certain hostile acts are 
beyond our protective control and business delay is a reality. Most hopefully, 
loss of life from these hostilities never becomes a reality.

II: 
reGIonal seCUrIty, 
HIstory, and trends
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Those Elusive Common Interests  
and Objectives: The Evolution of the 
Inter-American Security System
Hal Klepak, Royal Military College of Canada
This paper attempts to demonstrate that the inter-American security system has known periods of cohesion and cooperation as well as others of division and distrust and that these periods have resulted 
from the degree to which the members of the “system” could be said to truly 
share objectives and interests in the international and strategic context of the 
day. It will suggest that the evolution of the system has been anything but 
smooth and that while today’s divisions may be the most dramatic in the 
more than seventy years of the existence of the arrangements, they are far 
from the first.
It is perhaps worth remembering, when reflecting on these matters, that 
hemispheric cooperation in defence can hardly be considered natural or 
automatic in the Americas or anywhere else. Defence and security are the 
core elements of national societies and cooperation with others in alliances 
or other structures is far from the normal way of conducting national de-
fence, even for smaller powers and much less so for greater. Countries tend 
to wish to keep such matters firmly under their own control and as Antoine 
de Jomini argued so convincingly, alliances and defence cooperation are 
fraught with a lack of understanding, shared objectives, desires to do least 
but have the most political impact, and a myriad of other basic flaws and 
contradictions.
The Western Hemisphere: Ideal and Reality
If this has been true more widely in international affairs, it is equally so in 
the Americas. No one would conjure up easily an idea of Eastern Hemisphere 
cooperation in defence, or of Southern or even Northern. Yet in the Americas 
exactly such an idea has at least been present, if often only in rhetoric, for at 
least seven decades and there are structures, alliances, bilateral accords in 
this context, joint exercises, schools, meetings at high diplomatic and mil-
itary levels and low, exchanges among national armed forces, and all manner 
of real reflections of a hemispheric idea in defence. 
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This is the result of three factors: the overwhelming power of the United 
States in the Western Hemisphere, its status as the only international player 
of weight in the region, and the popularity of what became the Pan American 
ideal at least in the United States. The United States has for all this period 
been much more populous and rich than any other country in the Americas. 
Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, which at various times appeared as if they 
might be potential real rivals for the northern giant, were never actually able 
to compete with it. In no sphere was this clearer than in that of military cap-
acity. This asymmetry was mirrored elsewhere after the end of the U.S. Civil 
War when the influence of the United States on the regional and then global 
scene grew steadily and in impressive fashion culminating with the con-
struction of an actual U.S. empire after the defeat of Spain in the 1898 war and 
the transfer of essentially the whole of the Spanish Empire to Washington. 
The Pan American ideal, based on the belief that somehow the American 
republics were morally superior to the old regimes of Europe, and aiming to 
assure “the Americas for the Americans,” gained considerable credibility, at 
least in the United States, in the last years of the nineteenth and the first of 
the twentieth century. Thus a context appeared in which one could at least 
imagine an inter-American system distinct from wider global ones.
Inter-American Security Before the Eve of the Second World War
At first the idea of a Pan American Union (PAU) of nations, or at least a zone 
of economic cooperation in the hemisphere, did not include strictly political 
and certainly not defence considerations. The United States, anxious to re-
duce or even exclude European, and especially British, economic penetration 
of the region, sought something like a free trade area or a customs union but 
at the least the founding of a grouping of countries cooperating on economic 
matters, when it called for a first meeting of American nations to discuss 
such a group in Washington in 1889. Canada, a monarchy with an immensely 
strong British connection, was seen as a potential Trojan Horse for the British 
in any such initiative, and was not invited.1 Brazil, a monarchy when the 
idea of the conference was first put forward, was not to be invited either, but 
the military coup that brought in the republic in that country in that year, 
removed this obstacle and Rio de Janeiro was finally added to the list of those 
to attend as well as the other republics of the hemisphere.
Immediately, the contrasting objectives of the United States and the 
Latin American countries raised their heads. For in general, the latter were 
extremely keen on European investment, immigration, trade, technology, 
loans, and even military assistance missions as they modernized and en-
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tered the new international division of labour so rapidly developing in the 
years after 1870. While they wished for good relations with Washington, they 
did not see anything like an exclusive relationship with the United States as 
a good thing and many feared, as U.S. expansion into the region unfolded in 
the years after 1815, that without European counterpoise the situation could 
end up being very dangerous indeed. This feeling had been developing 
steadily since the U.S. seizure of East and West Florida while Spain was 
prostrate during the Napoleonic Wars, its support for the Texas rebellion in 
1835-6 and its acquisition of that vast territory a decade later, its defeat of 
Mexico in 1846-48 and the subsequent taking of half that country’s northern 
spaces, its support for “filibustering” invasions of various Caribbean and 
Central American countries with the final intention of adding them to the 
Union throughout the 1840s and fifties, and finally its dramatic move into the 
Caribbean in the 1890s with the seizure of Puerto Rico and Cuba after victory 
in the war with Spain.2
The Pan American idea therefore was greeted by many Latin Americans 
as little more than “America for the United States” rather than the more gen-
erous objective mentioned above. In this context it proved difficult indeed 
for Latin American governments to do more than acquiesce to a very weak 
economic cooperation arrangement and an agreement to meet at various 
times in the future.3 
Only in 1910 did real change seem to be occurring. Under the impact of 
repeated militarized European attempts to collect on the bad debts of many 
of the region’s countries several capitals, and especially Brazil under its ex-
ceptional Foreign Minister Rio Branco, began to see the United States as less 
of a threat and even a potential ally against such actions.4 U.S. support for 
Venezuela in the debt and boundary crisis with Britain and other European 
countries in 1895 had been well received in many regional states and the 
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, essentially lettre morte because of British naval 
power up to that time, did seem to some to be potentially useful in disputes 
with the Europeans over debt. But this did not mean that Latin Americans 
felt that U.S. domination was preferable to that of anyone else.
At the Rio de Janeiro Conference of that year, a breakthrough took place 
with Latin American countries agreeing that there should be a permanent 
secretariat for the grouping which should take the name of the Pan American 
Union (PAU). This would inevitably have its headquarters in Washington 
but would include among other activities those seeking to strengthen hemi-
spheric peace and security. Regular meetings at foreign minister level were 
also foreseen as part of the new arrangements and these could be supple-
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mented by emergency meetings if such were felt worthwhile.5 Thus was 
established the first structure dealing, at least potentially, with hemispheric 
security, although mutual suspicions ensured it did not really do so for some 
decades to come.
This came with a backdrop of more strictly sub-regional experience of 
truly dismal defence cooperation in the region and even such as there was 
among only a very few countries. When Simón Bolívar had held a first inter-
American conference in Panama in 1824, his idea was very much one that in-
cluded well to the fore the idea of hemispheric or at least Latin American mu-
tual defence cooperation. The determination of the King of Spain to reverse 
the independence of his Spanish dominions, still alive for several more years, 
made such collaboration seem important to many of those who attended. In 
fact, nothing came of proposals for cooperation, not even the much touted 
idea of a liberating mission to be sent to Cuba, still a major Spanish base for 
three-quarters of a century to come.6 
The United States, invited to the conference in the hope that it might 
commit to helping the fledgling southern nations in case of a Spanish counter-
attack, and fresh from declaring its Monroe Doctrine for excluding European 
colonization, nonetheless instructed its delegates to make no such commit-
ments to Latin American states and indeed hold aloof from even ideas of 
political collaboration. Mutual defence ideas were to be no less attractive in 
practice to the Latin American nations either.
In the long years of European interventions in the River Plate Basin, 
in Mexico, in the Caribbean, and Central America over the first forty years 
of independence, few initiatives were put forward by individual countries 
and nothing of consequence came of them. Indeed, instead of cooperating 
in mutual defence, Peru and Bolivia fought Chile, Brazil fought Argentina, 
Ecuador did the same with Peru, Mexico invaded Central America, and the 
countries of the latter sub-region fought each other regularly over those dec-
ades, although it must be said that they did show considerable disposition to 
cooperate in the defeat of the infamous Walker expeditions of the 1840s. But 
even Haiti and the Dominican Republic found themselves repeatedly at war 
over this period.
When later Mexico fell victim to the intervention of 1861 that eventually 
saw Maximilian placed on an imperial throne in that country, only neigh-
bouring Guatemala raised much protest and no one at all offered to help 
the Liberals in that country resist the new regime supported by Napoleon 
III of France. When Spanish marauding naval vessels later in that decade 
maintained a lengthy and vicious blockade of western South American ports 
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and heavily bombarded some of them, the reaction, even of those directly 
attacked, included very little indeed of mutual support other than the de-
claratory. Everywhere European military efforts to collect debts found the 
Latin American debtor nations alone in their efforts to deter or defeat such 
initiatives.
It can thus be said that there was essentially no tradition of mutual as-
sistance in the face of foreign attack at all in the Americas by the time of the 
outbreak of the First World War. Indeed, in the second half of the nineteenth 
century the trend to local wars showed no signs of abating with Paraguay 
involved in a disastrous and terribly costly war with three of its neighbours 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) in 1864-70, Brazil and Argentina at it again 
shortly before in 1855, Chile at war with Bolivia and Peru in 1879-1884, 
Central America wracked again repeatedly, and border disputes and skir-
mishes daily fare in most of the region. 
Despite the accords of the 1910 PAU conference, World War I saw very 
little defence cooperation either. In fact, the only countries of the Americas 
that followed the United States into the war in 1917 were those physically 
occupied by United States forces at the time. Brazil did join in the conflict 
alongside the Entente allies but limited its active cooperation to the Navy 
and even then only worked with the British and not with the United States 
or other Latin Americans.7 The work of the PAU from 1910 to the mid-1930s 
was limited to few and far between and generally desultory diplomatic ef-
forts to find solutions to the ubiquitous territorial and jurisdictional disputes 
plaguing the region. The great conflicts of inter-war Latin America usually 
found, as in the case of the Chaco War of 1935, ad hoc groupings of nations 
or single mediators more effective in searching for solutions than the hemi-
spheric body. It did not help that the United States continued to adopt policies 
to the region based on the infamous “dollar diplomacy” of the pre-war years.8
Nonetheless, at least formally some progress was being made. At the 
Fifth Pan American Conference of 1923 there was agreement to, at a min-
imum, put in place some new arrangements for multilateral investigation of 
incidents and disputes. And in 1929 signatories of a new accord agreed that 
they would first exhaust PAU options before taking military measures in a 
dispute, although this promise was not to prove very much of a constraint in 
future conflict situations.
The Coming of Fascism
This situation was to change slowly but completely in the years to come be-
cause of dramatic changes in North America, Europe, and even Asia. In 1931, 
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Japan began the military occupation of Manchuria in flagrant violation of 
the terms of the League of Nations Covenant. In January 1933, Hitler became 
leader of Germany with firm plans to reverse the peace settlement of 1919. 
And less seriously, in 1935, Mussolini launched his first imperial adventure 
in Ethiopia. The unravelling of the international peace of the time seemed to 
be quickly occurring with unimaginable consequences.
At the same time, governments of the extreme right were not only taking 
power in Central Europe but also in Spain and Portugal, and in much of 
Latin America as well. The Great Depression found movements with right-
ist solutions well to the fore especially in the form of military governments 
promising order. Flirtations with fascism, and open admiration for the new 
regimes in Italy and Germany, were frequent and loud. 
Little wonder then that the United States reacted to a threat on its south-
ern frontier. By early 1934, the new government of Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
implementing a dramatically new policy that rejected military intervention 
in the region, supported democratic governments and reforms there, with-
drew U.S. occupation forces from regional countries, removed restrictions on 
Cuban sovereignty put in place in 1902, and in general declared a new era of 
the “Good Neighbour Policy.”9 This policy proved so firm that in 1938, in the 
face of the unprecedented Mexican nationalization of an oil industry with 
huge U.S. investment involved, Washington remained unmoved and for stra-
tegic reasons kept its response limited to diplomatic protest and negotiation.
The reaction of the Latin American political centre and left, and even 
of elements of the right, can be imagined. Pro-U.S. stances became com-
mon, anti-Americanism became increasingly limited only to sectors of the 
nationalist right, investment was welcomed as never before, U.S. naval ship 
visits were received by admiring throngs, and governments queued up to 
cooperate. 
On the diplomatic front, despite the presence of rightist, military and 
even pro-Axis governments in several capitals, hemispheric friendship was 
in the air. In 1936, the Inter-American Conference for the Consolidation of 
Peace, held in the wake of failures to resolve the Chaco War, produced five 
accords on conflict resolution. They provided measures ranging from perma-
nent mixed bilateral committees to study disputes to norms of neutrality 
during wars among American states. Here again though, these accords were 
rarely put into practice or of much practical effect.
In 1938, at the Eighth Conference of Foreign Ministers, against Argentine 
opposition, several countries joined the United States in a mutual effort to 
cooperate in order to hamstring Nazi and other fascist subversion in the 
49
hal klepak
hemisphere in case of war.10 The next year Brazil and the United States signed 
an agreement on mutual consultation on political and strategic matters and, 
tellingly, the United States joined to this economic assistance for the hemi-
sphere’s second most important country. Dramatically, and unimaginable 
before this time and the maturing of the Good Neighbour Policy, when war 
broke out in Europe later that year, a special First Meeting of Consultation (at 
foreign ministers level) was held in Panama that approved a security zone 
for the Americas out of which belligerents were told to keep their forces and 
within which they should not engage in warlike acts. More striking still, all 
American nations agreed to a declaration of neutrality, a step so original in 
the inter-American context and such a victory for U.S. diplomacy, that one 
American diplomat referred to it as “a kind of Pax Americana.”11
World War II: Cooperation Rampant
The key moment was, however, May 1940. With the fall of virtually all of 
Western Europe to the Axis powers and blitzkrieg, and the collapse of Britain 
thought by most to be merely a matter of weeks, there was for the first time 
a real possibility that a future peace treaty would include the transfer of 
European possessions, that is potentially some of those of Britain, France, 
and the Netherlands, to the control of Axis countries. This would have meant 
the arrival of actual Axis political and military power in the hemisphere. 
An emergency Second Meeting of Consultation was held in Havana in 
July to study this very real possibility. In another stunning victory for the 
United States, Latin American countries essentially signed on to the Monroe 
Doctrine in declaring their refusal to accept any transfers of territory in 
the Americas between the belligerent powers. They also stated that if any 
European country were no longer in a position to administer its American 
colonies, the Pan American Union would take over those responsibilities 
under a provisional PAU administration until the stricken country could 
recover. Almost as striking, Resolution XV of the final declaration of the con-
ference included a statement that all signatories agreed to consult and decide 
on common measures to be taken if an American nation were to be attacked 
from outside the region as part of the wider war.12
The stage was thus set for the hemispheric reaction to the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. Brazil immediately called for the Third 
Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 
February of the following year. The conference called on all countries of the 
Americas to break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and established 
the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) and an Advisory Committee on 
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Political Defence within the PAU. Within two months the Board was already 
meeting, although some Latin American nations had not yet declared war 
on the Axis (two were not to do so until 1945 itself) and several had not com-
pleted the rupture of relations. 
Agreements on basing arrangements, radar posts, communications, 
standardization of weapons and doctrine, training and linguistic issues, 
military assistance with weapons acquisition, access to strategic materials 
and food, and a vast array of other cooperative accords were put in place 
either multilaterally through the Board or bilaterally in agreements reached 
under the Board’s overarching mandate. This was all greatly simplified by a 
trend in place also from the late 1930s that had seen European military train-
ing missions, active officially in most of Latin America since the 1880s, and 
less officially from even earlier, gradually replaced by similar U.S. missions.13 
This trend was completed by the need for France and Britain to withdraw 
those missions in any case in 1939 with the arrival of war in Europe. But the 
United States had been quick to move into the space created by such with-
drawals and had even been firm with several Latin American governments 
that had Axis missions in insisting on their removal in the years preceding 
the outbreak of war.
In Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, the levels of military 
cooperation reached great heights seeing the full re-making of regional 
forces. Mexico, despite its tradition of zealous distancing from the United 
States especially in the defence field, became the closest of collaborators 
with Washington even permitting the recruiting of labourers to replace U.S. 
farmers conscripted for wartime service, the opening of bases and radar sta-
tions on the approaches to the U.S. Caribbean and Pacific coasts, and access 
to food, petroleum, and other strategic minerals on a special guaranteed 
basis.14 Similar events marked Central America and the Caribbean including 
essentially the founding of regional air forces and navies in keeping with the 
U.S. need to fight the Axis submarine threat and secure its approaches and 
the Panama Canal.15 
In a reversal of history, two Latin American countries actually sent 
forces to fight on the Allied side. The most exceptional of these efforts was 
that of Brazil, which sent a full infantry division to serve alongside the U.S. 
Army in Italy and accompanied that force with attached air force units. 
Mexico took the even more unheard of step of sending a fighter squadron 
to fight alongside U.S. Army Air Force units in the Philippines.16 The Good 
Neighbour Policy had paid off handsomely and common interests and 
objectives had been found around which a real hemispheric defence effort 
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could hang, even if Chilean and Argentine reluctance to break with the 
Axis always tended to remind Washington and others that shared views 
were not unanimous.
The Post-War Context and the Arrival of the Cold War
The war’s end saw a new world appear into which Latin American govern-
ments knew they would have to find a way to enter effectively. The disappear-
ance of Great Britain as a great power and counterpoise to the United States 
was nearly as serious for them as it was to be for Canada and the British 
West Indies. French and Dutch decline were also of importance and the end 
of Italy and Germany as political factors in the region was also noteworthy 
if not on the same scale. The United States came out of the war absolutely 
dominant on the world stage but dominant as never before in Latin America 
as well.17
With the exception of Argentina, all of the region now had armed forces 
organized, trained, equipped, armed, and even clothed along U.S. and no 
longer European models. The habit of defence cooperation, and coming to 
know the practical advantages of working with the United States, had also 
transformed much Latin American military thinking where the United 
States, and U.S. regional ambitions, were concerned.18 Politically, the region 
was in the U.S. pocket where the United Nations was concerned, and even 
Chile and Argentina had been obliged to acknowledge U.S. leadership as the 
war ended and their desire to avoid exclusion from the new UN organisation 
meant that they declared war on the Axis.
In the spring of 1945, at the invitation of Mexico, a conference to coordin-
ate approaches to the end of the war and the new era of peace was held in 
Mexico City at the Palace of Chapultepec. But here, even if quietly, the lack 
of shared objectives and visions was to show at least its outlines. The Latin 
American delegations, hoping for gratitude on the part of Washington for 
their part in ensuring allied victory, suggested a revamped inter-American 
system to include defence cooperation but also to involve major efforts at 
regional development, access to U.S. markets for Latin American agricultural 
goods, and many other areas of collaboration. The United States came to the 
meeting uncertain on the defence cooperation in peacetime idea (after all, the 
United States had never engaged in such things in times of peace in continua-
tion of the Washingtonian tradition of disengagement from international 
complications), and even more determined to avoid commitments on the eco-
nomic front that would without doubt be untenable in the domestic political 
context of the peace on the horizon.
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A further conference was held in Rio de Janeiro two years later, but with 
the United States now keener on defence as a priority but with development 
measures still the main issue dear to the Latin Americans. Despite these 
underlying contradictions, positive feelings prevailed as well as a context in 
which the Cold War’s dawning seemed more and more evident to statesmen, 
and an Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) was signed by 
all of Latin America and the United States, a first-ever peacetime collective 
security pact for the whole of the Americas except for Canada. On the basis 
that an attack on one state party was an attack against all, the formula for 
the later North Atlantic Treaty as well, the United States and many Latin 
American states abandoned peacetime neutrality and eschewing of defence 
commitments in favour of a formal mutual defence accord.
The next year, this treaty, generally styled the Rio Pact, was reinforced 
as the old Pan American Union was shelved in favour of a new Organisation 
of American States (OAS). The new inter-American “system” was to be based 
on three pillars: the Rio Pact for collective defence; the Pact of Bogotá for the 
peaceful resolution of disputes; and the Charter of the OAS for the general 
context of cooperation and relations. The IADB would stay as a permanent 
peacetime organ giving advice to, and being tasked by, the OAS on defence 
matters. The Charter, signed in Bogotá that year, repeated in its Chapters V 
and VI the collective security commitments of the Rio Pact, but the treaty on 
peaceful resolution of disputes, which included compulsory mediation and 
other, for many, vexing commitments, was as unpopular in most of Latin 
America as it was in the United States, and never entered into force.19
Nonetheless, a permanent security system in the Americas was now in 
place and its Charter and principal treaty provided an overarching rubric 
for all manner of bilateral, sub-regional, and bilateral agreements for the 
United States on the one hand, and individual Latin American governments 
and armed forces on the other. Even more promising, the new OAS soon 
proved its utility in dispute settlement in Central America as the late 1940s 
progressed.
The Korean War: Bilateralization Triumphant or  
“The Meat in the Sandwich”
When war broke out again, this time in Korea in 1950, the United States 
worried that the conflict in that peninsula might well be the beginning 
of something much bigger and on a world scale in line with the Cold War 
that dominated strategic thinking since at least three years before. The U.S. 
Congress soon authorized the signing of Mutual Assistance Pacts (MAPs) 
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with countries willing to commit to assisting the United States in case of 
crisis or widespread major conflict. In time, some seventeen of the twenty 
Latin American countries signed such accords with the United States, mostly 
between the end of the war and 1957. 
The pacts usually provided for U.S. access to basing rights, transit, prior-
ity access to strategic minerals and agricultural goods at protected prices, 
and related military assistance provisions. In return Latin American armed 
forces got access to military equipment and weapons at reduced prices, and 
training and other assistance from the United States free or for nominal 
cost. These arrangements were soon truly the “meat in the sandwich” of the 
inter-American security system and provided much of the real cohesion it 
enjoyed since U.S. dominance ensured generally applicable standardization 
of weapons, equipment, training, doctrine, and ways of going about business 
virtually throughout the hemisphere south of Canada. While the multilateral 
arrangements continued to exist, their role seemed often secondary when 
compared with these lubricants which made the system actually work. U.S. 
funds, weapons, equipment, and especially training fuelled the creation of a 
real inter-American network of working relationships among armed forces 
that was frequently little understood by politicians in the Latin American 
countries or even in the United States.
Formerly secondary institutions, such as the inter-American air force 
college and the School of the Americas, were reinforced. U.S. Army, Navy, 
and Air Force missions, usually already in place in most of the region, were 
strengthened and given much more in the way of resources. Despite attempts 
here and there, and especially in Argentina, to keep the door open to at least 
European influence in the military, the United States now stood absolutely 
supreme. 
Those connections served the United States well when a reformist gov-
ernment, elected on two occasions in Guatemala, threatened legal and com-
pensated but nonetheless unacceptable nationalisations of U.S. assets in that 
country in 1954. The reaction was swift and sealed the future of Latin America 
as nothing perhaps before or since in the post-war world. The United States 
moved to isolate the Guatemalan government internationally and to pillory it 
before the UN and especially the OAS as under the influence of international 
communism. Despite the lack of belief in such accusations in most of Latin 
America, U.S. strength prevailed and the Guatemalan government was de-
clared incompatible with the peace and security of the Americas. Using its 
place within the Guatemalan armed forces and its MAP-related influence, 
the Central Intelligence Agency organised anti-government forces outside 
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the country into an invasion force that struck into Guatemala and gave the 
green light for a military coup which ushered in one of the fiercest military 
dictatorships ever to be seen even in that much suffering country. The Cold 
War had arrived in force in the Americas and moderate leftist and democratic 
forces were obliged to choose between no democratic progress at all or the 
way of armed revolution. The impact on Latin American democratic forces 
cannot be exaggerated as the United States renounced the Good Neighbour 
Policy with staggering results over time.20
The Cuban Revolution: The System Works but at What Cost?
That radicalization of Latin American democratic forces took place just as 
the Batista dictatorship in Cuba, supported fully by the United States, faced 
the new challenge posed by the extraordinary figure of Fidel Castro. This 
young liberal lawyer, horrified by what he saw in Guatemala as well as 
Cuba, organised the bulk of the resistance to the Batista regime and in a long 
struggle ousted it in January 1959. Beset by U.S. and upper class resistance to 
his reform programme, Castro became ever more radical and, blocked and 
threatened by the United States, searched out a relationship with the Soviet 
Union.21 
The United States quickly turned again to the inter-American secur-
ity system to answer its call for support. The new Cuban government soon 
found itself under siege not only by the United States but by all the con-
servative governments of the region. Only moderate centrist or leftist gov-
ernments withstood the brandishments for a time. Caught between a public 
opinion largely sympathetic with Cuba, and a United States and upper class 
deeply opposed to Castro, these governments hesitated to be drawn into the 
fray. While the United States sought by almost all means, including violent 
subversion, assassination and Guatemala-style invasion to topple Castro, the 
latter engaged in support for leftist movements aiming to unseat the very 
governments that supported the United States in its efforts.22 This “export of 
revolution” allowed the United States to bring in the system in its support in 
ways never before discussed.
Multilaterally, the United States called and got a revamped inter-Amer-
ican system with a new Inter-American Defence College to train staff officers 
for that system’s organs, a new series of conferences of Army, Navy, and Air 
Force commanders of the forces of the Americas, a new series of joint exer-
cises aimed at countering the threat, and the reorganizing of many national 
armed forces in order to permit them to defeat the insurgency backed by 
Havana and the reinforcement of what was soon to be seen as the infamous 
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School of the Americas. MAPs were strengthened and vast new resources 
in weapons, training, and equipment were made available to those armed 
forces whose governments backed the anti-Cuban campaign.
More sinister was the next stage of the modernization. In line with 
the policy of strangling the Castro regime, Washington sought to replace 
moderate or leftist governments with ones more of its choosing and more 
likely to reject relations with Cuba. Thus the system’s institutions, and es-
pecially the IADB, the School of the Americas and the MAPs, were brought 
into play in order to help conservative forces locally engineer situations in 
which military coups would replace such governments with ones willing 
to tow the anti-Castro line. Government after government fell as military 
regimes replaced civilian rule in most of Central America, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, and joined those, now reinforced 
by increased U.S. support, in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Paraguay. 
Only Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, already boasting essentially 
rightwing governments, seemed able to buck the trend towards military 
government.
The price was exorbitant for this success. The prestige of the inter-Amer-
ican security system suffered seemingly irreparable harm as democratic 
forces across the political spectrum denounced the violence, repression, 
and ferocity of most of the new governments. The “unholy alliance” of U.S. 
Embassy, Roman Catholic Church, oligarchy, and U.S.-influenced armed 
forces became the target of virtually all democratic forces, and not just the 
left, in most countries in the region. The security system, viewed as behind 
or at least supportive of the worst excesses of the new regimes, lost all the 
prestige that accrued to it during the period of the Good Neighbour Policy 
and after in most democratic circles. But this was in the future.
For the time being, the system had stood the test of the Castro challenge 
and the inter-American security “system,” as we currently know it, at least 
formally, was completed. To make clear the elements of the system at the 
time, they were now as follows:
1. The Rio Pact (TIAR): Still the main defence and collective se-
curity accord at the base of the system although only signed 
by 21 countries;
2. The Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
Chapter V and VI: Collective security elements of the TIAR 
repeated and signed by all members although with many 
reserving some commitments;
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3. The Inter-American Defence Board (IADB): Still formally at 
least the organ of advice and support in defence matters to the 
OAS;
4. The Conferences of Commanders of Armies, Navies, and Air 
Forces of the Americas;
5. The wide range of multilateral exercises set up at the time; and
6. The Inter-American Defence College.23
On the bilateral level, however, there were the seventeen MAPs or 
similar accords linking the armed forces of other states with those of the 
United States in a largely dependent relationship, the arrangements for U.S. 
military missions in many countries, the School of the Americas specializing 
in special training against insurgency, the Air Force College of the Americas 
training Latin American pilots and other air force officers, and the various 
commands of the U.S. armed forces responsible for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. These were all supported by U.S. bases and other installations in 
the continental United States as well as in Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico, and 
later on in Honduras and El Salvador. Many other sub-regional and bilateral 
Latin American arrangements were also added to this list of accords and ar-
rangements but these were not always considered to be part of the “system” 
per se. 
With all this in place, Cuban-supported or inspired rural insurrection 
and then urban insurgency were abject failures in the 1960s, seventies, and 
eighties. Military governments throughout the region were successful in put-
ting down violent revolt and smashing leftist democratic movements as well. 
The coordinating role of the system could be considerable but generally it 
provided a context of assistance and welcome within which those govern-
ments could operate with some legitimacy. Only in Nicaragua was a rural 
insurrection successful as the Sandinista movement turned into a real popu-
lar insurrection leading to the military defeat of the conservative Somoza 
government, one of the most active members of the system, which replaced 
that government with one not at all to the liking of Washington, but much 
appreciated by the embattled Castro government in Cuba.
In the other guerrilla wars of the 1980s in Central America the system held 
firm and leftists were defeated in Guatemala and El Salvador, in Honduras 
they never really got started, and even in Nicaragua military pressure on the 
Sandinistas was crucial to their electoral defeat in February 1990 and their 
fall from power. Thus the system had functioned as the United States wanted 
but was unable to garner support for itself as the return to democracy gained 
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pace from 1977 on. Military governments “pacted” their way out of power 
except in Argentina where defeat in the disastrous Falklands War led to that 
country’s departure the next year. With victory assured, especially in Central 
America, and then the end of the Cold War, the United States could relax its 
stand on military governments and switch back to backing formal democra-
cies in the region. Some of this, however, was forced upon the United States 
as the old problem of unshared objectives and perspectives came again to 
the fore.
Democratic governments continued to view the Cuban Revolution and 
the government that represented that movement as legitimate and by the 
mid-1970s it was clear that the isolation of the island from the Americas the 
United States had been able to achieve in the early 1960s could not hold. The 
OAS agreed that those countries that wished could re-establish relations 
with Havana and most did so as the late seventies progressed.24 In addition, 
almost all newly independent ex-British colonies in the Caribbean rushed to 
establish relations with Cuba and it thus became difficult to maintain even 
the fiction of unity in the face of the Cuban “threat.”
The Cold War Ends
As the perceived threat of communism abruptly disappeared and the Cold 
War ended, the inter-American security system, like others in the world, was 
increasingly challenged to prove its relevance. The “export of revolution” 
phase of Cuban foreign policy was long gone, if it had ever really existed as 
seen in Washington.25 The Sandinistas were also gone and Cuba was busily 
negotiating an end to its African internationalist interventions. The Soviet 
Union was no longer in an adventurist mood and in any case was about to 
disappear. Why not put the system to bed? Several countries added to this 
question the accusation that in the recent war between the United Kingdom 
and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, the OAS and the Rio Pact had prov-
en worse than useless to Buenos Aires, proving once more the irrelevance of 
the defence system to Latin American states parties.
Canada, the newest member of the OAS having only joined after a cen-
tury of reluctance the inter-American system as a whole in 1990, was none-
theless active in suggesting a revised and updated security system as of the 
next year. Unwilling to consider such a thing when it first joined as it feared 
U.S. domination of the system and the dreadful reputation of the system in 
most of the Americas (including Canada) as a result of the dark days of the 
1960s and seventies, Ottawa soon realized that without a secure and peaceful 
hemisphere, Canada’s hopes for a stable, democratic and prosperous region 
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in which to integrate itself would remain just hopes. Armed forces of many 
countries, long dependent on the United States, also wished to ensure that a 
revamped system could still prove of worth. And many in the United States 
feared losing the comparative advantage that country had in defence rela-
tions in the hemisphere at a time when political and economic dominance 
was no longer in the cards.
In this context, the United States Secretary of Defense in 1994 began a 
series of discussions with other American leaders and called for the next 
year a meeting of defence ministers of the hemisphere to discuss the future 
nature of the security system. The Conference of Defence Ministers of the 
Americas (CDMA) was held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1995 and almost 
all defence ministers were present or represented at the highest level except 
for Cuba, which was not invited, and Mexico, which came as an observer. 
There was agreement on the need for a continuation of defence cooperation 
in the hemisphere and even on the challenges before the region. Deep div-
isions surfaced, however, over the priorities to assign to such challenges as 
well as the approaches to take to them. These divisions ranged from subjects 
as diverse as the international illegal narcotics trade, illegal immigration, ter-
rorism, and even proper civil-military relations in democracies. Once again, 
the ideal of shared interests and objectives within an inter-American security 
system was to be elusive indeed, even though no one felt that the system as 
a whole should be scrapped, the absence of the Cold War notwithstanding.
At this time other hemispheric trends were interesting and reinforced 
the desire to keep at least some cooperation in defence alive. The civil wars in 
Central America were drawing down with only Guatemala still causing ma-
jor concern. The UN observer missions there were active and successful and 
backed by the OAS. De-mining was becoming a priority for several govern-
ments and the IADB could be and was helpful in this area. Haiti was a source 
of almost constant security concern as the decade progressed. And defence 
administration, progress with civil-military relations in many countries, cuts 
in defence establishments, and much else was of great interest to newly re-
turned democratic governments. The short but sharp war between Peru and 
Ecuador in early 1995 also underscored the fact that the oft-touted “region of 
peace” Latin Americans liked to term their part of the world was not exact, 
and that progress with confidence-building measures, peaceful resolution of 
disputes, and arms control was not irrelevant in the region’s still smoldering 
border and jurisdictional disputes.26 Despite disagreements on priorities and 
approaches, there remained a sense that there was work still to be done by a 
revised system.
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An ad hoc Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) was set up at 
the OAS in 1991 and four years later became permanent. An organ deal-
ing with support for democracy which included handling issues of civil-
military relations was likewise established in the organisation. The CDMA 
became yet another potentially important new element of the system as 
it decided to meet every two years and at defence minister level, making 
it the highest level meeting in the hemisphere for defence affairs. All this 
reflected the new Consensus of Miami of late 1994 when all hemispheric 
nations agreed to move together towards hemispheric free trade and polit-
ical cooperation.27
Consensus Questioned and Then Shattered, 1998 to the Present
The Miami Consensus was destined to last very few years indeed. The poli-
cies proposed by the United States in order to build a new economic order in 
the hemisphere were widely denounced as “neo-liberal” and anti-poor, and 
the future trickling down effect that was to bring greater prosperity to the 
poorer countries of the region was ridiculed as too little and too late. One by 
one, governments proposing to join in such hemispheric cooperation were 
defeated in elections and the tendency gathered steam steadily. But nothing 
prepared the hemispheric system for what was to come.
In 1998, with the election of former lieutenant-colonel Hugo Chávez 
Frias to the presidency in Venezuela, a trend began which was to become 
powerful indeed in regional politics. For Chávez was an open admirer of 
Fidel Castro, architect of an earlier coup attempt against the corrupt but 
pro-American Venezuelan regime, and something of a populist firebrand 
calling for the end of the old order not only in his country but throughout 
Latin America. Calling for a revolution to return to what he saw as the prin-
ciples of Simón Bolívar, he launched a reform programme in Venezuela, 
fuelled by petrodollars, which soon had the region and the hemisphere in 
political ferment. Proposing a democratic but people’s revolution, he soon 
had followers throughout the region and his close friendship with Castro 
brought great succour to Cuba in the form of Venezuelan oil and cash in 
exchange for the loan of Cuban doctors, nurses, teachers, sports and music 
instructors, and other experts. This marriage made in heaven of the two 
most leftist governments in the region soon had Washington in particular 
worried.
This was, however, only the beginning. In a half-decade the rightist gov-
ernments of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua were also replaced by deeply 
reformist if not revolutionary movements and leaders. These more extreme 
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forms of leftist leadership were merely part of the problem for conservative 
forces to face. In addition, more moderate leftist leadership took power in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile for a time and eventually, if in some cases only tem-
porarily, in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay. Only in Colombia and Mexico did the trend not result in 
power changes and even in the latter it was a near run thing. This “pink tide,” 
itself the reflection of centuries of conservative rule rejected in the first real 
context of possible victories by leftist democratic movements throughout the 
region, seemed unstoppable for a while.
The formation of a radical bloc of nations within this tide, to be termed 
ALBA after the Latin American People’s Alternative and similar evolving 
titles, and consisting of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, 
at first eschewed defence matters doubtless fearing the reaction in at least 
four cases of the heavily U.S.-influenced and still powerful armed forces. 
But soon, as early as the 2000 CDMA held in Manaus, Brazil, Venezuela for-
mally proposed the end of the inter-American security system as it had been 
known up to then and its replacement with a two-tiered system based on 
Latin America and the Caribbean on one level and the hemisphere only at a 
second. While rejected by all other members of the CDMA, its merely being 
proposed was a sign of future trouble and divisions.
The system, recently reinforced by the CDMA process and the CHS, and 
given at least some direction by the Conference on Hemispheric Security, 
at foreign minister level, held in Mexico in 2003, still found itself unable to 
retain any degree of unity. The ALBA nations were increasingly unhappy 
with a system they saw as entirely dominated by the United States and with a 
dreadful past behind it, not to mention institutions which had blood on their 
hands at massive levels. The IADB came in for particularly negative reac-
tions as did the Rio Pact itself. While some accusations spoke of institutional 
irrelevance, others spoke of institutional evil. CDMAs for a time retained 
some degree of restraint and no one would actually openly denounce the 
system as a whole although the Venezuelans were to do so on several occa-
sions after Manaus and then that country stopped attending at ministerial 
level altogether. 
Even at the OAS the meetings of the CHS were increasingly irrelevant. 
The overall political context worsened as the United States accused the 
radical governments of abandoning democracy, and the latter responded 
with considerable finger waving that the United States was no longer in a 
moral position to be the judge and jury for the level of democracy of Latin 
American governments. The absence of Cuba from the inter-American 
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“family” also became a source of growing discord as not only the ALBA 
states and the other leftists but even rightist governments in the region 
joined the others, including Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean 
nations, in calling loudly for Cuba’s re-incorporation into hemispheric 
bodies.
Worse was to come. Despite the withdrawal of Mexico from the Rio Pact 
in 2001, the attacks on the Twin Towers that September had seen Brazil call 
for the Pact to be activated as part of a hemispheric coordinated response to 
terrorism. This rejuvenation had, however, ended there. By the end of the first 
decade of the century, most countries spoke openly of either ending the Pact 
altogether or at least reforming it to respond to the conditions of the moment 
and not those of 1947. Attempts by Canada and others to reform and make 
relevant the IADB, despite support from many of the region’s national armed 
forces, were rejected by capitals and came to almost nothing. The progress 
made with hemispheric and regional confidence-building measures stalled 
and then stopped being replaced by local initiatives in South America or in 
other sub-regions.28 More and more it seemed that many countries attended 
hemispheric meetings on defence merely to stymie progress and not to 
further it. Dreams of greater hemispheric inter-operability among national 
armed forces, especially in countering terrorism but also in peacekeeping 
operations, fell afoul of the realities of the day and were shelved after some-
times promising beginnings. Civil-military relations were strained in several 
countries as armed forces wished to continue and even increase inter-Amer-
ican defence cooperation but faced national governments with no inclination 
to do so.
Repeated electoral victories returned ALBA governments, which felt 
greater freedom to embark on measures to reduce further the relevance of 
the inter-American system as a whole and its defence elements in particular. 
When calls by Venezuela for a South American “NATO” to deter U.S. inter-
ventions in the region failed to garner support from more moderate govern-
ments or even from Cuba, moderating efforts were made which included the 
founding in 2008 of a South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) which 
was soon given a defence element. UNASUR made no secret of its desire 
to build a South American identity in order to distance itself from the Pan 
American, Western Hemisphere, and inter-American concepts of ordering 
affairs, and its members even found fault with the idea of a Latin American 
identity. And when a defence dimension of the body, the South American 
Defence Council, was founded in 2010, it also quickly produced proposals 
distancing the group from Latin American and inter-American initiatives, 
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structures, and organisations. For the first time in the long history of inter-
American security system, sub-regional organisations made no effort to link 
themselves to the larger system and even proudly declared their independ-
ence from it.
Thus by 2012 one had a hemispheric system shorn of its unity but still 
showing the old structures that had not completely disappeared over the 
long years of decline. No one leaves the OAS nor do states usually show a 
complete rejection of things as they stand. The Latin American tradition is to 
stay in and slow down, that is to be there in order to ensure that nothing hap-
pens that is not in one’s interest. Never is this more true than in defence and 
never has it been more true than at the present moment in inter-American 
political and defence affairs.
Nonetheless, in 2012 the crisis brought out active disenchantment pub-
licly admitted and even trumpeted. After the disastrous Cartagena Summit 
of American leaders had broken up in total disagreement over future Cuban 
participation in the hemispheric organs and the question of the future of the 
Falkland Islands, moves on the defence front followed quickly. All four cur-
rent ALBA signatories of the Rio Pact denounced the treaty and announced 
their intention to withdraw from it. Thus a treaty signed by twenty-one 
states, which had already excluded one of them in the 1960s (Cuba) and seen 
another (Mexico) withdraw in 2001, now found four more leaving as soon 
as possible. And thus over a quarter of the original signatories are no longer 
such and the Pact’s legitimacy as somehow Pan American is highly suspect. 
While it is true that the Charter still is in place and has not been similarly 
denounced, and that it carries the same collective defence commitments em-
bodied in the Pact, this is splitting hairs. The system’s main defence pillar is 
all but shattered at the present time.
In addition, at the X CDMA held in Montevideo in October 2012, Ecuador 
and Bolivia further announced they would no longer be taking part in at-
tempts to improve the system and would specifically no longer take part in 
the IADB. Since Cuba is once again no longer a member of this body, and 
Venezuela has for some time eschewed participation, one can again speak 
of an organ of the system whose legitimacy can be questioned. Given that it 
never included anything like the whole of the hemisphere’s countries, with 
Canada for long and most of the Commonwealth Caribbean still holding 
aloof from it, the IADB is in grave trouble. That its OAS funding, on which it 
depends, is in doubt as well, merely adds to the feeling that the whole system 
is tottering.
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The Present Moment and the Possible Futures
Thus the system has arrived perhaps at its crisis point but certainly at its 
moment of most division, most lack of shared objectives, most uncertainty 
in general, in its history. Divisions of an ideological kind already discussed, 
added to the South American versus North American and even Central 
American and Caribbean perspectives, leave us with little immediate 
hope for a reinforced inter-American security system. Nowhere does one 
see common objectives, reducing tensions, etc. that are hemisphere-wide. 
Instead one speaks increasingly of joining the efforts of like-minded, that 
is either conservative or leftist governments, in projects in which only those 
like-minded will be interested or which they will be willing to support. In 
addition, other initiatives come within the new lines drawn geographically 
through the hemisphere. North American defence initiatives, à deux ou à 
trois, abound and others have seen the light of day for the Caribbean, Central 
America, the Southern Cone, Mercosur, UNASUR, ALBA, etc. But the idea of 
a hemispheric shared view of where we should be going is, alas, more absent 
than at any time known by the author.
The reality is that the hemisphere is divided ideologically between 
conservative governments keen on retaining the key elements of the inter-
American system in place, and reformist governments absolutely unwilling 
to continue to play that game and proposing another way of seeing the hemi-
sphere which is anathema to those same conservative elements. To this ideo-
logical divide is added one of geography as South America moves quickly 
to establish its own overall identity as not Latin American nor hemispheric 
but rather continental in the restricted sense of Colombia southwards to the 
southern cone. While every kind of cross-cutting issue may appear, those 
central elements of what one faces in the Americas today are undeniable. 
And the fact that those countries which might play a constructing honest 
broker or helpful fixer role, like Canada or Mexico in the past, are not in-
terested because of their own evolution ideologically, merely means that no 
one is prepared to risk anything serious in order to save the system as it was 
known. 
Chile and Colombia would doubtless be willing to support loudly the 
inter-American system but not if the price is too high in terms of South 
American solidarity. Ecuador at times would like to ensure that the system 
does not become a casualty of UNASUR or even ALBA efforts, but cannot face 
both those bodies and appear to be a spoiler of their wider objectives. Brazil, 
anxious to be helpful but restrained by its deep commitments to UNASUR, 
does its best but cannot do enough. Its virtually unqualified support of the 
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highly reformist government of Argentina limits what can be done in any 
case as do its own doubts as to the current value of the system as its stands. 
Virtually all countries call for a total re-making of the system, although the 
rightist Central American governments can be counted on for slowing down 
such demands. Unfortunately, such opposition to reform merely reinforces 
the arguments of those that suggest the system is dead and should be put 
out of its misery.
Conclusions
Thus the shared interests, objectives or even perspectives that might provide 
for effective defence cooperation remain elusive and perhaps impossible to 
find in the present context of inter-American relations. We have seen that this 
situation of stymied working together has only really been avoided once in 
the history of the Americas. The coming together of internal factors, such as 
the Good Neighbour Policy, with external ones, such as the rise of fascism, 
did produce more than a modicum of common perceptions of threat and 
shared interests. The result, with nuance, was a level of defence cooperation 
in pre-war conditions and then in wartime and in the post-war period never 
seen before or since. 
When those conditions changed, however, with the arrival of the Cold 
War, the U.S. attempt to essentially bludgeon Latin America into taking the 
challenge of Soviet communism seriously was not able to produce common 
views where there were none naturally. Latin American societies were gener-
ally deeply Catholic and conservative and showed no signs of actually being 
threatened by communist penetration and such was the view of the bulk 
of regional governments. The communist threat simply could not act as the 
glue in a cooperative effort without the United States allying itself with the 
most reactionary forces in the region and assisting in the overthrow of civil-
ian democratic governments which would have been its natural allies during 
the Good Neighbour Policy’s reign of 1934-54.
When the conditions of the Cold War ended, the security system in 
place, used so dramatically to smash reformist forces over the long dark 
years of military dictatorship, could no longer garner significant shared sup-
port. Whether anything can be done to change this state of affairs is the open 
question. Major change in the actions of the principal actors on this stage 
would appear to be the only way for progress to be made.
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Challenges of Collective Action in the 
Hemisphere
Frank O. Mora, Latin American and Caribbean Center, 
Florida International University, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense–Western Hemisphere Affairs 
(2009-2013)1
In the Western Hemisphere, we face a strategic challenge that has not yet been fully appreciated. Whilst there is a litany of challenges that have been collectively agreed upon in the 2003 Mexico City Declaration, ran-
ging from extreme poverty and natural disasters to transnational organized 
crime, experience as a policy practitioner in government over the past four 
years has made it abundantly clear that we are not collectively prepared, or 
able, to tackle these challenges. In fact, it is questionable whether the political 
will required to confront these challenges is present. 
This “insecurity dilemma” is not one that is driven by traditional con-
cepts such as power asymmetries, or arms races, but, rather, is a phenom-
enon presented to us by weak states, with significant institutional deficits. 
Over the past four years it has been apparent that while many states are able 
to “talk the talk” in terms of agreeing to promising and pragmatic solutions 
to the host of hemispheric security challenges, few countries have the insti-
tutional capacity or resources to “walk the walk” in terms of implementing 
meaningful countermeasures. 
A mixture of globalization and weak state power has given rise to chal-
lenges of a complexity and magnitude never seen before, requiring more 
than ever a multinational, interagency, response which is sorely lacking. 
This paralysis of action is ominous. Global and hemispheric problems are 
multiplying whilst the capacity of governments and organizations to con-
tain them is stagnant. It is a crisis of trust, expectations, and legitimacy. The 
nature and complexity of the challenges requires a level of collaboration and 
coordination across agencies and national border of the likes not seen before. 
The question is whether governments, agencies, and non-government organ-
izations are up to the task.
When was the last time a large number of countries in the hemisphere 
agreed to a major regional accord on a pressing issue? Not since the 2003 
Mexico City Declaration have we reached consensus on what the problems 
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are and how to respond. Diplomatic relationships in the hemisphere are not 
currently conducive to cooperation even towards modest goals. For instance, 
U.S. efforts to achieve non-controversial cooperation in the way militaries re-
spond to natural disasters were met with significant resistance in the Defense 
Ministerials fora (CDMA). This has been the pattern towards U.S. leadership 
over the past decade. On the other hand, “chattering organizations” such as 
CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), CARICOM 
(Caribbean Community), SICA (Central American Integration System) and 
others have a tendency to issue a prolific number of international agreements 
that go unfunded, resulting in, effectively speaking, useless rhetoric. 
Effective deals are elusive with high levels of distrust between states 
and, perhaps more importantly, between and within institutions of the same 
states. For instance, governments and institutions with weak political capital 
and institutional capacity, in the many incomplete or unconsolidated democ-
racies in our hemisphere, cannot strike effective deals. These require political 
risks weak leadership has little incentive to attempt, and/or sacrifices their 
publics will not allow them to make. The current environment has led to 
the pursuit of bilateral, and smaller multilateral, agreements between small 
clusters of capable, or likeminded, countries that are not broad enough in 
scope to deal with the problems we face. What is required is to develop a 
new framework, or regime, or set of institutions, that are flexible and capable 
of dealing with the host of complex problems and flexible adversaries in the 
twenty-first century. 
What should the response be in a post-Westphalian era where state 
borders and sovereignty mean less every day? Unfortunately, states, includ-
ing the United States, are still too jealous of their sovereignty to contemplate 
“shared sovereignty.” What is doable now? Countries besides the United 
States and Canada can export their capabilities, such as Colombia is doing 
with security training. Chile is another promising leader punching above 
its weight by exporting security training to Haiti and El Salvador. We can 
continue to broaden the sense of burden sharing a bit beyond bilateralism 
to “mini”-lateralism, with three or four states working together such as the 
Pacific Alliance. At the end of the day, such measures will be insufficient 
without broader strategic consensus as to what the problems are and how 
to win.
Audience Commentary
It was noted that Mora’s recipe to successfully address future security chal-
lenges in the hemisphere appears to overlook significant U.S. role and leader-
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ship. In reply, Mora noted the United States has been forced to act bilaterally 
within the hemisphere in the face of strong U.S. opposition. Moreover, the 
United States is tired of issuing financial backing to countries with a ten-
dency to make excuses for why initiatives cannot work or who refuse to work 
together in an effective way. Brazil, for instance, despite its military’s willing-
ness to work with the United States, will only deal with the United States 
on security issues bilaterally, refusing to cooperate openly with the United 
States in regional fora for political reasons.
It was further observed that the United States appears itself to be disin-
clined to act multilaterally, putting forward weak multi-lateral delegations, 
and opting for unilateral policy stances on contentious issues such as Cuba. 
However, such critiques were dismissed as overly U.S.-centric. At the end of 
the day, even if Cuba were to be removed as an issue, it was argued, U.S.-Latin 
American relations would not improve substantively. The institutional prob-
lems of organizations such as CARICOM and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the Inter-American system in general are much deeper than 
whether or not the United States fields strong delegates in Latin American 
diplomacy or favors one position or another. 
It was argued that hemispheric initiatives such as the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter contradict pessimistic prognostications regarding hemi-
spheric agreement and cooperation. However, this claim was dismissed from 
the standpoint that the Charter itself holds little sway or meaning at this 
time. In the face of democratic reversals in Venezuela, for instance, there was 
no collective response, even from the United States, which fears its critiques 
will only serve to make matters worse. Then there was the perversion of the 
Mercosur and UNASUR reaction to events in Paraguay. The country was 
suspended despite following its own constitution. 
U.S. intervention can be productive as it was with Plan Colombia, yet this 
success was only possible due to the collective epiphany of the Colombian 
people in the late 1990s who decided to make the sacrifices necessary to save 
their country. For instance, while the United States footed billions of dollars 
in aid, the Colombian government had the will to implement the tax on the 
wealthy to pay for most of what was required and the wealthy proved will-
ing to pay for it. 
Note
1 Summary of presentation prepared by Clayton Dennison, University of Calgary.
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The Persistent Multidimensional 
Security Dilemma in the Caribbean 
and Requirements for Emergence: 
Trapped Between Dependence and 
Development—A Strategic Deficiency
Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer, Vice 
Chief of Defence Staff, Trinidad & Tobago Defence Force
I am appreciative of the important responsibility to contribute to discus-sion on the theme of security from the perspective of the Caribbean sub-region. I must emphasize that while I will refer generally to the reality of 
the entire Caribbean, I will focus on the small states of the Caribbean, and 
principally the island jurisdictions and the other nations that are members of 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
The title of my paper describes the problem of multidimensional security 
in the Caribbean as a dilemma. I hope that upon conclusion, the nature of the 
problem of Caribbean security is made clearer. However, I trust that above all 
else, the potential for future Canadian, Caribbean, and international policy, 
defined as prerequisites for what I call “emergence,” will be recognized and 
embraced by representatives of the public, private, and civil society sectors 
and, equally important, by the representatives of academia and other actors 
with an interest in improving the global and hemispheric strategic security 
environment.
For the Caribbean generally and the small states of the English-speaking 
Caribbean and CARICOM more specifically, the issue of emergence has for 
too long remained an elusive reality. Whether applied to the requirement 
to either emerge fully from the culture of dependence created by its inter-
national political history, or from the clutches of underdevelopment that 
have been enabled by its international economic history, the small, highly 
open and still developing states of the Caribbean Basin remain trapped in a 
dilemma. The dilemma is that in the face of an increasingly multidimensional 
security environment, these small states must pursue sustainable economic 
development and political independence, or even better, interdependence, 
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amidst structural features that have historically been conducive to crime and 
other multidimensional threats to their security. 
The character of security in the Caribbean has been historically and 
structurally multidimensional. Whether viewed from the perspective of 
plantation economy or international economic periphery, the reasons for the 
emergence of crime and insecurity in the Caribbean have all been associated 
with the features of:
• an exploitable and inescapable geography, on one hand, ideal 
for man-made illicit trade or illegal transhipment activity, 
whether in slaves and contraband of centuries ago, or drugs, 
guns, and humans today, and on the other hand, exposure 
to natural disasters, hurricanes, earthquakes, and climate 
change;
• an open and exogenously driven economy, and its propensity 
for the movement of pirated bullion of centuries ago to the 
accumulation of private unregulated off-shore accounts and 
money-laundering practices of today with the associated brib-
ery and corruption of public officials;
• a dependence on the transfer of technology to the region, ori-
ginally associated with industrialization by invitation models 
of the early post-colonial years that have been adopted by 
criminal actors including deportees in the form of ATM fraud, 
kidnapping, cyber-crime, and excessively violent crimes of 
today; and
• a migrant and pluralist society with the challenges of social 
diversity, income disparity, and divergent extra-regional 
loyalties that have all led to a high probability for undocu-
mented migration, document fraud, identity theft, and human 
smuggling.
At the outset these features may be considered to be common to many 
other developed and developing regions of the world today. However, it is 
their debilitating and destructive presence in small states in particular, like 
those in the Caribbean with limited capacity to address them that renders 
the region vulnerable to what may otherwise be manageable threats to pub-
lic safety and security. This was certainly not missed in the recent case of 
the response by Boston, granted with federal support, to the bombings at 
the Boston Marathon. In the vast majority of Caribbean states, sufficiently 
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capable and competent state institutions, such as law enforcement, intelli-
gence, defence, criminal justice, border management, and corrections with 
the requisite organizational capacity to provide an acceptable level of public 
safety and security rarely exist. Where they do exist, and even with their 
constrained capability, capacity, and competency, there is the high level of 
exposure to corruption and bribery as was previously highlighted as a struc-
tural reality of the region.
An even greater cause for concern, however, is the reality that beyond 
the institutional level of analysis, there is a critical and persistent deficiency 
at the political and strategic levels to understand the realities and, more 
important, the requirements for decision-making and policy-making to ac-
curately respond to multidimensional security threats, which in turn create 
circumstances of increased vulnerability because of already existing institu-
tional weakness. 
In fact, in some Caribbean states where time has been taken to examine 
the source of institutional weaknesses in the state security sector, it has been 
recognized that flawed or deficient strategic security decision-making and 
policy-making have also contributed to the persistence of weak security in-
stitutions. If ever there was a trap, or the proverbial catch 22, I would consider 
this situation of persistent vulnerability from a strategic deficiency to be a 
classic one. 
Figure 1. Public Policy Conceptual Framework. 
(Source: Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer). 
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Up until the end of the Cold War, the response to this under-estimated 
and miscalculated multidimensional and transnational security reality in 
the Caribbean was exogenously determined and understandably threat-
driven on the basis of previous patterns and traditional approaches to global 
wars over territory or ideology. It was therefore only after the end of the Cold 
War by the mid-1990s that regional as well as extra-regional actors realized 
and accepted that the security response by the region, for the region, and to 
the region was overlooking the inescapable vulnerability-based reality of the 
Caribbean’s multidimensional crime and security experience. (See Table 1.)
However, the Caribbean region itself had also failed to diligently fulfil 
expressed commitments at regional integration and functional cooperation 
including in the area of regional security. These unrealized expectations have 
long denied and delayed efforts in the region for the pursuit of a strategic and 
integrated approach in response to the multidimensional and vulnerability-
based challenges of the region.
In the process, Caribbean states, governments, and institutions have 
experienced a crisis of legitimacy and trust within their individual jurisdic-
tions. Just as Holsti predicted, and as has now occurred in several Caribbean 
countries, this loss of legitimacy has undermined the strength of these states 
and has created what John Rapley has referred to as “statelets” in his 2006 
article The New Middle Ages.1 In fact, Cope and Mora offer the following accur-
Table 1. Historical Overview: Major Shifts in Caribbean Security Cooperation  
Environment, 1983-2010
 (Source: Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer).
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ate description of the problem confronting some CARICOM states today: “At 
the core of the turbulence is the decline of the state symbolized by deteriorat-
ing sovereignty and exacerbated by poverty, inequality, and ineffective gov-
ernance at all levels of society.”2 Based on the obvious multidimensionality of 
the vulnerability-based security reality of the Caribbean, the historical and 
traditional threat-driven response to territorial, ideological or other global 
threats, while still necessary, can no longer be considered as sufficient to ad-
dress the security concerns of the Caribbean. 
From my own exposure and experience over more than thirty years as 
a former practitioner in the field at the tactical level, to my current role as a 
policy advisor at the political-strategic level, I am now fully convinced, both 
by first-hand evidence and independent research, that the Caribbean is likely 
to remain trapped in its struggle to overcome the violent, destructive, and 
potentially destabilizing effects of its multidimensional security realities, 
principally because of the vulnerabilities that are certain to persist in the face 
of the deficiency that exists in the area of strategic security decision-making 
and policy-making, at the political and institutional, as well as individual 
levels of analysis.
The principal threats to Caribbean security, such as illicit trafficking, 
whether in drugs, guns or persons, cannot be ignored or avoided and must 
of necessity be addressed. However, given its structural and historical re-
alities, the strategic security dilemma for the Caribbean is more accurately 
examined and understood with greater reference to the vulnerabilities of 
the region. It is the persistence of these vulnerabilities on account of limita-
tions in institutional capacity, but even more so because of deficiencies at the 
political level in strategic security decision-making and policy-making that 
render the current multidimensional security experience of the Caribbean a 
dilemma. 
CARICOM
CARICOM comprises twelve islands and three continental states within 
a geographical zone that lies directly in the path of one of the most active 
international drug trades: between the world’s primary source of cocaine 
(the Andean region of South America) and its primary consumer markets 
(the United States and Europe). Adding to the challenge of the international 
drug trade, CARICOM member states have extensive coastlines and vast ter-
ritorial waters to patrol, and lack adequate law enforcement capabilities. The 
twelve islands are spread over approximately 60,000 square kilometres of the 
Caribbean Sea, which has an area of 2.75 million square kilometres. Just over 
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2 percent of CARICOM’s area is land, within an overall area that is three 
quarters the size of the twenty-seven member states of the European Union 
combined. This makes it extremely challenging for each state to monitor its 
coastlines and territorial waters which are, on average, fifteen times larger 
than their land mass. Four member states share land borders with other 
sovereign territories.
Although diverse in terms of population size, all the member states of 
CARICOM are considered small states. The Community has inherent sus-
tainable developmental challenges, which include small populations, very 
large maritime frontiers, susceptibility to external shocks and natural disas-
ters, vulnerability to global economic developments, and the threat of both 
domestic and transnational organised crime.
As a Community with approximately 17 million people, over half of 
which are in Haiti, CARICOM member states are committed to the principles 
and values of democratic choice, freedom, justice, prosperity, respect for and 
promotion of human rights, and good governance. CARICOM’s crime and 
security mandate is guided by these principles and values all of which reflect 
the convictions of the Community.
The Impact of Crime 
Most CARICOM member states have high rates of homicide and violent 
crime. (See Table 2, p. 77.) This has reduced citizen security, impeded socio-
economic development, eroded confidence in nation-building, and height-
ened fear among the population. The 2012 Caribbean Human Development 
Report indicates “that region wide, only 46 percent of respondents said 
that, overall, they felt secure or very secure living in their countries.” The 
greatest threats to the region’s security and sustainable development are 
transnational organised criminal activities involving illicit drugs and illegal 
guns; gangs and organised crime; cyber-crime; financial crimes; and corrup-
tion. Tier 1 Threats are the main drivers of criminality, have already crippled 
the development of a number of member states, and have the potential to 
undermine all hopes for socio-economic development in CARICOM and the 
advancement of the CARICOM Single Market & Economy (CSME).
In the recently adopted CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy, which 
I will later discuss, four Threat or Risk Tiers have been established. Tier 1 
Threats are primarily responsible for the region’s high murder rates and 
violence that burden socio-economic development. These threats have a 
particular impact on the most vulnerable members of the population, es-
pecially women and children in poor areas. The average homicide rate for 
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the Community is 30 people killed for every 100,000 inhabitants annually. 
In Mexico, a country suffering appalling widespread drug-related violence, 
the rate is just 18 while the global rate is approximately 7 (see Table 2). All 
CARICOM member states have significantly higher murder rates per cap-
ita than the United States, which has a murder rate of 4.6 per 100,000. More 
than 70 percent of the people who die a violent death in the region are killed 
with a gun. Young people under the age of thirty comprise 60 percent of the 
region’s citizenry, and are both the main perpetrators and victims of crime. 
This very high level of violent criminality has reduced the citizens’ quality of 
life, placed the limited resources of member states under extreme pressure, 
reduced local and foreign direct investment, and has threatened the ability 
of states to achieve their developmental goals.
Recent and Current Responses to the Dilemma
Given the misdirected and misplaced response to the Caribbean’s multi-
dimensional security dilemma until the mid-1990s, it should be noted and 
recognized first that the process of effective security institution-building in 
the region is now still less than two decades old. Second, the realization by 
regional and extra-regional security cooperation actors that the Caribbean 
security experience is multidimensional and not principally territorial or 
ideological, nor even purely transnational, occurred barely ten years ago and 
was significantly precipitated by a global strategic security shift in September 
2001. Of course earlier projects such as the 1991 Santiago Commitment, and 
Ivelaw Griffith’s 1997 articulation of a conceptual framework for understand-
ing the multidimensional scope of drug trafficking in his publication Drugs 
and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Seige (Griffith Framework) also 
Table 2. Murder Rates for Selected Regions and States, 2011.
(Source: IMPACS 2012; UNODC 2011).
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helped to reveal the necessity for a multidimensional approach to security 
generally, and for Caribbean security in particular. 
It should therefore have been expected that the Multidimensional 
Approach to Security would have emerged in the form of the Declaration 
of Bridgetown in 2002 at the 32nd Organization of American States (OAS) 
General Assembly. This hemispheric commitment more accurately expresses 
and defines an appropriate philosophy, doctrine, and concept to guide the re-
sponse to crime and security in the Caribbean. The timing of the Bridgetown 
Declaration was also perfect when one examines the definition of security 
and crime in the 2002 Report of CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime 
and Security. 
Since the Declaration of Bridgetown in June 2002, the response to the 
Caribbean Crime and Security Experience has been consistently focused 
on the multidimensionality of the regional security experience. In fact, that 
process, which began with the Declaration of Kingstown on the Security of 
Small States in January 2003, served to propel the approval and establish-
ment by the CARICOM Heads of Government of the existing CARICOM 
Framework for the Management of Crime and Security in July 2005. In this 
regard, it must be noted that while the necessity for effective state security 
institution-building in the region goes back to 1996, the actual framework 
and processes for doing so at the regional level, as well as for regional level 
strategic security decision-making and policy-making are in fact only now 
approaching their eighth year of existence. 
Even so, it must be highlighted that the imperative for action during the 
first half of that short eight year experience of institution-building, decision-
making, and policy-making was driven almost exclusively between 2005 and 
2007 by the exogenously mandated security requirements for CARICOM to 
host the 2007 Cricket World Cup Tournament in ten of the member states. 
During this time even the strategic security decision-making organs and 
entities of the newly established CARICOM Framework for the Management 
of Crime and Security such as CONSLE and SEPAC, were themselves deeply 
engaged in operational level activities, and less focused on strategic security 
decision-making and policy-making. 
Having a strategy makes it even more urgent to develop the capability 
and build the capacity at both the political and institutional levels for strategic 
security decision-making. If that capability and capacity is not developed in 
the flawed short-term, tactical decision-making of the past will continue and 
the strategy will become just another well written but failed security policy 
agenda. It appears the CARICOM region, due to its structural security chal-
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lenges and insufficient capacity to meet threats, is likely to remain inextric-
ably trapped between dependence and development. However, there are 
opportunities for emergence. The region’s decision-making capacity needs 
to be reformed, ideally with outside assistance from nations like Canada and 
the United States, in order to strengthen security at an institutional level. 
There needs to be increased participation from civil society groups and the 
private sector. Together these groups can bring to bear significant underutil-
ized capacities. 
Notes
1 John Rapley, “The New Middle 
Ages,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 
2006), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/61708/john-rapley/the-new-
middle-ages.
2 John A. Cope and Frank O. Mora, 
“Hemispheric Security: A New Ap-
proach,” Current History 108, no. 715 
(February 2009): 65-71.
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Multidimensional Security Perspective
Ambassador Adam Blackwell, Secretary of Multi-
dimensional Security, Organization of American States
The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, created in 2005, is tasked with coordinating political, technical, and practical cooperation among member states and other inter-American and international 
organizations to analyze, prevent, confront, and respond to emerging threats 
to national and citizen security. Politically, the Secretariat receives mandates 
from the Summit of the Americas, from the annual general assembly, as well 
as from our Permanent Council and its working groups. In fact, we are cur-
rently working on a drug study and TOC (Transnational Organized Crime) 
plan, both of which were mandated by the Presidents of the Hemisphere at 
the last Summit.1
To fulfill these mandates and other obligations, the Secretariat has 
technical bodies; the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug 
Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-
American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), the Department of Public 
Security (DPS) and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). Each of these 
technical bodies has its own set of networks to address key themes such as: 
border and maritime security, cyber security, money laundering and ter-
rorism financing, forensics, prisons, arms trafficking, drugs and organized 
crime, and terrorism, among others. These networks are made up of our 
National Points of Contact and are in my view our real force multipliers. 
In my tenure as Secretary of Multidimensional Security, we have tried 
to move beyond supply driven solutions to build practical programs that 
connect the political and technical platform that we have at our disposal. 
Our work is united by a common philosophy, which we have termed “smart 
security.” Smart security is actually something simple and logical: an object-
ive, evidence-based diagnosis of the problems; creation of proposals based 
on national and regional needs and capabilities, implemented in alliance 
with all relevant actors; a multidimensional and multi-stakeholder focus 
ensuring systematic problem-solving; and a rigorous evaluation of results 
and indicators.
Our work in the region has produced positive tangible results. We have 
helped countries set up Drug Treatment Courts as an alternative to incar-
ceration for certain types of drug offenders and financial intelligence units 
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to prevent money laundering; implement computer emergency response 
teams to tackle cyber threats; strengthen detection techniques to identify 
suspicious cargo; expose cases of human trafficking and adopt better tech-
niques to manage risks at airports and sea ports; mark and manage fire-
arms; reduce the demand and supply of illicit substances; and help millions 
of victims. We have also been a lead player in the gang truce in El Salvador, 
leading programs to promote alternatives for at-risk youth and former gang 
members trying to reintegrate back into society, and I am a member of the 
Commission to Reform the Security Sector in Honduras where I have been 
tasked with investigating corruption and redesigning security institutions. 
These are important tactical results but it is clear that we need to be more 
strategic. 
The Declaration on Security in the Americas is now ten years old. In its 
days, this was a forward-looking document that helped member states start 
to define the new and emerging threats to international security that have 
accompanied globalization, and the need to place a higher value on citizen 
security. It started to identify some of the future challenges in dealing with 
the multidimensional nature of risks we face, but left the possible mitigating 
strategies undeveloped. 
I am not sure though that this Declaration could have predicted how 
rapid this evolution would be—how information, technology, communica-
tions, and transportation would challenge the norms of global governance 
and the international system. Never before have we had to contend with the 
sheer volume, speed, and diversity of people and commodities that cross our 
borders both legally and illegally. This openness, in the exchange of informa-
tion and knowledge through the internet and social media, or global travel, 
migration, trade, and banking, has benefited Canada as we are a trading 
country, but it is this very openness that also places us and others at risk. 
It is estimated that the illicit economy ranges from 1 to 15 percent of 
global GDP. Even on the low side, this puts it at US$718 billion. We estimate 
in our soon to be released drug study that the trade in illicit drugs in our 
hemisphere alone to be in the range of $150 billion per year. This is half the 
GDP of Alberta just from illicit drugs. 
This vast illicit income has financed the growth and fortification of vio-
lent organized criminal enterprises. Their adaptability, innovativeness and 
increasing convergence gives them ever-improving ability to circumvent 
official countermeasures and overcome logistical challenges, as well as de-
velop even better tools for exploiting weaknesses and opportunities within 
the state system, indeed attacking that system, not to mention the people.
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We cannot forget that people and families are bearing a heavy cost. They 
are many times caught in the crossfire, both literal and figurative, of the battle 
between the criminal groups and law enforcement. In 2011 the hemisphere 
recorded 150,000 homicides related to organized crime. Firearms were used 
in 75 percent of these homicides, whereas the global average is 40 percent. 
USAID reports that there are over 900 gangs in Central America alone, re-
sulting in a “fear of crime.”
Trafficking, smuggling, and irregular migration has now become a major 
business line for transnational organized crime groups. While it is impossible 
to know with certainty, there are estimates from the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) that report as high as $32 billion in annual income from 
these activities. According to a 2005 International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) report, trafficking in women and girls for purposes of sexual exploita-
tion has become a $16-billion-a-year business in Latin America.
At a recent Regional World Economic Forum meeting in Lima, I had 
a unique opportunity to mingle with the presidents of Peru, Mexico, and 
Panama, and many senior ministers and key business actors. At the Forum, 
I noted some common themes from the senior level speakers, regardless of 
ideology; comprehensive reform, continuity, state policies, social and eco-
nomic development, inclusive societies, and open for business.
Similarly they all recognize that crime, violence and insecurity are a 
drag on their business and prosperity. The Inter-American Development 
Bank estimates that Latin America’s per capita GDP would be 25 percent 
higher if the region’s crime rate were reduced to the world average. Crime 
increases costs; it drives away investment and forces states to re-direct their 
already limited resources towards security. Canada boasts low crime and 
violence rates, but it sends millions of tourists, invests billions of dollars each 
year, and has signed seven free trade agreements in the last five years. So 
clearly, Canadian interests are not immune to these security concerns. 
This, unfortunately, is only half of the story. How much of the illicit 
economy is flowing across our borders? Where do the cocaine, heroin, and 
methamphetamines come from? How many gangs do we have in our cities, 
some that were started elsewhere? All you have to do is look at the econom-
ics or business of crime to know that the risks are also here as we are major 
consumers of the illicit economy.
What Can We Do About the Problems: Smart Security
The solution to the problem of insecurity is not necessarily more security; 
such as police, troops, and heavy-handed anti-crime legislation. We know 
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that we are not going to arrest our way out of the problem. Rather, we 
need to refocus strategically on a humanistic approach; on areas like pre-
vention and keeping youth out of the gangs in the first place. We also need 
to ensure that there is no impunity for those that do commit a crime, that 
they are punished by criminal justice systems that are professional and 
trustworthy, and that the punishment is humane and fosters the reintegra-
tion of offenders back into society to hopefully lead useful and productive 
lives. 
Looking ahead for the next ten years I see Multidimensional Security 
converging to what I would call “shared security,” which looks at three core 
and interconnected themes; new concepts of networked sovereignty; inclu-
sive multi-stakeholder states; and resilient communities where citizens have 
a renewed consciousness of their rights and obligations. Success will require, 
first and foremost, confidence. Confidence is the great enabler and multiplier; 
impunity is the enemy.
Networked Sovereignty: Strong States
Let us start with shared sovereignty. Historically, most countries used 
multilateral fora to try and protect their sovereignty rather than enhance it. 
This might have worked twenty-five years ago but we now live in an era 
of global borders and virtual territories. Globalization and our open econ-
omies, open societies, and open technologies have advanced so quickly it 
has far outpaced our traditional governance models. The lack of capacity in 
some countries has led to either the militarization of security, the privatiza-
tion of security or, frankly, no security. What is required is a citizen-centred 
or a people approach. We also need to start changing the indicators or we 
are going to be stuck measuring homicide rates, prison populations and 
drug seizures. It is hard but essential that we rebuild the confidence of the 
citizenry in their police and rule of law institutions through well-articu-
lated and well-designed prevention, community policing, and correction 
models.
We have successfully developed global financial systems, global tel-
ecommunications networks, and global supply chains. It is clear that the 
response to transnational threats require the same approach—a multi-state 
response system which must devise comprehensive and multidimensional 
strategies and policies that reinforce collaboration, build confidence across 
jurisdictions, and ensure that there is no sense of criminal impunity, which 
is surely the greatest threat to our sovereignty today. 
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Inclusive Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Governance
This leads to my next point about helping others create a modern multi-
stakeholder approach to the building of robust, resilient, and responsive 
state institutions to support long-term public policies. The Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (IADC) is over a decade old and we should be very proud 
that almost all of our countries have a democratically elected government, al-
beit of mixed quality, but democratic principles have advanced significantly. 
What, in my view, is the next challenge is the creation of professional and 
inclusive state institutions that are capable of providing essential services, 
opportunities, and support to their citizens on the one hand, and, on the 
other, are able to understand that a mature and sophisticated democracy at 
its best is messy and even messier in the multi-stakeholder connected soci-
eties in which we live today. Messy meaning that now we have even more 
actors with a multiplicity of interests and concerns. 
Examples of this can be found in the fields of cyber security and money 
laundering. In both cases major parts of the infrastructure are in the hands of 
the private sector. Whereas if you look at the drug study we are working on, 
in many countries, NGOs or the not-for-profit sector are providing prevention 
and treatment services. The private sector can play a very important role here, 
by not corrupting and helping with the development of modern transparent 
tools like accounting, business management, and ISO-like (International 
Organization for Standardization) rigor in the development of the processes 
of government. This is important because for the multi-stakeholder approach 
to be effective, it must be built on mutual trust and confidence.
Resilient Societies 
Petty/common or transnational organized crime in all its manifestations 
will continue to be insufficient if we do not address the underlying social 
conditions that allow these activities to take root. We must work to build up 
the social capital of our communities, which can be measured in levels of 
trust, teamwork, and cohesiveness. Young persons in a supportive, inclusive 
society are less vulnerable than those who are isolated. Resilient societies 
are built from the bottom up, through grass-roots level community-based 
initiatives like cultural programs for underprivileged communities, vo-
cational training programs, basic skills for a successful life, programs for 
young and under-educated parents, and community-based policing pro-
grams, to list a few. 
Resilient societies must simultaneously be supported from the highest 
levels of government. Leadership must address such issues as economic 
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inequity, access to quality education, healthcare, good governance, and pub-
lic trust. The convergence of not doing this is what I call “social warming.” 
Today, we essentially have a better connected and better educated popula-
tion. The lives and behaviours of persons in public office are more public 
than ever and today citizens are more outspoken and have higher expecta-
tions than in the past. 
As democracy has improved in the Hemisphere, so too has the economy. 
The Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
says that we have been able to reduce poverty levels by over 40 percent over 
the last ten years. Unfortunately, we have not been as successful at reduc-
ing inequality by more than 4 percent. This remains the Achilles heel and 
it is clear that without shared development there is no security, and without 
security there is no development. 
If all of this seems unobtainable, I can assure you that there are models 
of success out there that we need to start duplicating in a much more rigorous 
manner. To bring what I have mentioned so far to the ground and away from 
the abstract, take, for example, the story of Colombia. Ten to fifteen years 
ago this country was as close to being considered a failed state as possible. 
Through strong leadership, good international cooperation, and inter-state 
coordination, Colombia has begun the long hard slog to rebuild itself. Today, 
Colombia has stronger institutions, a robust democracy and civil society, 
and economic opportunities for a greater number of its citizens. Colombia 
is becoming a global player—potentially joining the OECD, promoting 
international security cooperation across the hemisphere and helping us 
at the OAS document their police experience and ISO certification models. 
Of course, this transformation did not happen overnight. It involved a lot 
of assistance and policy coordination to reduce impunity and rebuild the 
confidence of its citizens. 
One such example was the OAS led Mission to Support the Peace Process 
in Colombia, or MAPP-Colombia. Established in 1994, the mandate of this 
Mission was to contribute to peacebuilding in Colombia by working with 
different sectors of society; providing support to the initiatives of the govern-
ment and civil society groups; and supporting local initiatives in the conflict 
areas. In Colombian communities, MAPP worked to re-build trust, promote 
reconciliation, and strengthen democracy at the local level. The MAPP 
Mission employed three strategies to help in this re-building process: shared 
sovereignty; a multi-stakeholder approach; and stronger resilient societies. 
In using this three-pronged approach, it succeeded in re-instating trust and 
confidence, the real multiplier. 
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We know there are a variety of different problems, but we need to be 
smart about solutions and draw from successful models. Our office has 
drawn on the experience of MAPP in Colombia in our strategic approach 
to addressing insecurity in Central America and the Caribbean, which we 
have dubbed “MAS Centro- America” and “MAS Caribbean.” Using this 
approach, we are working at every level (regional, national, municipal) with 
different actors (including private sector, NGOs, civil society groups) to 
strengthen the capacity of states and institutions to respond to their security 
threats, as well as to emphasize the importance of community development 
and resilience through prevention programs. If, as in the case of El Salvador, 
this means open dialogue with the gang leaders, then so be it, as there is 
no solution in a country that a year ago was the most violent in the world 
without dealing with the major cause of that violence.
The TRUST of the Americas is an excellent example of this approach. The 
not-for-profit organization, run by Linda Eddleman, is building partnerships 
with local organizations in communities across the hemisphere to provide 
vulnerable populations with alternate development opportunities. At the 
same time, they are coordinating their activities with governments and 
the private sector to promote economic and social inclusion for maximum 
impact. 
We are convinced that a multidimensional, multi-stakeholder, coordin-
ated joint effort is the only logical way forward. What comes as no surprise 
is that we have found that the best solutions are those that are built on an 
accurate diagnosis of the problems, tailored to the local environment, and 
must adopt a multi-stakeholder horizontal approach in its delivery and 
evaluation. The international community also needs to do a much better job 
of coordinating its assistance, recognizing its role as illicit consumers, and 
helping those societies that are struggling.
Note
1 The Report on the Drug Problems in the Americas was released by the OAS on May 
17, 2013, and can be accessed at www.cicad.oas.org. 
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The Future of Inter-American Relations
Peter Hakim, President Emeritus,  
Inter-American Dialogue
In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, there emerged for a time what appeared to be a relatively wide agreement in the United States and much of Latin America regarding the direction hemispheric relations 
should take. The convergence focused on renewed efforts to achieve inter-
American cooperation and integration along three axes—economic, political, 
and institutional.
Most nations welcomed the 1990 proposal of President George H.W. 
Bush to build toward an integrated economic bloc, a hemisphere-wide trade 
area that would allow for the free flow of capital and goods among all the 
countries of the Americas. The new bloc, later named the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), was intended to improve the competitiveness of the 
hemisphere’s economies, and enable them to keep up with the economically 
integrated nations of the European Union and with Japan and the fast grow-
ing “tigers” of East Asia. The increasingly market-oriented Latin American 
economies had begun to unilaterally reduce their trade barriers, and saw 
the value of joining a regional free trade arrangement effectively led by the 
United States.
Second, the idea that democracy was the only valid form of govern-
ment was taking firm root across the Americas. Free and fair elections were 
widely accepted as the only legitimate way to secure power. By 1991, every 
country in Latin America except for Cuba could boast an elected govern-
ment. Moreover, the hemisphere’s governments approved Organization of 
American States (OAS) resolutions requiring collective action to protect and 
strengthen democratic governance in all nations of the Americas. This com-
mitment to collective responsibility was subsequently codified in 2001, when 
every country of the hemisphere (except Cuba) signed the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (IADC).
Third, the OAS was seen as providing the crucial institutional frame-
work for regional governance and cooperation. It was supplemented in 1994 
by the newly launched Summit of the Americas process, which was designed 
to regularly assemble the hemisphere’s heads of state.
This three-pronged convergence, which represented more of an aspira-
tion than a firm commitment from the governments, has mostly evaporated. 
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Negotiations toward a hemispheric trade bloc were halted in 2005 after 
several years of limited progress, largely because the United States and 
Brazil could not find common ground on several key issues. The Democratic 
Charter has hardly ever been invoked, despite many notorious violations of 
democratic practice. And, after many setbacks, the OAS and Summit of the 
Americas are both weakened institutions. Today, there is a lack of anything 
near a consensus on hemispheric relations. 
Diminishing Ties Between Latin America and the United States
The United States and Latin America have been drifting apart for a decade 
or more. Still, the United States remains the most important external eco-
nomic presence in Latin America—even though it has been steadily losing 
ground to Europe and China, which is now the leading commercial partner 
of several Latin American countries. The United States is the first or second 
largest trade partner for nearly every country in the region. No other nation 
invests more in Latin America, transfers more technology, or is the source of 
more remittances and overseas aid (although the latter is focused mainly on 
public security and drug-related issues). While its relative economic signifi-
cance will continue to diminish in the coming period, the United States will 
surely sustain a robust commercial and financial relationship with Latin 
America.
U.S. political engagement in Latin America has suffered a faster decline. 
Washington no longer has much influence on most issues and decisions in 
the region, particularly in South America. U.S. capacity to shape the region’s 
agenda or affect specific decisions has diminished considerably—and its 
interest in doing so has shrunk as well. Washington has sharply reduced its 
involvement in conflict and crisis resolution in Latin America, both within 
or between countries. The Latin Americans themselves have taken on these 
tasks, often making use of new regional and sub-regional institutions in 
which neither the United States nor Canada participate.
The United States today has no unifying vision or common approach 
to Latin America. U.S. policy is largely directed to Mexico and Central 
America, driven by geographical proximity, economic and demographic in-
tegration, and concerns about security and drug trafficking. Brazil—because 
of its size, economic potential, and regional and global influence—also com-
mands U.S. attention. The two countries, however, have not identified any 
clear path toward a closer, more cooperative relationship, either political or 
economic.
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Diverging Trajectories in Latin America
Economically, Latin America has divided itself into two blocs. One includes 
the eleven countries that have free trade agreements with the United States, 
virtually all of which are seeking even stronger U.S. commercial ties. The 
other bloc consists of the five members of Mercosur and two aspirants. 
Nearly all of them enjoy substantial economic relations with the United 
States, but few have shown much interest in developing more formal com-
mercial ties. There is currently no overlap between the two blocs. Of twenty 
Latin American countries, only Haiti and Cuba belong to neither.
Regional politics are even more divisive. Among Latin American 
countries, there is no agreement on (a) what norms have to be satisfied for 
a government to be considered democratic; (b) what should be viewed as a 
violation of democratic practice, to be corrected and possibly sanctioned; (c) 
how persistent violators should be dealt with; (d) who should be the judge of 
whether violations are taking place; and (e) what role the OAS should play in 
preventing, judging, and responding to violations.
Other trends are also evident. Perhaps the most important is Brazil’s 
assumption of a more active and important regional leadership role, particu-
larly in South America—although it does not yet appear fully comfortable in 
that role or certain of its objectives. Venezuela is in a transition. During the 
Chávez years, the Venezuelan government was time and again a disruptive 
force in inter-American relations. The new government of Nicolás Maduro 
remains hostile to the United States, but Venezuela’s significance in the post-
Chávez era is in question.
Latin American countries are diversifying and strengthening their ties 
outside the Western Hemisphere. China’s presence is expanding almost 
everywhere in Latin America, including countries that still do not officially 
recognize the Beijing government. Chinese trade, investment, and land 
purchases have all exploded in the last ten years, particularly in commodity 
exporting nations. It is reasonable to expect growing political influence in 
the region as well, even as the Chinese government has insisted on its only 
limited interest beyond economics and commerce. 
Looking Ahead
The critical question, however, is not where inter-American relations stand 
today, but where they are headed in the coming decades. What follows are 
four possible scenarios for the evolution of hemispheric affairs. They should 
not be viewed as predictions. Indeed, the most likely outcome is probably 
some unexpected combination of several of the scenarios. Instead they are 
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meant to contribute to an understanding of the principal factors that will 
likely shape the future of hemispheric affairs—and stimulate a discussion of 
policies that would lead to productive outcomes.
Scenario I: The Drift Continues
The most likely scenario is that inter-American relations remain on their 
present course. The United States continues gradually to disengage politic-
ally from most of the region. Economic relations expand with many coun-
tries, but the U.S. share of total trade and investments keeps falling as China 
and other extra-hemispheric nations increase their share. Reflecting evolving 
political forces, social changes, and national aspirations, hemispheric ties 
may become less structured and perhaps less coherent. Relations among the 
countries of Latin America could become more tense and divisive.
For the United States, the scenario involves increasingly selective engage-
ment, directed to specific issues, countries, and events—without much atten-
tion to developing a broader strategy for U.S. relations with Latin America. 
U.S. interest in issues of regional scope will continue to recede. 
U.S. engagement remains strong only in Mexico and Central America, but 
even there it will be less intrusive as the countries become more independent 
and assertive. Latin America’s foreign relations grow increasingly diverse 
as globalization opens up new opportunities and weakens hemispheric ties. 
Within Latin America, countries continue to diverge and disagree; in some 
cases their differences may intensify in the absence of a significant U.S. pres-
ence. The distancing of the United States and Latin America combined with 
the divisions within the region will likely continue to diminish the import-
ance of the OAS and Summits of the Americas.
Scenario II: A Return to the Pan-American Vision
With Chávez gone, the anti-U.S. alliance, ALBA, loses what is left of its drive, 
direction, and determination. Venezuela faces deeper political and economic 
challenges and no longer has the money or unity to play much of inter-
national role. No effective replacement for Chávez and Venezuelan resources 
emerge, and what is left of extreme opposition to U.S. engagement in Latin 
America fades in importance.
There is broad movement towards the center—regarding relations with 
the United States and political and economic issues generally. This shift 
may already be occurring in many countries and should lead to an easing 
of tension and division between Atlantic and Pacific nations, and between 
North and South American countries. Most Latin American countries in-
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creasingly adopt orthodox macroeconomic policies, their economies become 
more closely aligned, and they expand attention to issues of equality and 
social justice. The continued emergence and strengthening of the middle 
class helps to sustain a pragmatic centrism in most countries, and allows for 
an increasingly shared understanding of democratic principles and the rule 
of law.
Mexico and Brazil recognize the value of closer bilateral ties and more 
regional and global cooperation. For its part, Brazil—whose differences with 
the United States have frustrated hemispheric economic integration efforts—
becomes increasingly concerned about its long-term economic prospects. It 
recognizes the Mercosur trade bloc as mainly consisting of unstable, eco-
nomically hobbled partners. Brazil is also painfully aware that other Latin 
American nations (Peru, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico) 
show greater dynamism and brighter economic futures than the Mercosur 
group. If U.S. negotiations with Europe and Asia are successful in creating 
new trade agreements, Brazil knows that its global competitiveness will 
shrink further. Meanwhile, its expanding middle class presses for faster 
growth and improved government performance. All of these factors should 
push Brazil toward greater economic pragmatism and openness, and toward 
stronger commercial ties with the United States and the higher performing 
Latin American nations.
The appeal of the Pan-American vision increases as the United States 
decisively emerges from slow growth and high unemployment, and man-
ages to overcome its current political hyper-polarization. A more prosperous 
and unified U.S. modifies policies that have long caused friction with Latin 
America in the past, including Washington’s approaches to drugs, immigra-
tion, and Cuba. The United States is viewed as a more responsible and more 
respectful neighbor.
In this scenario, hemispheric economic cooperation becomes more 
viable, perhaps opening the way for resumed negotiations toward a hemi-
spheric free trade arrangement. The OAS takes on a more forceful role in 
regional affairs, and progress toward economic integration allows enhanced 
political cooperation.
Scenario III: Latin American Solidarity
Exactly as in the previous scenario, a broad movement towards the center 
leads to improved relations among Latin American nations. Most Latin 
American governments pursue similar economic and social policies, solid 
(not spectacular) growth rates are attained across the region, middle classes 
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continue to expand, and a shared understanding of democratic practice 
emerges. The left and right extremes are rarely able to win elections. Latin 
America’s two giants, Mexico and Brazil, recognize the value of closer eco-
nomic ties, and greater international coordination.
During this period of Latin American convergence around centrist pol-
itics and economics, the United States remains unable to regain an adequate 
trajectory of economic growth, the country’s politics remain dysfunctional, 
and it finds itself overextended internationally. After conservative triumphs 
in presidential and congressional elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020, immigra-
tion legislation becomes more restrictive and exclusionary, harsher sanctions 
are imposed on a post-Castro Cuba, and U.S. policy in Latin America focuses 
mostly on drug and security issues and trade disputes.
Under this scenario, political and diplomatic relations remain cordial 
but the United States’ importance in the region declines sharply. The United 
States no longer plays a major role in regional affairs. Conflicts between 
countries or crises within them are addressed by Latin American govern-
ments. The United States remains an important economic partner for many 
nations in Latin America, although a weak U.S. economy leads Latin America 
to focus increasing attention on other trade partners and investors.
The OAS and Summits lose most of their role in hemispheric affairs. 
Latin American institutions take on many of their responsibilities.
Scenario IV: A Hostile Relationship
There remains a possibility that Latin American nations could become in-
creasingly hostile or antagonistic toward the United States. Some variant 
of the anti-U.S. sentiment promoted by Hugo Chávez could take hold in a 
significant number of countries in the region.
Developments in the United States would be the same as those outlined 
in the previous scenario—a continuing U.S. economic slump combined with 
highly polarized politics and increasingly isolationist foreign policies.
At the same time, Venezuela and Argentina unexpectedly rebound from 
their economic setbacks, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner takes firm control 
of Argentina politics, and Maduro or a Chavista successor does the same in 
Venezuela. Brazil and Mexico, along with several other countries, enter a per-
iod of slow or zero growth again, leaving both their low-income populations 
and what had been expanding middle classes vulnerable and frustrated. 
Populist, authoritarian leaders win elections in many countries.
Although extensive economic ties remain in place, neither the United 
States nor Latin America retains much interest in collaborating with the 
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other. Regional organizations, like the OAS and the Summits of the Americas 
become moribund, if they survive at all.
Some Final Observations
Interestingly, of the four scenarios, only the last (by far, the least likely) would 
necessarily be damaging to long-term U.S. interests, and probably to Latin 
American interests as well. 
The Pan-American scenario (Scenario II) is most appealing—in part be-
cause we are long accustomed to hearing it portrayed as an ideal model for 
inter-American relations, but also because it would likely lead to most pro-
ductive outcomes for both the United States and most countries of the region. 
But the factors responsible for the already attenuated U.S.-Latin American 
relationship may have sunk any prospects of a return to the Pan-American 
framework, at least anytime soon.
Since neither the United States nor the countries of the region seem will-
ing to do very much at this point to rebuild vibrant, collaborative relations 
the best that is hoped is a continuation of some form of selective engage-
ment (see Scenario I). This allows for countries, including the United States, 
to choose the partners and allies with which it wants to work, and establish 
appropriate distance from others. It does mean, however, that there will 
be only limited commitment to any common set of norms or hemispheric 
institutions. 
Latin American solidarity (Scenario III) should not be considered a par-
ticularly intolerable outcome, particularly if it leads to improved and more 
constructive relations among the countries of Latin America, and enables 
them to develop joint approaches to critical domestic, regional, and inter-
national issues and needed institutional arrangements to put them into 
practice. The United States and Latin America might even benefit from a per-
iod of disengagement—rather than trying to sustain what has increasingly 
become, at least for most countries, a largely empty rhetoric of partnership 
and community.
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Introduction
In this paper I define what I mean by the concept “civil-military rela-tions” (CMR), discuss the different roles and missions security forces are currently expected to fulfill, and assess the challenges to implementing 
democratic civil-military relations by analyzing the incentives motivating 
civilian decision-makers in the broad areas of national security and defense. 
The paper builds on my previous publications in civil-military relations, 
and seeks to elaborate on the perspective of David Pion-Berlin and Harold 
Trinkunas in their work focusing on the incentives motivating civilian 
decision-makers in Latin America. It draws extensively from my work with 
the Center for Civil-Military Relations between 1996 and today in conducting 
week-long seminars for high level officers and civilians on various aspects of 
democratic civil-military relations throughout Latin America. Specifically I 
use the opportunity of looking back to more than a decade and a half of con-
ducting programs promoting democratic civil-military relations in the region 
and analyze their impact, if any. I have kept notes and files on the programs 
I conducted, which included all countries between the United States and the 
Antarctic but for Guyana and Venezuela. Unfortunately, in looking back I 
have found in most countries minimal progress, and in several (including 
Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) regression. While the emphasis in this 
paper will be on the lack of progress, I will also include, near the end of the 
paper, the cases of Chile and Colombia where there has been clear progress. 
And I will attempt to explain that progress in terms of incentives for civil-
ians, in these two countries versus all of the others, to become interested and 
invest political capital and resources in national security and defense.1 My 
overall analytical goal in this paper, as well as in my other publications, is to 
put on a more empirical basis the analysis of civil-military relations, which 
until now has been heavily normative and minimally empirical. To under-
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stand the central issues of CMR, requires a framework, and that framework, 
with comparative evidence, is a key part of this paper. My focus is on the 
necessary, if not sufficient, requirements for the components of civil-military 
relations that I posit. To suggest what could be possible, I will compare and 
contrast the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Partnership 
for Peace (NATO/PfP) regions with those in Latin America. And, since in 
democracies, including even new democracies, civilian politicians make 
the main decisions, the focus will be overwhelmingly on them and not on 
military officers.
Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations
Traditional concepts of civil-military relations focus almost exclusively on 
the one dimension of democratic civilian control of the security forces, and 
on these forces in terms of their preparation for and engagement in trad-
itional territorial defense and war fighting.2 Yet, if we even superficially re-
view what the armed forces and other security forces in fact do, and are pre-
pared to do in the contemporary world, war-fighting is probably the least 
likely role and for which most forces in most countries are only minimally 
prepared. In a recent chapter on roles and missions of the armed forces by a 
retired U.S. Navy captain, he posits five different macro roles that he argues 
predominantly characterize countries and their armed forces. Of these five, 
citing as examples the United States, Russia, China, France, and India, only 
one is concerned with war fighting. The others include what he terms roles 
as defender, peacekeeper, fire fighter, and police officer. According to this author, 
the Latin American countries fit within the last three categories.3 In an arti-
cle by a respected British scholar on civil-military relations and security sec-
tor reform, the title alone conveys the sense of the article. In What are armed 
forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe, Timothy Edmunds 
identifies four roles for European militaries in the post-Cold War era. These 
are the following: war-fighting, peacekeeping, internal security, and nation-
building.4 Going beyond Europe, in our own work with a global perspec-
tive, we have identified six major roles. These are: war-fighting, fighting 
internal wars, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, supporting the police in 
combatting organized crime and gangs, and supporting civilian authorities 
in humanitarian disasters.5 There could be a seventh if we consider the fifty 
countries under NATO in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan as something other than peacekeeping, fighting internal 
wars, or combatting terrorism.6 Further, there could be yet another role if 
we take Paul Collier in his Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous 
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Places seriously where he apparently advocates the use of armed forces to 
intervene and overthrow dictatorial regimes, mainly in Africa. (Lest I am 
accused of misunderstanding his point, here is Collier’s text: “The core 
proposal of this book is a strategy whereby a small intervention from the 
international community can harness the political violence internal to the 
societies of the bottom billion. This powerful force that to date has been so 
destructive can be turned to advantage, becoming the defender of democ-
racy rather than its antithesis”.7 It is clear to me that if we even minimally 
investigate what military forces are in fact doing, what becomes obvious 
is that there are 116 countries that are currently involved in peacekeeping 
under the United Nations.8 There are the fifty countries participating in 
ISAF. In certain countries and regions, including Brazil, most of Central 
America, Mexico, and South Africa, the armed forces support, or have even 
supplanted the police in dealing with domestic sources of violence. And 
everywhere, military forces support civilian authorities in responding to 
humanitarian disasters brought about by volcanoes, earthquakes, hurri-
canes, tsunamis, and the like.
Once we broaden the focus on military roles and missions to what 
they are in fact doing today, we encounter yet greater problems in logic and 
methodology in assessing their effectiveness. For, even if we limit our focus 
to only traditional territorial defense and war fighting, we encounter the 
logical fallacy of proving a negative. That is, how to evaluate wars that do 
not happen? It can be argued, for example, that due to nuclear deterrence 
between the United States and former Soviet Union in the Cold War, there 
was never a hot war. Or, when a country does not attack another due to the 
perception of military strength of the latter? Or, how to assess intelligence 
successes vs. intelligence failures, when those involved, either intelligence 
professionals or special operation forces, cannot talk or write about oper-
ations? When we broaden the focus to the roles and missions that armed 
forces are actually fulfilling, it becomes all but impossible to assess effect-
iveness. Peacekeeping can continue, as is the case with the UN missions in 
India and Pakistan since 1949, Cyprus since 1964, Syria since 1974, Lebanon 
since 1978, and the Western Sahara since 1991, for as long as troop-contribu-
tors can be found.9 Failed states, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, will 
require peacekeepers for the foreseeable future. Organized crime, street 
gangs, and natural disasters result in serious human and security challen-
ges that can be mitigated, but probably never resolved. In short, it is all but 
impossible to assess effectiveness without making so many assumptions as 
to seriously damage reality.
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A Broader Concept of Civil-Military Relations
If I have accurately identified a major problem in traditional approaches to 
civil-military relations for focusing only on traditional territorial defense and 
war-fighting, an equally important lapse is the exclusive focus on democratic 
civilian control. This is the focus in the traditional literature, beginning with 
Samuel Huntington, and it has been brought forward in the more recent 
focus on democratic transitions and consolidation.10 My colleagues and I have 
argued tirelessly in print, that in addition to control, the conceptualization 
of CMR must also include effectiveness in the implementation of the roles 
and missions.11 In our recently published Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military 
Relations we have assessed sixteen countries in terms of either control or ef-
fectiveness, or both. The assessments can be found in Table 1.
Considering that, as argued above, effectiveness is virtually impossible 
to assess, short of making a great number of unfounded assumptions, we 
focus on the necessary, if not sufficient, requirements to achieve control or 
effectiveness, or both.
It is clear in Table 1 (p. 103) that there are major differences between the 
NATO and PfP countries and those in other areas. For example, the only 
NATO/PfP country that ranks low in any of the six categories is Moldova, 
whereas in the other, non-NATO/PfP countries the lowest rank is 2, 3, 3, 4, 3, 
4. Or, conversely, in the high rank, whereas the NATO/PfP countries are 8, 3, 7, 
2, 5, and 2 for the other countries there are 4, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1. It is particularly clear 
that the lowest, or the least high, pertain to the dimensions of effectiveness.
My argument is that the requirements for accession to NATO and PfP, 
the Bologna Process, not to mention European Union (EU) and Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and ensuing membership 
demands, motivates them to create the institutions for both control and ef-
fectiveness. I have found in doing CMR programs in older NATO members, 
including Portugal, as well as newer ones, including Bulgaria and Romania, 
and even those desiring less than NATO membership (Armenia and 
Moldova), that the requirements of the Membership Action Plans require 
these countries desirous of membership to fulfill extensive categories that 
amount to democratic civilian control and effectiveness (on Membership 
Action Plan for accession to NATO, NATO 2012). These requirements are not 
duplicated in other parts of the world, and my argument is, therefore, the 
presence, or more likely absence, of these requirements is up to the civilian 
decision-makers. In analyzing whether or not they will fulfill these require-
ments, we turn to the concept of incentives; that is, the incentives for the 
civilian decision-makers to provide these requirements.
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Incentives to Use Resources for National Security and Defense
An approach analyzing the incentives civilian decision-makers possess to 
use the resources to which they have access will, I believe, prove useful 
in further elaborating my approach to analysis. I will apply the concept of 
resources to each of the requirements for control and effectiveness. One 
cannot only examine the resources in a positive way, what may be gained, 
but equally in a negative manner in terms of what may be lost; what may 
be the costs to the political decision-maker. Further, I will illustrate each of 
the dimensions I review with anecdotal evidence from my own personal 
observations in fourteen countries in Latin America since 1996 in order to 
illustrate the points. Again, the ratings are based on the balance, or net result, 
of the positive and negative aspects regarding politicians and the resources 
to which they have access.
What are the resources that political decision-maker have access to? 
There are two prior considerations before we discuss resources. First, aspir-
ing politicians are not decision-makers until and unless they are elected. 
Max Weber provides some insight on this issue: “We wish to understand 
by politics only the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership of a pol-
itical association, hence today of a state.” He continues by stating: “All party 
struggles are struggle for the patronage of office, as well as struggles for 
objective goals”.12 Today, in modern democracies, elections—votes—are the 
key to politicians’ calculations. And in power, politicians have access to re-
sources by virtue of their role in using the powers of a government. This 
can be as directly elected members of the executive or legislative bodies, or 
as advisors or staffers proximate to these decision-makers and influencing 
their decisions. It seems to me, based upon research on secondary materials 
and observation of and interviews with civilian decision-makers, that they 
have access to two main resources: first, political capital, meaning the ability, 
or influence, to affect or change something using their access to the pow-
ers available in government. Second, the use of money, derived from taxes 
and other government generated sources, and applying it to one purpose or 
function and another. And, to emphasize again, the focus here is on civilian 
decision-makers, for once a democracy has been consolidated the civilians 
can take control over all areas of policies, including national security and 
defense. They may decide not to, but they can and in most cases do. My basic 
question here is—what do the politicians gain, or lose, in attempting to imple-
ment any of the requirements for control and effectiveness? What, finally on 
balance, is the cost—high, medium, or low—in terms of use of resources for 
the following six dimensions?
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Control Power Money
Inst. Low Low
Oversight High Medium
PME High High
effectiveness
Plan High Medium
Inst. High Low
$ High High
Indicators of the Dimensions
Utilizing evidence from countries that are members of NATO and PfP, the 
following indicators are used to evaluate each of the six dimensions. As 
the central institution of democratic civil-military relations, the creation of 
a ministry of defense is clearly the main indicator of institutionalization 
of democratic civil-military relations. Indeed, for NATO membership, the 
presence of a civilian-led ministry of defense (MOD) is the sine qua non for 
membership. Thus, the mere creation of a civilian-led MOD is the criterion 
for this dimension.13
Oversight requires not only a MOD, but also a MOD staffed with know-
ledgeable civilians who are qualified to make inquiries and empowered to 
do something about what they find. And, it also requires either a functioning 
national security council, or its equivalent, and/or a defense committee in the 
legislature that can keep track of what is, or is not, going on.14
Reform of professional military education (PME) is necessary to demo-
cratic civil-military relations since during pre-democratic times the military 
everywhere had a monopoly on education. There is little point in changing 
structures to more democratic civil-military relations unless the culture of 
the officer corps is changed. This is the case in the NATO/PfP countries, and 
has been accelerated by the so-called Bologna Process by which civilians 
have asserted their control over all education, including military education.15 
For our purposes here, reform of PME means, at a minimum, proof that civil-
ians have asserted control over PME, either through a ministry of education 
or through reforms directed by a civilian-led MOD.
A plan or strategy is necessary to demonstrate to the security forces, the 
population itself, and the outside world, that there is some plan or strategy 
for what the country intends to do with the forces. In the NATO and PfP 
areas, this is included in the individual partnership action plans (IPAP).
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Organizations for operational effectiveness encompass, today, the cre-
ation of joint or general commands whereby the forces can be employed for 
specific purposes. The emphasis must be on joint commands since it is hard 
to imagine any military situation that does not require the use of more than 
one of the armed forces. This is a tricky issue since creation of such a struc-
ture demonstrates that a country has gone beyond taming the armed forces, 
to once again empowering them. But, there are cases, including Portugal, 
where the author has personally verified that the civilians have gone beyond 
control to effectiveness.16
Finally, without some level of resources, it is inconceivable that a coun-
try’s security forces can be effective. Obviously the question comes up as 
to “effective at what” since not all countries will seek to implement a full 
spectrum of roles and missions. But, if we can identify the level, and also 
identify the percentage assigned to personnel costs, we can have an idea of 
what is involved.
As I reviewed my notes from conducting programs in Latin America 
since 1996 what stands out most clearly are two facts: first, it has been a rela-
tively long period of time during which countries stated publicly and were 
expected to create the institutions for both control and effectiveness; and, 
second, how little progress has been achieved in all but a few countries.
Creating the Institutions for Control of the Armed Forces
1. This is the one area that is relatively positive in Latin America. 
The fundamental organization is a civilian-led ministry of 
defense. Even so, it was only in 1999 and 2000 that a MOD 
was created in Brazil and Nicaragua respectively. It should 
also be noted that there is still no MOD in Mexico, but rather 
two secretariats, one for the army and air force and another 
for the navy, headed by a general or admiral respectively. It 
takes neither much power nor money to establish a ministry of 
defense. In short, all but Mexico have created MODs, although 
by law in Guatemala the minister is an active duty senior of-
ficer, and the same is the case by tradition in El Salvador. On 
balance, creating a MOD demands relatively low political and 
economic resources.
Establishing Oversight Mechanisms
2. To create oversight mechanisms, however, is much more 
onerous in terms of politicians’ resources than just creating 
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a MOD. Oversight can be done by a MOD that is well staffed 
by sufficient numbers of prepared personnel, and by either 
a functioning national security council or well-staffed com-
mittees in the legislature. What stands out clearly in the vast 
majority of countries in the region is the lack of these well-
staffed institutions. We have seen clear regression in the staff-
ing of the MODs in Ecuador and Guatemala, and the prepared 
civilians we have helped train in El Salvador and Honduras 
have never achieved decision-making positions in these de-
fense institutions. I have verified in Bolivia and Ecuador that 
the National Security Council (NSC)—equivalent, Consejo 
Nacional de Seguridad (COSENA) in both countries—do not 
function. To achieve these civilian capacities, which would go 
against the tradition of military dominance, will require both 
political capital and substantial funds. So far, but for Chile and 
Colombia, this has not been done.
Reform of Professional Military Education
3. Currently, the vast majority of the instructors in professional 
military education (PME) are active duty or retired military 
officers. There are some changes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Colombia, with the assertion of civilian control over PME, 
and the hiring of some civilians. Elsewhere in the region, how-
ever, there is no willingness to change PME. To overcome the 
resistance in the military, recognizing that this could involve 
a cultural change, requires political capital. And, to hire quali-
fied civilians to replace the officers, who are already receiving 
salaries as either active duty or in reserve or retirement, would 
involve a cost. The demand for political resources, then, to 
change PME is high on both dimensions.
Developing a Plan or Strategy
4. The most useful definition I have seen on strategy is by Hew 
Strachan: “In the ideal model of civil-military relations, the 
democratic head of state sets out his or her policy, and armed 
forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. The 
reality is that this process—a process called strategy—is itera-
tive, a dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the 
result—also called strategy—is a compromise between the 
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ends of policy and the military means available to implement 
it”.17 Unfortunately, the political demands are high, and the 
resources are medium at least. I have seen promises to develop 
strategies in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras, for at least 
a decade, but the most these countries, and others including 
Argentina, produce are the so-called white books, which are 
basically coffee table books displaying some defense equip-
ment and personnel. The main reason why these countries, 
lacking the motivation of NATO and PfP, do not produce 
national strategies is the vulnerability they would create for 
themselves if they publish a plan, with any degree of detail, 
and then do not fulfill it. The opposition would attack them, 
and they know it. Therefore, they simply do not produce plans.
Institutions to Achieve Effectiveness
5. To achieve military effectiveness requires the creation of some 
kind of joint or general command. To do so requires a sense 
that democratic civilian control has been established, and is no 
longer questioned. This took at least a decade in Portugal and 
in the newer democracies of East/Central Europe. Throughout 
Latin America there are real joint or general commands only 
in Colombia, with nascent structures in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile. In all of the other countries, there are totally separ-
ate forces, as in Mexico, a primitive military structure doing 
“its own thing” in Nicaragua, or haphazard arrangements 
between a weak MOD and confused command structures 
in most other countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Guatemala.18 To change this situation would require heavy 
investment of political capital, and some funds.
Money to Achieve Effectiveness
6. To provide the resources for military effectiveness requires 
high political capital, as everybody knows that “defense does 
not bring votes” and money for which there are other huge 
and obvious demands in poverty relief in the economic, so-
cial, and health areas, and which do bring votes. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the percentage of GDP devoted to na-
tional security and defense in the region is minimal. Utilizing 
data from SIPRI from 2010, the percentage of GDP to national 
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security and defense is as follows: El Salvador 1.1 percent; 
Guatemala 0.4 percent; Honduras 1.1 percent; Mexico 0.5 
percent; Nicaragua 0.7 percent; Argentina 0.9 percent; Bolivia 
1.7 percent; and Brazil 1.5 percent. (By contrast, Canada is 1.5 
percent and the U.S. 4.5 percent). And, also in contrast, Chile 
is 3.2 percent and Colombia 3.6 percent.19
In short, the requirements for achieving democratic civilian control, 
and especially military effectiveness, are high in terms of the resources to 
which political decision-makers have access. It is no surprise that in terms of 
the framework, most countries in Latin America show little, or no, progress. 
There are two deviant cases, however, which are Chile and Colombia. Not 
only do they spend a great deal more on national security and defense, but 
also in my other publications I demonstrate that they have developed the 
institutional bases for both control and effectiveness.
How to Explain Deviant Cases: Chile and Colombia
In seeking to explain why Chile and Colombia are different from other Latin 
American countries, what stands out first is their shared emphasis on institu-
tional development in national security and defense by the civilian political 
elites.20
Chileans have felt threatened by their neighbors, particularly Bolivia 
and Peru, for reclaiming territorial gains made by Chile during wars in 
the nineteenth century. In 2008, Peru brought suit for conflicting territorial 
claims (really a large maritime zone) before the International Court of Justice 
in The Hague (International Court of Justice). Meanwhile, the Peruvian and 
Chilean media keep the issue alive at home. The conflict with Bolivia, and 
Bolivian President Evo Morales, also threatens to go to the International 
Court of Justice, is yet more pressing. A constitutional referendum passed on 
January 25, 2009, mandates that in 2014 the Bolivian president must abrogate 
the 1904 treaty between Bolivia and Chile recognizing the current territorial 
situation. While there is some progress in confidence-building measures 
(CBMs) between Chile and Peru, with Bolivia there is much less progress 
since the Bolivians want to maintain pressure on Chile regarding access to 
the Pacific Ocean.
Colombia’s investments in institutional development, PME, and strategy 
formulation are due to nearly fifty years of fighting several leftist insurgen-
cies, particularly the well-organized and well-funded (through drug money) 
FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The threat became 
challenges to institutionalizing civil-military relations
110
particularly acute during the presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), 
when the country was decertified by the U.S. government for its anti-drug 
policies. President Andres Pastrana, (1998-2002) attempted negotiations with 
the FARC which, by the end of his term of office, were widely recognized as 
a failure. In 1998 and 1999, while ostensibly negotiating an end to the conflict, 
the FARC launched extensive attacks, persuading many analysts that they 
were a more capable armed force than the Colombian military (Serafino 2001, 
10).
Álvaro Uribe was elected president on a “law and order” platform, in the 
first round of voting in May 2002. Upon taking office on August 7, 2002, Uribe 
immediately declared a state of emergency and used the increased powers to 
impose a special tax that was allocated mainly for defense.21 President Uribe 
was easily reelected president on May 26, 2006, with 62 percent of the vote, 40 
percent more than his nearest competitor and left office in August 2010. His 
approval ratings were between 79 percent and 84 percent during his second 
term. Despite the traditional reticence of the Colombian civilian elite to be-
come involved in issues of national security and defense, civilian officials 
finally perceived that the danger to the country was extremely serious, and 
instituted major reforms to several aspects of national security.
In short, Chile and Colombia have made much greater progress than 
other countries in the region toward creating the institutional capacity for 
democratic control and effectiveness in the security and defense sector, 
and in funding this sector, because civilian political elites in both countries 
perceive threats, and have clear political incentives to commit financial and 
political resources. At a minimum, the incentives are votes. It is significant 
that Michele Bachelet of Chile and Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia were 
both elected president of their countries immediately upon leaving their 
ministerial position in the MOD. I can think of no similar experience in any 
other South American country. Elsewhere, the MOD is not a trampoline for 
political ascendency, but rather a millstone perpetuating political irrelevance. 
Or, in popular terms, “defense does not produce votes.”
Conclusion
My argument in this paper is that in most countries of Latin America the 
political decision-makers lack incentives to utilize their resources, power or 
money, to improve CMR, here understood as including both democratic civil-
ian control and effectiveness. Utilizing a framework developed to compare 
and contrast CMR globally, I attempt to demonstrate that political decision-
makers have little or no incentive to use their resources, as they will not get 
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any votes by doing so. Making reference to my previous work on Chile and 
Colombia, I argue that in both countries there are indeed incentives and the 
countries have indeed made major improvements in CMR. To highlight the 
political relevance I note that in both countries, previous ministers of defense 
were subsequently elected president of their countries. 
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Militarization of Public Security in 
Latin America: Where Are the Police?
Lucía Dammert, Universidad de Santiago, Chile
Crime and violence have increased in Latin America in the last decades. The scenario is multiple and complex with high levels of violence specifically localized in some areas of the region. Despite 
the evident differences even within countries, the criminal phenomenon is 
at the center of the public agenda.1 The diversity of the phenomenon is not 
only linked to the magnitude of the crime wave: there are some countries 
with the highest homicide rates in the world, while others show rates similar 
to developed countries.2 But also to its characterization: there are countries 
that are facing important levels of violence, while others have non-violent 
property crime as their main concern. Additionally, in recent years the main 
element of differentiation between crime problems is the link to organized 
crime. Although drug trafficking is present throughout Latin America, in 
some areas the problem is linked to specific battles against the state and be-
tween drug cartels. In any case, insecurity is a phenomenon that pervades 
the entire region with social, cultural, economic, and political consequences. 
Unfortunately, the structural weaknesses of police institutions reported 
by several authors in recent years have not been resolved.3 Quite the contrary, 
the sophistication of the criminal phenomenon has highlighted the lim-
itations of the criminal justice system as a whole. The challenge for govern-
ments is not only to improve the quality of police service, but also to increase 
the quality of justice, to prioritize the modernization of the prison systems, 
and to increase health coverage for addiction problems, among many other 
specific needs. 
Specifically in the case of police institutions, many reforms have been 
designed and implemented in the last decades. Ranging from modernization 
processes to complete restructuration of the police institution; the initia-
tives in most cases have little long-term results. The literature on this issue 
is comprehensive and recognizes the need to continue or rather start a real 
transformation agenda of police services.4 Nonetheless, it also recognizes its 
limited achievements and effective progress. 
At the same time, many governments have decided to use the armed 
forces for public security purposes. Based on the assumption that police 
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forces are either incapable or ineffective to control crime, armed forces have 
been called to patrol the streets. The range of functions done by police per-
sonnel varies greatly in each country but the undeniable process towards the 
inclusion of the military in the fight against crime continues.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss both processes as complementary 
faces of the same problem. Lack of results in police reform initiatives and 
growing military response to crime in many ways are elements of the same 
problem. Both linked to the incapacity of governments to effectively prevent 
and control crime with adequate policies as well as to the electoral debate 
that highlights the need for direct and quick action. 
The simple analysis presents the situation with two elements. On one 
hand, there is an increase in crime, corrupt or inefficient police institutions, 
and the difficulty of preventing crime and controlling frightened citizens. 
On the other hand, there are military institutions consolidated in budgetary 
terms, in many countries with high levels of citizen’s trust accompanied by 
limited military conflict scenarios.5 For many, all the elements are in place to 
call the military as the main force to tackle criminal activity, especially crime 
related to drug trafficking.6 
A Difficult Context 
Latin America faces an increasing problem of violence and crime. Homicide 
rates are an example of the magnitude and the diversity of the problem. As 
shown in Figure 1, homicide rates have different levels but a growing trend 
in most countries. In any case, it is clear that those closely linked to the drug 
market have higher rates. Interestingly, the main cocaine consumer in the 
hemisphere, the United States, is the exception to the rule.
But homicides are only one part of the criminal picture. In most coun-
tries violence has not reached this point, but increasing levels of non-vio-
lent crimes mark the public policy agenda. Altogether, crime is one of the 
most important public concerns throughout the region and greatly impacts 
political discourses and actions. Figure 2 shows that countries tradition-
ally considered safe in terms of homicide have victimization levels similar 
to those with higher homicide rates. It seems that any victimization has a 
direct impact on the population since that problem is more decentralized, 
while homicides are a localized problem, not only in terms of territorial 
presence but also in the definition of the victims. While almost every 
group in society is a victim of street crime, those related to homicides are 
mostly young males from the most precarious socioeconomic groups of 
society. 
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Figure 1: Homicide Rates, Latin America 2000-2011.
(Source: Organization of American States 2011.)
Figure 2: Victimization and Homicide Rates 2010.
(Source: Barómetro de las Américas.) 
As crime starts to emerge as one of the main problems for Latin 
Americans, the confidence and trust in institutions in charge of the problem 
are at a minimum. Figure 3 shows that an important part of the population 
has expressed zero trust in the police since 2004. It is important to mention 
that we have witnessed a decreasing trend, but still by 2010 more than 15 
militarization of public security in latin america
118
percent declared having no trust in the very institution in charge of crime 
control. On the other hand, those who declared having no trust in the armed 
forces ranged from 15 percent to 8 percent in the same period. 
Furthermore, the same source included a question on the possibility of 
supporting a military coup under specific circumstances, among them secur-
ity problems. For many, the results are shocking since more than 50 percent 
declared support for a military coup in 2004 and 41 percent in 2010. In fact, 
after military coups and civil wars during the 70s and 80s, the armed forces 
have regained a role in public security issues. 
Missions and functions of the armed forces have been changed in many 
ways in the region. The reforms have been mostly focused on keeping the 
armed forces as far as possible from the political arena but still most institu-
tions could play an array of roles. An analysis of the functions of the armed 
forces in Latin America divided the roles in three: policemen, social workers, 
and firefighters. As Figure 4 shows, most countries have armed forces that 
could be part of any activity linked to the development and protection of 
the country. In that sense, the presence of many countries in the area where 
all three roles overlap is a clear demonstration that at least in legal terms the 
armed forces are still defined as an institution with no specific function. 
Figure 3: Zero-Trust in Police and Armed Forces, Latin America 2004-2010. 
(Source: Barómetro de las Américas.)
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Militarization: Fast Answer?
Democratization and the end of civil wars generated more civilian inter-
vention in military issues. There was an increasingly strong desire to limit 
the political role and ambitions of the military in domestic affairs. At the 
same time, since conflict between countries is not normally a threat in Latin 
America, there was increasing scrutiny of large military budgets to evaluate 
their effectiveness.
But do not confuse urgency with actions, because the military incursion 
into internal security issues is longstanding with the result that change has 
only come slowly. In Colombia, for instance, since the end of the 1990s, with 
the development of Plan Colombia the armed forces became increasingly 
involved in the drug war. Colombians followed the experience developed in 
Peru during the previous decade in the fight against terrorism and its rela-
tionship to drug trafficking. Both strategies were supported and developed 
under the umbrella of the U.S. regional strategy to combat drugs. Later on, 
this perspective was confirmed with the participation of more than 45,000 
Mexican soldiers under the Mérida Initiative in Mexico.
Figure 4: Functions of the Armed Forces in Latin America. 
(Source: FLACSO 2007.) 
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The results of such military engagement in the war on drugs are mixed, 
and although it is clear that combating drug trafficking, especially if linked 
to guerrilla movements, is an area of possible military involvement, the use 
of military forces for public security is a different issue.
In Uruguay in late 2012, the Secretary of Defense of the United States 
Leon Panetta, as part of the Tenth Conference of Defense Ministers of the 
Americas, urged the countries of the region to use the police and not the 
military in the control and enforcement of the law. He recognized that mil-
itary involvement is not a good recipe for long-term solutions. In order to 
have a professional response to crime, Panetta committed U.S. help in the 
development of local police, and to promote respect for human rights and 
the rule of law.
Unfortunately, Panetta does not represent the general consensus among 
Latin American governments. Many, as the result of a lack of alternatives, 
have brought the military to the streets to perform police functions. There 
are many different types of military involvement in the fight against crime in 
Latin America, from full operational groups that patrol specific areas of the 
cities to border patrol. 
Governments in Latin America are at a crossroad facing a citizenry des-
perate for more security and fearful of institutions marked by inefficiency 
and corruption. The military has become the tool to be used to show signs 
of governmental power and strength. As mentioned before, this situation is 
present not only in countries marked by the presence of organized crime in 
the region but in general. For example, in November 2011 the Honduran gov-
ernment voted to change the constitution and allow the military to be used 
for police roles. Similarly, the President of Guatemala during his first speech 
to the nation, urged the army to “neutralize organized crime.” The govern-
ment of Venezuela, for its part, motivated by high homicide rates, created the 
“People’s Guard,” a military-type organization that shares the security police 
roles, even investigating crimes.7
In Ecuador, President Correa referred to the battle against organized 
crime as a military priority, noting “there cannot be a successful battle 
against organized crime without considering the military in it”.8 These state-
ments are at least contradictory with Ecuador’s constitution (2008), which 
states clearly that “the maintenance of internal order and the rule of law 
are exclusive powers of the national police role” while the armed forces 
are devoted to “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity.” However, 
the political rhetoric included a complementary perspective that President 
Correa noted: “A poor country cannot afford to have their armed forces only 
for conventional warfare.”9
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In Peru, President Humala authorized the military to collaborate with 
the police in a social conflict in Cajamarca where roads, schools, and hospi-
tals were closed. In Bolivia, military units were deployed to assist the police 
in high-crime areas of Santa Cruz and El Alto. However, Bolivia’s constitu-
tion allows the military assistance once the police have been overwhelmed. 
In El Salvador, President Mauricio Funes defended the 2009 reform 
that allowed a greater role for the military police in the context of the battle 
against organized crime. In this respect, and in front of the rumors that most 
of those allocations would increase with further reform, the president stated 
that citizens’ fears are anchored in past actions of the armed forces, but now 
with democracy the armed forces must play a role in security matters.10 
Guatemala installed three task forces against crime that were part of the 
proposal of Pérez Molina in his presidential campaign. These task forces are 
staffed with Police Special Forces, researchers from the Specialized Criminal 
Investigation Division, Public Safety personnel, and army paratroopers.11 
Nonetheless, the United Nations has been pressing to put limits on the mil-
itary use of force in law enforcement.
Honduras with “Operación Libertad”12 has recently initiated a new 
operation with the aim of lowering the high levels of violence plaguing the 
country’s major cities. However, the military legitimacy is often disputed by 
denunciations of personnel accused of being involved with torture, injuries, 
and threats against citizens. Furthermore, there have been increasing indica-
tions and charges of corruption among officials.
In Mexico, the strategy developed by President Calderón included 
broad participation of the military, which was replicated at the state level 
and even with local efforts.13 With the return to power of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), the drug strategy was modified and one of the 
signs of this change would be the gradual withdrawal of the military from 
the streets. However, in his first months in office, Enrique Peña Nieto has not 
been able to show progress.14
In South America, Brazil has expanded the military’s role in crime con-
trol tasks. Since 2010 army troops have been located in the favelas to contain 
organized crime. What initially was conceived for a brief period of time, it 
has been extended until today with the “peacekeepers” that are present in 
many intervened favelas.15 That is why the military involvement in a diverse 
range of missions that it has been assigned is not a good omen for democracy 
in Brazil, a country where deep social problems remain and civil institutions 
are weak and traditionally inefficient.16 Beyond the urban patrolling, in Brazil 
a priority has been given to military involvement in crime control tasks at the 
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borders where it has developed multiple operations, including the installa-
tion of high-tech equipment to increase seizures of illegal material.17
In Argentina, the federal government has resorted to using middle forces 
(Gendarmerie) for operating support in the fight against crime in the city of 
Buenos Aires and greater Buenos Aires.18 Additionally, President Cristina 
Fernandez’s government recently named an active military officer as secre-
tary in the Ministry of National Security, raising all kinds of questions and 
doubts about the strategy that seeks to ensure civilian government control 
over military affairs. 
The brief overview presented in the previous paragraphs shows that 
the phenomenon is across the region and is supported, at least currently, 
by the citizenry. As previously explained, it is not clear what the positive 
consequences of this involvement will be. No country has evaluated the 
military involvement in terms of their effectiveness in reducing crime. In 
fact, information gathered on the initiatives described above is scattered and 
most of the time does not include details on the consequences of such actions. 
Nonetheless, many voices have been heard regarding the difficulties and 
challenges of military intervention. However, there are multiple problems, 
and these are described below.
Corruption, Human Rights, and Politicization
Multiple voices directly criticized the use of armed forces in the fight against 
crime. Many cases focused on a classical doctrinal position that divides the 
work of the military and police since the early nineteenth century. It is best to 
leave aside definitions open to confusion, such as Huntington’s conceptualiza-
tion, which makes explicit that the military’s main role is the application of 
violence under certain conditions (1957) or when Bayley and Shearing (2001) 
note that both police and military are security forces but their main difference 
is their jurisdiction. Clearly for many authors who develop their theories in 
contexts of high levels of professionalization and modernization of the armed 
forces, the challenge to study the Latin American dilemma is massive.
In the last two decades we have witnessed a narrowing of the distinction 
between these roles.19 The increased importance of the types of military-style 
policing strategy and the incremental use of technology and military instru-
ments, not to mention the military involvement in police work in multiple 
peacekeeping operations and military action in internal order, are only ex-
amples of the porous border between the two institutions.20 
While the debate is global, Latin American specificity is evident. This 
is a continent marked by multiple forms of political involvement by the mil-
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itary in the recent past. Armed forces that participated in clear actions have 
been denounced and investigated for human rights violation and corruption. 
However, as Stepan enunciated, the main danger of military involvement in 
crime control tasks is its possible politicization.21 
In this analytical framework it is noteworthy that in many countries 
the process of democratization does not necessarily limit the real powers 
of the armed forces, but rather high levels of autonomy are still the norm. 
Maybe this is clearly shown in the budget analysis that indicates that only the 
military has been subject to measures of transparency and accountability of 
their revenues and expenses.22
In this sense, the 2010 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) re-
port states that the involvement of the military in this issue lies in the official 
position of the forces, which can seriously compromise their political isola-
tion, and may even try to use this power to influence policy in government 
decisions.23
Human rights violation is one of the problems mentioned repeatedly 
as a result of military actions on issues of public safety. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in particular has emphasized the 
problems encountered especially in Mexico and Central America where vari-
ous press reports and complaints of civil society organizations have revealed 
the presence of torture, disappearances, and even murders in the context of 
actions not yet recognized by soldiers in crime control efforts.24
Another of the recognized problems of military involvement in inter-
nal security tasks is corruption. Linking unprepared soldiers, narrowly 
professionalized with minimal specialization in tasks related to prevention 
and control of crime with organized crime agents opens the space for the 
development of illegal actions. Thus, there is concern that this recognized 
corruption in the police will penetrate the armed forces. Multiple media al-
legations on these practices in various countries of the region suggest that 
rather than being just a threat, corruption in the armed forces is a reality we 
must face in the near term. 
Thus, the impending military involvement in the fight against crime 
seems not to bring major benefits except institutional budget increases and a 
greater political role. This strategy does not appear to address the increase in 
crime. To the contrary, several authors argue that it is precisely the military 
response to organized crime which is one of the triggers of the exponential 
growth of violence in Mexico. 
Finally, as Bailey (2012) indicates, in various debate forums on the best 
strategies to address organized crime the central question is not whether 
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the military will continue to play a police role in the medium term. Rather, 
the main question is whether this intervention has led to changes in learn-
ing, adaptation, and innovation processes to address previously identified 
problems. The answer is not clear and requires more specific analysis to 
determine its impacts.
A Way Out?
In this paper, a clear gap emerged. The problems of armed forces participa-
tion in public security policies are evident but that realization has not had 
any impact on public policy decisions that increasingly call for more military 
involvement in the fight against crime. 
What to do? For many there is no way that the military should be al-
lowed to participate in this issue. For instance, an IACHR report stated, “the 
Commission has repeatedly observed that the armed forces are not properly 
trained to deal with citizen security; hence the need for an efficient civilian 
police force, respectful of human rights and able to combat citizen insecurity, 
crime and violence on the domestic front”.25 Furthermore, the same report 
mentioned that “states must restrict to the maximum extent the use of armed 
forces to control domestic disturbances, since they are trained to fight against 
enemies and not to protect and control civilians, a task that is typical of po-
lice forces”.26
Although there are valid reasons for the opposition to the use of mil-
itary intervention, at this point it should be recognized that in most coun-
tries with serious problems of violence and crime the reasons that motivate 
governments to use the military in police functions persist. In that sense, 
pragmatism meets doctrine and decisions are not easy to take. In any case, 
two processes should be addressed in the short run: an internal process of 
training and institutional change in the armed forces, and a strong police 
reform agenda. 
Both processes would ensure an effective crime control policy and a 
clear path towards a recentralization of the role of the police while leaving 
the armed forces for the national security agenda. Among the steps that 
should be considered as urgent in those countries where military personnel 
are participating in public security strategies are: 
• training in public security principles that govern the actions 
of the security forces in the area of  security, which clearly de-
fine and guide their actions in relation to citizens;
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• limiting abuse by explaining that prevention is the main 
goal and the arrest of the offender should be done under strict 
rules of law;
• training in community involvement in order to enhance 
trust and to limit possible problems in the interaction between 
military personnel and the community;
• training in the exceptionality in the use of force: The use 
of force is allowed for exceptional situations in which crime 
cannot be prevented or controlled;
• training in due obedience: Like any police force, subordin-
ates are bound only to lawful orders given to them by their 
superiors;
• training judicial police: For the military to ensure the safety 
of citizens in the best possible way, it is key that personnel be 
trained with legal procedures and that they be accompanied 
with judicial police in any activity;
• Use of appropriate weapons to the requirements of public 
safety, particularly in urban centers.
Finally, governments should recognize that this is a limited solution. 
Not only that the military involvement will not ensure success in the crime 
control strategy, but also that it will not necessarily help the process of police 
reform.
The Agenda for Police Reform27
The improvement of the police service is an issue in Latin America’s political 
and civic agendas. The difficulties are not minor because of the institutional 
variety, multiplicity of structural challenges, limited sustained political will 
and institutional corporate pressure. Despite this recognition, advances are 
slight and evaluations of the processes developed are very precarious. In 
fact, it lacks an evaluative gaze of the progress and challenges in almost two 
decades of interventions. The necessary structures for the development of 
a professional police force have not been able (or willing) to be installed in 
most countries. 
Latin American police institutions are diverse in terms of origin, type of 
structure, organization, agency, scope, and objectives, to name a few items. 
This diversity limits a comprehensive analysis and a design of unique initia-
tives that impact on major problems. Despite this limitation, it becomes in-
creasingly urgent to review these institutions at a regional and sub regional 
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level, identifying common trends, challenges and especially possible areas 
of intervention.
Police can be characterized in general terms as “(...) the persons author-
ized by a group to regulate interpersonal relationships within the group 
through the application of physical force”.28 This definition has three key 
elements: institutional nationalization, use of force, and professionalism. As 
police force, the institution responds to the needs of society as a whole, which 
requires responding to the various pressures of the citizenship. This feature 
has been eroded over the past decade in most countries of Latin America by 
two parallel processes: the rise of private financing and the lack of regulation 
of this funding, and the explosive growth of private security, which puts 
a halt to policing, occupying their spaces, and limiting and, in some cases, 
weakening their ability to respond. The proliferation of security companies 
paradoxically increases the sense of vulnerability of many citizens who do 
not have access to that service, as well as those that invest in these mechan-
isms of confinement and collective alarm. Multiple studies now show that 
the number of police in most countries is significantly lower than the number 
of private sector operatives.29 
In the area of  the use of force, the police should be the institutions that 
hold the monopoly on the use of legitimate force of the state. Various factors 
have undermined this principle, not only by the aforementioned increase 
in private security but also by the increasing use of weapons by citizens 
in some countries. Furthermore, the exercise of the use of force requires a 
significant degree of social legitimacy that is in doubt due to cases of “easy 
trigger” (cases recognized by the press in countries as diverse as Argentina, 
the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala) or alleged involvement in 
criminal schemes as organized crime.
The third element of this conceptualization is the professionalization of 
the police exercise. This professional preparation also gives the police some 
autonomy from the political leadership in relation to intervention in deci-
sion-making and the implementation of expertise in their work; however, in 
no way does this give them full independence. The security responsibility 
should be assumed by the political power, which also has the responsibility 
to evaluate and assess the impact of the strategies used. 
The three main elements in the definition of police work are seriously 
called into question in the daily actions in Latin America. While most in-
stitutions have undergone major modernization and reform processes in 
the last two decades, these have been insufficient. In fact, at the present the 
information gathered by the authors shows with force the pending agenda of 
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roads to advance and accomplish the decrease of the three central problems: 
corruption, inefficiency, and abuse of the use of force. 
While the challenges are many and of various kinds, police moderniza-
tion requires change in at least four areas: 
• Institutional processes: The challenges of reforming police 
work include a weak selection process of police personnel, 
who often lack the educational background required for the 
type of work to be done. The precariousness of the initial 
process and subsequent training prevents the development of 
early responses to problems and leaves the police work on a 
purely reactive level of action. The professionalization of the 
police is also a problem in many countries where the police 
do not have a system of promotion, grades, and benefits; the 
health and pension coverage are not appropriate; and, in some 
cases, wages are clearly insufficient.
• relationship with the community: High levels of distrust 
expressed towards the community police institutions are a 
serious problem. It lowers the legitimacy of the policies de-
veloped to prevent and combat crime, provides a look away 
from possible innovation capabilities and further isolates the 
police officer in spaces often marked by violence. Community 
policing programs that sought to improve relations with neigh-
bors have been ineffective because of their limited impact and 
short time sustainability. It is necessary to seriously tackle the 
initiatives to improve police-community relationship.
• Integration in the criminal justice system: Police work by 
itself will not solve the problem of crime in any of the coun-
tries analyzed. It requires a system that is able to integrate 
from prevention to post-prison rehabilitation. This should be 
a process in which the police play a specific role to be profes-
sionalized, transparent, and respectful of the rule of law while 
recognizing the relevance of other interventions. Likewise, 
the clear differentiation between the tasks that the military 
and police develop becomes an unavoidable task to prevent 
the militarization of security responses; many of which are 
daily as seen in Central American countries.
• Private security coordination: Sustained increase in private 
security provision as well as the ability to carry weapons has 
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ended with the monopoly of the use of force in most Central 
American countries. This situation poses a serious risk over 
the police capabilities to generate effective action strategies 
and market control of weapons and their use inside the coun-
tries. Similarly, the lack of effective control over the industry 
(especially informal) increases security problems and enhan-
ces the sense of impunity. 
All the proposed action areas are complex; they require a financial in-
vestment and political support sustained over time. Besides, the intervention 
requires a clear prioritization to avoid duplication of efforts and the building 
of expectations in officials and citizens who will be able to enhance the feel-
ing of security in the future.
In other words, police reform should be a strategy that is here to stay. The 
threat of organized crime and state weakness leads to a permanent agenda 
based on the modernization of institutions and reform focused on the goal of 
effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.
The participation of the armed forces in public security initiatives should 
not be perceived as a barrier for further development of the police reform 
agenda. On the contrary, in Latin America strong and professional police 
forces are needed in order to clearly define the differences between military 
and police doctrines. 
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There is a clear tendency in Latin America for the armed forces to be employed on secondary and parallel missions. This tendency dates back to the end of the Cold War when the United States attempted to 
recuperate their strategic hold on the region. Several events contributed to 
this concern such as the emergence of the so-called “new threats” associated 
with the Palme Commission Report on Common Security, and the proposed 
regional implementation of the “Washington Consensus.” This new set-
ting initially emerged at the first Meetings of the Ministers of Defense of 
the Americas in Williamsburg. At these meetings, which tried to impose a 
hemispheric security agenda on the countries of the region, the concept of 
“multidimensionality” was first used in relation to the region. 
The term “multidimensional,” which until then had been used exclu-
sively in relation to threats, was moving towards a focus on stability to de-
fine “security” as a whole. When applied solely to threats, it was possible to 
understand that the term referred to new kinds of threats which, once the 
traditional influences had diminished, could be viewed in more detail. As a 
result, the origin of the threat was not limited to the state but rather spanned 
various spheres such as the social, economic, political etc., and the new con-
ceptual neologism “multidimensionality of threats” emerged. One of the last 
attempts at placing a limit on the reach of the term “security” was left for 
Ambassador Patiño Mayer, who warned that the emerging threats did not 
necessarily affect security and did not require a military response. In light 
of a multidimensionality of threats, the state deployed an array of “multi-
faceted” responses that should have been articulated by the various specific 
state agencies. Mayer proposed that the state rely on various institutional 
tools, apart from the armed forces, in order to deal with these challenges. The 
Ministries of Education, Health, Justice, and Economy, among others, seemed 
to be the more appropriate options than the Ministry of Defense in organiz-
ing the measures needed to successfully deal with the new challenges.
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The 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas1 outlines both the 
diversity of challenges, concerns, and threats, as well as the “multidimen-
sional” scope. Accordingly, these challenges, concerns, and threats extend 
to different spheres of the state. However, many concerns and challenges, 
such as environmental, political, economic, and those related to extreme 
poverty,2 do not appear to threaten sovereignty or the legitimate monopoly 
of violence guaranteed by the state. Indeed, many of the challenges are not 
simply threats but rather clear symptoms of incomplete sovereignty and 
undesired consequences of deficient democracies. Nevertheless, according to 
the signatories of the Declaration, “security is multidimensional in nature” 
and in some ways, the implicit philosophy in Patiño Mayer’s warning rings 
true, as outlined in the Declaration: “The new threats, concerns, and other 
challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multifaceted responses 
by different national organizations and in some cases partnerships between 
governments, the private sector, and civil society all acting appropriately in 
accordance with democratic norms and principles, and constitutional provi-
sions of each state.”3
However, confronted with the institutional weakness of some countries 
in the region, the lack of confidence in the police system and sometimes in 
the judicial system, added to the generally limited politicians who are mainly 
concerned with the timeframe of their four-year term (until the next elec-
tion), military responses are much more appealing than appropriate institu-
tional responses. Consequently, the new threats, which, according to Patiño 
Mayer, do not require a war, normally need to be dealt with by strong state 
institutions. On the other hand, even if proven to be ineffective in solving the 
new “challenges,” the armed forces, because of their capacity to mobilize and 
maneuver as well as their logistical amplitude, create almost immediate and 
impressive results. In the streets, the armed forces create a “sense of secur-
ity” for citizens, allowing for “good levels of popular approval” which are 
important for politicians and the government, even without changes in the 
level of violence or decreases in criminal activity. In actuality, for some coun-
tries the only institutional option with the capacity for national mobilization 
is the armed forces. This echoes the warning from some analysts of the “se-
curitization” of some problems afflicting the region4 and the militarization 
of the response. Others fear that the irresponsible use of this conceptual 
method can lead to the “militarization” of the police service, which in some 
countries is exhausted due to high levels of intolerable crime, or lead to its 
counterpart, which can be equally harmful to the state: the “policization” of 
the armed forces. 
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The concept of “multidimensional security,” which could be appropriate 
for discussion at hemispheric summit meetings given that the objective is 
to specify all aspects that impact security of the state, societies, and people, 
becomes a trap when incorporated in the Hemispheric Conferences of 
Ministries of Defense (CHMD), because as the name implies, it is a forum ex-
clusively for defence. In fact, ministers meet to discuss issues relevant to their 
ministerial agenda of defence. However, a “multidimensional provision” of 
security has been incorporated into recent meeting agendas and relates to 
the development and progress of the nations of the region. As stated in the 
second paragraph of the 2004 Quito Declaration:
Security constitutes a multidimensional condition for the de-
velopment and progress of our nations. Security is consolidated 
when its human dimension is promoted. The conditions for hu-
man security improve with the full respect for dignity, human 
rights, and the basic freedoms of the people, in the framework 
of the rule of law, as well as by promoting social and economic 
development, education, the fight against poverty, disease, and 
hunger. Security is indispensable to create economic and social 
opportunities for all and to generate a favorable environment to 
attract, retain, and productively use the investment and trade 
that are necessary to create sources of employment and fulfill 
the hemisphere’s social aspirations. Extreme poverty and social 
exclusion of broad sectors of the population are also affecting 
stability and democracy, eroding social cohesiveness and under-
mining the security of the States.
It is true that “each State has the sovereign right to identify its own na-
tional security and defence priorities; to define strategies, plans, and actions 
to address threats to its security, in keeping with its legal framework.” Yet, 
given the difference in perceptions between the countries of the region and 
the range of institutions for confronting these threats, dangers, and challen-
ges, I am cautious to agree that the Ministry of Defense is able to “attract, 
retain, and productively use the investment and trade.” I doubt the ability of 
the Ministries of Defense to make sound decisions on mitigating HIV; on the 
reconstruction following natural disasters such as earthquakes and torna-
does; containing forced migration; and combatting organized crime, when in 
many countries these are the concern of other Ministries. It is understandable 
that the armed forces could be able to play a role in responding to natural 
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disasters, supporting the fight against crime and at some point play a role in 
migratory control; however, it must depend on the judicial orders and sub-
sidiary functions of the armed forces. These types of missions should never 
become specific objectives of defence policy, as in the case of some Ministries.
The misunderstood concept of “multidimensional security” does not 
appear in the official documents released by the Ministries of Defense of the 
South American Defense Council (Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano, CDS). 
This particular detail perhaps reflects one of the motives for which South 
America began to acquire an identity based on strategic interests and values, 
differentiating its position in successive CHMD meetings from that of other 
countries in the Americas. The effort to minimize the defence agenda to 
specific items, along with the intent to distinguish between issues of public 
security and defence, and maintain the institutional mechanisms combatting 
challenges and threats separate, highlights the convergence of the positions 
held by the countries of the South American region. 
The avoidance of the use of the discursive concept “multidimensional 
security” is considered a sign of maturity on the part of the sub-regional 
defence forum, as was the creation of a separate Commission specifically 
for dealing with issues pertaining to public security. On 10 August 2009 the 
Conselho Sul-americano de Luta Contra o Narcotráfico (South American Council 
Against Drug Trafficking, CSLCN) was created as part of the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) as a “forum for consultation, coordination and 
cooperation in preventing and combatting the global problem of drugs.”5 
The creation of the CSLCN was related to the clear intention of the CDS to 
separate the defence agenda from that of security, not only for conceptual 
considerations but also for institutional and operational reasons as well (the 
institutional representation of CSLCN is comprised of government minis-
tries and/or entities specialized in combatting drug trafficking in the region).6
Before discussing the semantic inaccuracy and heuristic ineffectiveness 
of the concept in question, I will first consider two relevant aspects that are 
often left unnoticed. On the one hand, there is the notion of a single agenda 
for hemispheric security that contains a list of common threats to all the 
countries in the region, as well as a set of prescribed responses for all of the 
countries. Security declarations and conferences have already recognized 
the different perceptions of threats and the presence of institutional and 
organizational idiosyncrasies in confronting them, which I will discuss in 
further detail and include my personal point of view. I will reflect on the 
difference in the nature of defence and public security, without neglecting 
to recognize that it remains nebulous and unclear, be it because of a lack of 
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conceptual definition, constitutional precision or institutional resources and, 
at times, political orders and electoral interests. 
Perception as the Original Source of Security 
A critique of the idea of an agenda of common threats to the hemisphere, 
which I discussed in other settings,7 is based upon the definition of a threat 
as a purely perceptive phenomenon. Thus, a threat itself does not actually 
exist; rather it constitutes itself and acts in the perception of who is or feels 
threatened. I describe the threat as “a representation, a sign, a certain dis-
position, gesture or manifestation perceived as an announcement of an 
undesirable or risky situation for the existence of whoever perceives it.”8 In 
this sense, the threat is not an object that can itself be analyzed, but rather 
a relationship that requires an assessment of all its components, from the 
emitter of the signal and the emission to the receptor. Since a threat sim-
ply exists in and for a perception, and since perceptions are relative to the 
specific makeup of the receptor, when we refer to national threats we are 
referring to a phenomenon conditioned by a specific and unique geopolit-
ical, historical, cultural, institutional, and political context that reflects the 
idiosyncratic aspects of each country, filters inputs, and constructs percep-
tions. Therefore, a single threat to the entire continent does not objectively 
exist, but the particular perceptions that make up threats are numerous: 
migration, for example, while one of the principle threats for the United 
States, constitutes an important (when not the principle) source of foreign 
capital for other countries of the region. Even if we are able to agree on a 
single theory of threats (whether it be militarily, economically or politically 
imposed), the question remains whether we can also agree on a single stra-
tegic response: for example, some countries in South America have declared 
armed combat to be the only possible solution to drug trafficking, while 
others have identified precisely this type of combat, along with the local and 
armed presence of extra-regional military personnel, as the principle threat 
to their sovereignty and freedom of action. 
As a last resort, security, as a central aspect of international politics, is 
made up of the same empirical material as the perceptions. Consequently, 
the exercise of external politics produces, consolidates or alters perceptions 
of neighbouring decision-making bodies. The threatening act or attitude of 
a political body, as an expression of its external politics, tries to provoke in 
others a certain perception, such as intimidation or insecurity. As such, a 
political body seeks to carry out acts of friendliness, transparency, and trust 
in order to create a perception of security and even cooperation.
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These simple arguments, while perhaps obvious, were sufficient to dis-
mantle the untenable notion of “common threats” that were the basis of the 
proposal for a hemispheric security agenda. What was disguised in the back-
ground was the need to rely on a common base of threats and their respective 
responses in order to apply a single “security doctrine,” which would allow 
the region to strategically recover from its position of irrelevance during the 
Cold War. In line with this doctrine, and as part of the continental security 
initiative, countries of the region, with the help of their armed forces, set out 
to overcome what the United States considered to be threats. In turn, the 
United States would offer a defensive cover for a powerless region, and the 
national armed forces would be transformed into mere police forces respon-
sible for public security. 
Philosophical Basis for the Difference Between “Defence” and 
“Public Security”
Despite the operational difficulty of some countries9 to recognize the distinc-
tion between defence and public security because of severe internal conflict, 
I argue the need to debate10 this issue based in a constitutional distinction 
assumed by different countries. Here I attempt to outline another approach 
that justifies the distinction between defence and public security through a 
philosophical analysis. 
Several philosophical anthropologists consider humans to be social 
beings by nature and consider society to be an intrinsic characteristic that 
defines humans.11 Conversely for others, human nature is solitary, and soci-
ety is a product of debate and agreements between humans. These philoso-
phers12 believe that at the beginning there was a pact; not a chronological 
or historical beginning, but rather strictly a logical one. Prior to this, the 
gods had not yet been created, and as a result, there was no good or bad. 
Furthermore, there were no laws or norms that guided human behavior, and 
without which there was no crime. Therefore, without moral restraint or nor-
mative or legal limits, force became the preferential form of contact between 
humans who, as a result, perceived themselves to be the most powerful in 
nature. It was perceived that each human should look out for themselves 
in an endless cycle of self-defence; every person for themselves and against 
others in a state of permanent war that Hobbes called “state of nature” in 
which “man is a wolf to man.”13
It was not love for a fellow being, but rather fear that led humans to make 
a pact in which they renounced their will to make decisions, ability to defend 
themselves, and their force and tools, concentrating on conceding themselves 
139
hector luis saint-pierre
to someone (a person or group of people) that, because they were not part of 
the agreement, lacked obligations and restraints in addition to controlling 
the absolute and monopolized concentration of force. To be above of the pact 
was to be sovereign; a pure will without limits. As such, the other beings 
became subjects through this voluntary pact and legitimated the leader as a 
monopoly of force and political decision. 
Total liberty of the sovereign is founded in the incontestable exercise of 
his total decision-making power. This decision-making ability, as a product 
of the freedom of the leader, constitutes the material content of his expres-
sion and syntactic form of his obligation. As such, the sovereign exerts his 
freedom and manifests his will in the way in which he makes decisions. As 
a result of this manifestation, the sovereign creates a network of norms, and 
with the normative expression of freedom the sovereign legally commands 
the relations between him and his subjects, and amongst his subjects. He 
creates interconnected obligations that constrain will and limit freedom. The 
tragic paradox of the sovereign exercising freedom is that the manifestation 
of his absolute will organizes the world and his place in it, and with this he 
limits the freedom of his will.14 It is not a pure form of the norm - as Carl 
Schmitt would say in response to Hans Kelsen - that is the basis of rights, but 
rather total absence, and therefore, the exercise of total will: the materializa-
tion of the decision.
In the inevitable order created by the expression of freedom, one condi-
tion guides sovereign will within its normative realm. However, the leader 
(who has no obligations whatsoever) is not connected to the agreement, the 
basis of which guarantees the protection of the subject and, as a result, is 
an implied condition, albeit a founding one as well. As a result, humans 
renounce their ability of self-defence and surrender their instruments of vio-
lence knowing that neither the accumulation of powerful abilities nor instru-
ments of violence would be enough to guarantee their security. They concede 
these capabilities to the leader with the expectation that they will receive 
protection from the legitimate monopoly of force (because it is collectively 
voluntary). Therefore, a principal characteristic of this monopoly is the na-
ture of decision-making and violence towards the subjects, which is both 
the organizer (in the way in which it normatively manifests) and protector 
(of both the subjects and the normative status quo that guarantees security). 
The nature of the use of legitimate monopoly of force towards the subjects 
is to guarantee security and order, which is to resolve internal problems and 
internally dissolve the concept of “enemy,”15 insomuch as the leader owes 
security to his subjects. The internal exercise of sovereignty is for neutral-
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izing conflicts within the limits of security of all citizens.16 Internally, the 
leader represents “police”17 and, in the strict sense of the term, externally the 
leader represents “politics.”18 
The normative order that produces the will of the leader establishes the 
relationship between humans and constitutes the social sphere between the 
inhabitants of the territory under the monopoly of violence. The relationship 
between the leader and its subjects is expressed within a legal univocalism 
established through the normalcy created by the leader and maintained by 
the legitimate monopoly of violence, the political monopoly. This univocal 
expression constitutes, in international political terms, the “decision-making 
unit” or, in stricter terms, “political unit.” In turn, this decision-making unit 
makes up a “unit” in an area in which other political units independently 
reclaim the respect for their particular legal univocalities applied exclusively 
to a community within the territorial space.19 They try to defend the norma-
tive principles of their units against whichever other units can threaten their 
existence. It is vital for each unit to develop their strategic sensibility that al-
lows them to perceive amongst the neighboring political units those that can 
empower their unit and those that can threaten it. This perception is based 
on the ability to distinguish between friends and enemies, which is the basis 
of its external political function. The presence of this plurality of political 
units, which can end up fighting for their existence, configures the external 
sphere as a pluriverse, as opposed to a universe, as Schmitt observed. In this 
pluriverse, each political unit tries to preserve its own normative order and 
achieve recognition from other political units. Faced with a lack of normative 
order that regulates the relationship between the political units within the 
pluriverse, each unit projects an image of its power ability, looking to define 
and obtain recognition of the limits of its sovereignty. Moreover, its percep-
tive sensibility tries to perceive and demarcate its strategic sovereign position 
from other political units. As such, with the projection of the image and the 
perceptive sensibility, the limit of the normative order and the decisions of 
each political unit, and the relationship between them, are established. This 
external projection of power of the political units makes up the network of 
forces in the mutual recognition and delimitation of the respective strategic 
statures of the decision-making units, or empirical material of “international 
security.” The legal formation of this relationship of forces constitutes the 
“international law” that defines and normalizes war and peace, conflict and 
cooperation, and the core of international politics. In this way - as Raymond 
Aron affirms - the internal sphere of the decision-making unit and pluriverse 
is defined in relation to the difference of use of force (internally a monopoly 
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and externally open to competition).20 Also, vice-versa in which the same 
phenomenon unequivocally shows the different nature of force used in each 
case: as internal organizer and protector, and external and lethal defender, 
as I will now discuss. 
The Institutional Difference Between Defence and Security
The principal challenge and ongoing concern of the leader is, on the one hand, 
the security of the subjects and the maintenance of order that ensures the 
status quo of the decision-making unit, and on the other, the defence of this 
status quo in the face of eventual threats to the group of decision-making 
units that make up the pluriverse. Internally, the role of force is the protector 
of the subject and the preserver of order within the monopoly, producing 
what is known as “public security,” “internal security,” “citizen security,” 
that, in the complexity of the modern state, is normally administered by jus-
tice ministries, interior ministries, and more recently ministries of security21 
created in light of the growing gravity in the types of threats that make the 
general public uneasy. With the lethal nature of defence, the monopoly of 
force, in an environment of open competition with other units, is intended 
for combatting and eliminating sources of potential hostility and deterring 
hostile intentions of military organizations that go against the status quo of 
the political unit and its decision-making capacity. 
This double role of the legitimate monopoly of force, in compliance with 
its specific purpose, requires the expansion of a jurisprudence that legalizes 
and normalizes the conditions and limits of its use, and that univocally de-
fines the responsibilities that allow legal proceedings in the case that these 
conditions and limits are not respected, both internally and externally. In the 
majority of national constitutions, the regulation of the use of force in each 
of its roles is addressed in specific sections.22 With respect to this regulation 
and attempt at efficiency, each of these roles relies on a general doctrine and 
specific purpose, and as such, requires certain preparations and weaponry. 
The specific double nature of force in both these manifestations and its func-
tional permanence, obliges it to depend on administrative bureaucracies that 
are also specific and permanent to fully follow through with the constitu-
tionally defined role, and to efficiently carry out the constitutionally assigned 
missions with adequate professional training and education. The mainten-
ance of both institutional structures and their correct function depend on a 
specific and adequate budget because they are vital to the preservation and 
operation of the political unit, internal order, and external strategic status. 
The government, which is in charge of administering the political unit, is 
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obligated to provide the appropriate and necessary means for the correct 
operational function of both armed institutions. In the case that one of them 
is inadequate or insufficient, the government should ensure its recovery. The 
substitution of one for the other23 (a tendency that is increasingly more fre-
quent particularly in Latin America) can result in instrumental inadequacy, 
ineffective results, and loss of specific function (because it has been diverted 
from its original function), perpetuating the deficiencies of the state appar-
atus that it is substituting.
Difference in Purpose Between the Military and Police
Tyrtaeus said, 
Not if he had all splendors except for a fighting spirit. For no man 
ever proves himself a good man in war unless he can endure to 
face the blood and the slaughter, go close against the enemy and 
fight with his hands. Here is courage, mankind’s finest posses-
sion; here is the noblest prize that a young man can endeavor 
to win, and it is a good thing his city and all the people share 
with him. When a man plants his feet and stands in the fore-
most spears; relentlessly, all thought of foul flight completely 
forgotten.24 
For Aristotle, the warrior was made up of something particular and 
different from other humans. Whether it is ethical character or a particular 
inclination, the moral constitution that drives a young person to embark on a 
military career, knowing that his/her life is at stake while fighting in defence 
of their country, against other warriors that put themselves at risk, is clearly 
different from those that enroll in a police academy to fight against delin-
quents and misdemeanors. This motivates one to protect citizens, repress de-
linquency, and maintain social order, and prepares them to confront threats 
that put the decision-making and sovereign capacity of the political unit at 
risk. Police prepare themselves to help citizens and, through detention, deal 
with those that operate against the laws regulating social relations. The mil-
itary is prepared to deter, kill or be killed in combat against foreign forces 
and the enemy that put the political unit at risk. To the Greeks, war (Polemus) 
was waged against non-greeks and against the “other” (Xenos). For internal 
conflicts, other terms were employed such as stasis and metabole. 
Notwithstanding, police also run risks; their beliefs and values, upon 
entering the police force, are different from those that enter into a military 
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career. For that matter, “career in arms” refers to a career in the military and 
not in the police force. I believe that any change in a profession defined by a 
clear vocation is frustrating, and as such, I imagine that it must not be very 
gratifying for military personnel to be employed as police. 
Differences in the Means of Defence and Public Security
In relation to the instruments available for carrying out their function, there 
are many differences that can be observed. Whilst defence requires weap-
onry of large scale lethal power and destruction, sufficient for deterring or 
confronting other armies of large operational and destructive capabilities, 
the police are armed with non-lethal weaponry, sufficient to guarantee police 
security, repress delinquent acts, and preserve social order. In the external 
sphere in which defence is meant to be employed, the use of destructive and 
lethal violence is limitless beyond political needs. Even though domestic vio-
lence statistics are alarming,25 police need to be preventing and decreasing 
violence using non-lethal means.
The difference in doctrine between control of internal security and 
external defence can be summed up in the following way: even the worst 
criminal assassin and drug trafficker should have their life and dignity guar-
anteed by police and the judicial system, while even a saint can die in war 
without it constituting a crime. Human rights guide the behavior of police, 
and humanitarian rights guide the warrior. 
Lastly, intelligence, a tool used by both professions, is also radically dif-
ferent. On one hand, defence intelligence comprises the eyes and the percep-
tive system of the political unit, as detailed by Sun Tzu, and is necessary to 
anticipate certain actions in an unpredictable environment that, through the 
fault of the normative univocalism, requires calculation - as Aron affirms.26 
Intelligence has to try to understand the strategic meaning of the gestures of 
the neighouring political units as well as the situation and use of the defence 
mechanisms in comparison with its own. In the case of public security, intel-
ligence serves the judicial system by collecting evidence that will be part of 
the judicial process leading to the arrest and conviction of the delinquent, 
who will remain isolated from society to avoid reoffending. In some cases, 
for example drug and arms trafficking and organized crime, intelligence is 
carried out via infiltration into the crime group, which entails a high level 
of familiarity between the intelligence agent and the crime. It is precisely 
within this context of familiarity that the agent becomes vulnerable to the 
economic opportunities of crime and becomes fragile to corruption. By pla-
cing the armed forces in this combat role is to run the risk of failing to collect 
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intelligence and corrupting the forces; as a result, a soldier, upon entering a 
favela (shantytown or slum), will not be able to distinguish between a delin-
quent and a regular worker. 
Final Considerations
In all scientific areas, conceptual definition is central and thus occupies an 
important place in scientific production. On the one hand, conceptual preci-
sion strengthens the univocalism that allows for the comprehensive com-
munication of scientific activity; and on the other, a well-defined concept 
guarantees important access to the part of reality under analysis. However, 
in the specific area of security the significance of these norms is intensified, 
since, given prior epistemological concerns, these concepts become oper-
ational in political discourse with real political and social consequences for 
which academics do not assume responsibility. 
“Multidimensionalism,” as a general focus or even notion of security, is 
heuristically infertile, analytically insufficient, and operationally dangerous. 
It had been gradually introduced in the hemispheric declarations in the area 
of security under political pressure by those who rely on force to make deci-
sions about conceptual ambiguities.
The perceptive nature of threats contradicted the hegemonic pretentions 
of defining hemispheric agendas, but permitted the search of strategic sub-
regional identities. This search identified and distinguished such identities 
not just based on the perception of threats, but also the conceptual, institu-
tional, and operational distinction between defence and security.
Lastly, as a general conclusion resigned to the limits of objectivity: for 
science that strives for recognition in international scientific dialogue, it 
is insufficient to simply study concepts, test theories, and repeat the pro-
cesses of mainstream scientists. Instead, scientists should identify their own 
problems, formulate questions and concepts, practice their methods, and 
construct their theories with the precision of someone that does not fear the 
autonomous and comprehensive discussion of their results. 
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Multidimensional Security, “Ungoverned 
Areas” and Non-State Actors
Bernardo Pérez Salazar, UN Habitat and  
Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris 
Introduction
Today the threat to the countries of the region is not the military 
force of the adjacent neighbor or some invading foreign power. 
Today’s foe is the terrorist, the narcotrafficker, the arms traf-
ficker, the document forger, the international crime boss, and the 
money launderer. This threat is a weed that is planted, grown, 
and nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such 
as coastlines, rivers, and unpopulated border areas. This threat 
is watered and fertilized with money from drugs, illegal arms 
sales, and human trafficking. This threat respects neither geo-
graphical nor moral boundaries. 
General James Hill, Commander of U.S.  
Southern Command, 2003.
As recognized by the President’s 2011 Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime, transnational organized crime is 
a global issue with global implications that directly impact the 
United States. In the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibil-
ity, these powerful groups exploit under-governed areas —where 
state capacity is weak and corruption and impunity are ram-
pant— to consolidate control over drug, money, weapons, and 
human smuggling networks that span the hemisphere. 
General John Kelly, Commander of U. S. Southern  
Command, 2013.
A decade ago, at the time when General James Hill as Commander of U.S. Southern Command stated his appreciation about “ungov-erned spaces” as a major source of hemispheric insecurity, the 
Organization American States (OAS) was broadcasting multidimensional 
security as a renewed approach to deal with threats and challenges to the se-
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
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curity of states in the Western Hemisphere in the twenty-first century. Apart 
from geopolitical and military matters, these threats concern terrorism and 
the possible access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery by terrorists; the global drug problem, trafficking 
in persons and other forms of transnational organized crime including cor-
ruption, asset laundering, attacks to cyber security, and illicit trafficking in 
weapons; environmental degradation and natural and man-made disasters 
as well as HIV/AIDS and other diseases coupled with extreme poverty and 
social exclusion of broad sectors of the population; and the potential for dam-
age arising from accident or incident during the maritime transport of pot-
entially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials 
and toxic waste.
To face these cross-cutting challenges the OAS’s Security in the Americas 
Declaration, adopted in Mexico City on October 28, 2003, posits the need for 
appropriate hemispheric cooperation and multifaceted responses involving 
partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society. 
Specifically in regard to the challenge represented by transnational organ-
ized crime, the multidimensional security concept commends criminalizing 
money laundering, kidnapping, illicit trafficking in human beings, corrup-
tion, and other related crimes in order to strengthen domestic legal frame-
works so that the assets from the proceeds of these crimes are identified, 
traced, frozen or seized and are ultimately confiscated and disposed of. It 
also commits governments to increase multilateral cooperation in particular 
through the exchange of information, mutual legal assistance, and extradi-
tion in order to reinforce national institutions dedicated to preventing and 
sanctioning transnational crimes and identifying and prosecuting members 
of transnational criminal organizations. 
Yet, judging by the statement made before the U.S. Senate Armed 
Services by the present Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General 
John Kelly in March 2013, the measures implemented in the multidimen-
sional security framework have not succeeded in modifying major aspects 
of hemispheric insecurity, in particular, the consolidation of powerful crim-
inal structures exploiting “under-governed areas” that control illicit drug, 
money, weapons, and human smuggling circuits by means of networks that 
span the hemisphere.
This article discusses the theoretical flaws as well as evidence concern-
ing the shortcomings of this hemispheric security concept, which has tacit 
underpinnings related to standard doctrine of counterinsurgent and stabil-
ization operations, particularly in dealing with the challenge represented by 
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non-state actors criminalized by the state-centric multidimensional security 
doctrine. Following this introduction, a first part criticizes the view that the 
state is necessarily the best actor capable of providing governance goods 
and services. It also deals critically with subsequent “development agendas” 
focused on strengthening state military and policing capacity as the main 
cornerstone of state-building. The next part will look specifically at the case 
of Colombia, where counterinsurgent, antinarcotic and stabilization doctrine 
and operations have been applied for decades with increasing troop density 
to no avail as all the country’s border areas continue to rank among the major 
“terrorist safe havens” identified by the U.S. State Department in the Western 
Hemisphere. A third part discusses the risks associated with nation-building 
agendas that unintendedly favor partnerships between criminal organiza-
tions and local political entrepreneurs. A final section pulls overall conclu-
sions from the balance presented concerning multidimensional security, 
ungoverned areas, and non-state actors.
The State, Non-State Actors and Hybrid Political Orders
In the future, will governments or non-state actors lead in solving problems 
caused by growing world population, rapid urbanization, and climate 
change? Which will be more successful in confronting global challenges 
such as boosting economic productivity, managing efficient and sustainable 
use of water, energy, and land, and generally procuring safe and healthy 
livelihoods and environments? Which will find the path to deliver overall 
upward social mobility and control of corruption? 
Such is the scope of the questions posed by the National Intelligence 
Council in its most recent outlook of the world in 2030.1 Though there are no 
straightforward answers, the study presages that the future will probably 
reward those able to adapt fast enough to harness change instead of being 
overwhelmed by it. 
States in the Western Hemisphere are committed to fighting new threats 
to security, among them transnational crime, by means of confidence and 
security-building measures based on international law, the respect for state 
sovereignty and non-intervention, faithful compliance of treaties and coven-
ants and acting appropriately in accordance with constitutional provisions 
of each state, respect for and promotion and defense of human rights, soli-
darity, and cooperation. Yet, even though the concept of “multidimensional 
security” formally addresses other public concerns that can negatively affect 
human security, such as global pandemics, climatic variability, and its influ-
ence on natural and man-made disasters as well as massive environmental 
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
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degradation and extreme poverty and social exclusion, its main objective is 
clearly focused on national security. 
This is especially evident in the case of transnational organized crime, 
which is not dealt with as a public security problem but as a “national se-
curity threat” precisely because these criminal structures allegedly have 
the ability to challenge state sovereignty in areas where local governance 
structures are not under state control. These areas naturally offer favorable 
conditions for criminal activity to thrive without detection and with impun-
ity, and provide their perpetrators refuge from efforts to combat or counter 
them, making them convenient launching pads for terrorist attacks against 
nation-states and the interests they represent.2 
Understandably, diplomatic apprehensions render inadmissible the use 
of terms such as “ungoverned territory” in official OAS documents. Yet, the 
concern for territorial “vacuums” outside the control of a nation-state is a ma-
jor feature in the security doctrine that guides counterinsurgency, counter-
terrorism, antinarcotics, and stabilization and peacekeeping operations that 
are carried out by member states in dealing with the challenges identified in 
the framework of the multidimensional security approach.3
Yet as Robert Kaplan (1994) notes, understanding authoritative territorial 
governance in today s´ world is not well served by political maps comprising 
hundreds of countries marked by sharp, bold borders and uniform colors. 
An invention of European colonialism, these political maps are conceived 
to offer “… a way to classify… national organisms, making a jigsaw puzzle 
of neat pieces without transition zones between them” (58). However “coun-
tries” such as Sierra Leone and Nigeria, or Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or 
Indonesia, constantly ridden with ethnic and religious strife and violent 
political instability, are far from the “national organisms” which appear as 
evenly stained blots in political maps because they are not populated by 
homogeneous cultural identities. 
The U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism, which in 
August 2010 identified a dozen “terrorist safe havens” in the world,4 seems to 
corroborate Kaplan s´ 1994 insight5 that the state as a governing ideal cannot 
be transported functionally to areas outside the industrialized world as a 
fool-proof model for successful territorial governance. Apart from the “coun-
tries” named above, the State Department s´ map includes the “Trans-Sahara” 
(Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger), Yemen, Somalia, the maritime borders 
of Indonesia, Malasia and the Philipines, Venezuela, the Colombia “border 
region” (Brazil, Ecuador, Panamá, Perú, and Venezuela), and the “Tri-border 
area” (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay).
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Indeed the U.S. State Department’s map (Figure 1) may be an understate-
ment, as “quasi-states” or “areas of limited sovereignty” characterized by a 
disconnection between legal and effective sovereignty account for about two-
thirds of the planet according to studies carried out during the past twenty-
five years.6 Yet the fact that governance structures are not controlled by 
nation-states in these territories does not mean that they are “ungoverned.” 
Instead, alternative forms of governance controlled by non-state actors based 
on tribal, sectarian or clan relations or even persistent insurgencies, are better 
positioned to compete for the loyalty of populations they serve or control 
because they are often more effective than the nominally “legal” territorial 
sovereign in providing for protection from violent threats to individuals and 
various forms of socio-economic and political inequity, as well as access to 
sources of income, shelter, health, and educational services, among others. 
In sum, the notion of “ungoverned areas” mainly reflects a biased concep-
tion of governance rooted in a normative preference for territorial rule by 
“sovereign States”.7
Figure 1. Terrorist Safe Havens Identified by U.S. Department of State, 2010. 
(Source: U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism released in August 
2010, cited by GAO 2011, 5.)
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
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Perhaps a better conceptual framework to understand territorial govern-
ance outside the Western industrialized world is the model of “hybrid political 
orders.” Emergent in the context of constitutional liberal democracies, hybrid 
political orders operate according to formal, legally enforceable rules, but must 
compete with conflicting and alternative territorial governance models based 
on other forms of socio-political order that are rooted in non-state, indigenous 
societal structures that rely on a web of social relations and mutual obligations 
to establish trust and reciprocity. In some cases, cleavages observed in state 
territorial authority, capacity, and legitimacy are so deep that the control of 
violence, resources, and rulemaking is firmly accrued by territorial elites by 
means of their own militias, courts, and even basic services.8
The expansion of authoritative territorial governance structures con-
trolled by non-state actors is favored by the fact that globalization under-
mines effective territorial authority of “sovereign” nation-states. As a result 
of conditions tied to economic aid and development assistance from Western 
and international donors during the 80s and 90s, global diffusion of neo-
classical economic liberalism has led to increasing private control in markets 
and decreasing state regulation. Deregulation of trade and financial markets 
have increased porousness of national borders compromising governments’ 
ability to regulate cross-border flows of goods, services, information, tech-
nology, and people, as well as to collect tariffs and taxes. Fiscal restraints 
progressively have undermined social and economic safety nets as well as 
the ability and legitimacy of government efforts to provide the governance 
goods that create favorable conditions for equitable domestic economic pros-
perity and “national” social cohesion.9
The bottom line is that in the context of globalization, economic growth 
has ceased to be a path leading to distributive justice for many social groups 
in many places, undermining the legitimacy of state controlled territorial 
governance structures where this trend pervades. Consequently in settings 
where misdistribution of wealth increases, working conditions deteriorate 
and social safety nets shrink, parallel markets and “governance” structures 
controlled by non-state actors may become socially, economically, and pol-
itically relevant, if they prove capable of connecting willing suppliers with 
willing customers for goods and services (including “criminalized” goods 
and services such as drugs, smuggled goods, and money laundering, among 
others); warranting protection from hostile law enforcement and public 
regulators; defining property rights and regulating disputes; operating 
social safety nets to take care of vulnerable households and dependents of 
those killed or jailed; and even serving as lenders of last resort.10
153
bernardo pérez salazar
With the global diffusion of ideas about democracy and human rights, 
and the spread of standards that equate good governance with the rule of 
law, government accountability, respect for human dignity, and universal 
provision of access to basic goods and services, these alternative govern-
ance structures are commonly framed as transnational and subnational 
challengers of state sovereignty threatening national and international 
security. Consequently, areas under control of non-state actors that do not 
comply with the referred standards, tend to be prime targets for stabiliza-
tion and nation-building operations, whether in the form of humanitarian 
non-governmental organizations providing emergency service delivery, or 
international financial institutions and Western governments conditioning 
assistance on improvements in transparency, human rights, and environ-
mental protection, and, in extreme cases, by means of armed intervention 
directed to support “nation-building” processes based on strengthening 
state military and policing capacity in order to reestablish state-centric 
“democratic governance standards”.11
States legitimize these interventions by “criminalizing” non-state actors 
and their activities, often in accordance with the multidimensional secur-
ity guidelines, even though in many cases the latter have local support and 
legitimacy precisely because they are able to offer working solutions that 
satisfice local needs. Naturally, non-state actors labeled as “criminals” in 
these settings do not define themselves as criminals and instead frame their 
activities as strategies to sustain or improve their livelihoods under specific 
given circumstances. As a result, “criminalization” in these types of settings 
tends to blur the line between “war” and “crime,” and burdens the task of the 
occupying military and police forces trying to “win the hearts and minds” 
of the locals. Thus, as the case of Colombia discussed in the next section will 
illustrate, counterinsurgency and stabilization operations in areas controlled 
by non-state actors prove ineffective, even when military and police forces 
are deployed with high troop densities. 
Counterinsurgency and Non-State Territorial Governance 
Dynamics
Counterinsurgency doctrine assumes that competing territorial governance 
structures controlled by non-state actors can be undermined and defeated 
by occupying and transforming the targeted political hybrid order. The 
strength of these “feral” governance structures lies in the relationship be-
tween non-state actors that control these structures and the general popula-
tion, which provides intelligence, logistics and, ultimately, a sanctuary that 
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
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allows non-state actors to blend into the population and disappear under 
pressure. Counterinsurgency argues that severing this relationship is pos-
sible by offering economic incentives, making deals with emergent elite fac-
tions and protecting the population from “insurgents” who might conduct 
retributive attacks for collaborating with the occupying force. In this reckon-
ing, counterinsurgency misjudges the fact that values as well as social and 
political identities such as kin relationships, religion, and tribalism are very 
real among many populations. Therefore the “occupying” force’s ability to 
alter these values is dubious, no matter how helpful, sincere, and sympathetic 
the occupying force is. In sum, the assumption that a mass of military and 
police troops can achieve more than intimidate an occupied population for a 
given period of time is highly questionable.
And yet, after the debacles that followed the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq during the decade ending in 2010, estimating military and police 
forces’ needs for occupation control in “critical limit situations” remains a 
crucial issue for defense and security planners.12 
Multiple questions have been raised concerning troop density in 
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Should the number of 
troops deployed be defined based on enemy strength, population density or 
the extension of the territorial area of  operation? In calculating troop density 
needs, are indigenous police forces counted as own troops? What proportion 
of troops should be used to perform police work?
Presently, there seems to be consensus on some answers to these ques-
tions. Military manuals agree that the main criterion for determining troop 
density in occupation scenarios is population density, so troop per popu-
lation rates are now universally used. Historical experience of successful 
counterinsurgency and stabilization campaigns in different contexts sug-
gests that required troop densities are in the range of 60–210 per 10,000 of 
the local population (McGrath 2006, 162). There is also consensus concerning 
the need for greater troop density where the intensity of insurgent activity 
is higher. In this regard, some analysts propose troop density for three dif-
ferent levels of intensity in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. 
In settings where insurgencies exhibit ongoing military activity (intense 
level), troop density needs are estimated in the range between 100 and 200 
per 10,000. In situations characterized by frequent clashes between civil-
ian factions (intermediate level), troop density requirements are reckoned 
in range between 40 and 100 per 10,000 inhabitants. In generally peaceful 
contexts (low level), a typical troop density is assessed in the range of 20–40 
per 10,000.13 Furthermore, historical experience suggests that about one third 
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of the force in counterinsurgency or stabilization operations should be al-
located to address police work, including vehicle checkpoints, protection and 
escort of persons, crowd control, tactical operations, crime prevention and 
control, and conflict mediation, among others.14 
These parameters drawn from counterinsurgency doctrine shed light 
in considering present day military and police troop density figures for 
Colombia, a country where counterinsurgency operations persist in periph-
eral areas and scarcely populated areas while stabilization operations mainly 
prevail in more densely populated areas to counter the activities of criminal 
structures dealing with the challenges focused on by the multidimensional 
security approach, among them, drug trafficking and other activities such 
as trafficking in persons, corruption, asset laundering, and attacks to cyber 
security and illicit trafficking in weapons, among others. An outstanding fea-
ture in the case of Colombia is widespread diffuse social violence expressed 
in a national murder rate in 2012 of around 33 per 100,000 inhabitants, with 
more than a quarter of its 1,122 municipalities recording murder rates equal 
to or above the national average.
The overall situation in Colombia corresponds to an intermediate stage 
of operational intensity, which according to counterinsurgency parameters 
reviewed above, demanding troop density in the range between 40 and 100 
troops per 10,000 inhabitants. Recent reports on the size of the security forces 
in Colombia mention figures in the range of 285,000 troops in the armed 
forces and 161,000 troops in the national police.15 Based on an estimated total 
population of 46,581,823 for 2012,16 Colombia currently has a density of 96 
troops per 10,000 inhabitants, of which nearly a third are committed to police 
work, suggesting that troop density is situated in the upper end of the range 
established by counterinsurgency doctrine for intermediate intensity oper-
ational scenarios. 
This “balanced” troop density in Colombia is the result of efforts for more 
than a decade spent fighting guerrillas, paramilitaries and, more recently, 
“criminal gangs linked to drug trafficking” (CGLDT)17 in order to regain gov-
ernment control of territories previously under the influence of these groups, 
many of which were home to large extensions of illicit coca crops. Combined 
counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency efforts have significantly reduced 
the numbers of guerrilla, paramilitary, and CGLDT combatants as well as of 
illicit coca cropping areas. 
In 1999, when the illicit coca cropping area in Colombia was nearly 
160,000 hectares, 85 percent of this area was concentrated in twenty-nine 
municipalities. A decade and US$5 billion later, coca cropping area was 
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
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slashed to nearly 67,000 hectares, and the 30,000 strong standing forces of 
non-state illicitly armed groups had been cut to a quarter of their original 
size. Municipalities affected by their activities fell from over 500 in 2004 to 
around 300 in 2009.18 See Figure 2.
Figures provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense reckon that 
numbers of non-state illicitly armed units, as well as their standing forces 
operating in different parts of the country have significantly declined since 
2004:
• In 2004, 168 non-state illicitly armed units totaled a joint stand-
ing force estimated in the range of 24,500–49,200 combatants; 
nearly 40 percent belonged to the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) (estimates range between a minimum of 
10,300 and a maximum of 20,000), 40 percent to the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) (10,025–19,950), and 
the remaining 20 percent to National Liberation Army (ELN) 
(4,175–9,250).
• In 2006, 111 non-state illicitly armed units summed together 
an estimated standing force in the range of 11,850–23,350 com-
batants; two thirds belonged to FARC (7,775–16,150), 20 percent 
to CGLDT (2,425–4,300), and the remaining 15 percent to ELN 
(1,650–2,900); and 
• In 2009, forty-eight non-state illicitly armed units gathered an 
estimated standing force in the range of 7,850–17,550 combat-
Figure 2. Total Illicit Coca Cropping Area, Colombia 1999-2010. 
(Source: SIMCI, 2000 -2011.)
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ants; three fourths belonged to FARC (5,475–13,350), 20 per-
cent to CGLDT (2,075–3,650), and less than 5 percent to ELN 
(300–550)19 See Figure 3.
Despite these significant reductions, the shortcomings of the combined 
anti-narcotic and counterinsurgency strategy are increasingly visible as a 
result of the successful adaptation of these non-state armed actors to counter-
insurgency and coca crop eradication efforts: according to the Ministry of 
Defense and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), illicit 
armed groups persist in approximately 150 municipalities where major coca 
cropping areas have been resilient to eradication efforts.20 
As the number of illicit armed units and their standing forces have 
declined over time, a trend has emerged: there is growing concentration of 
illicit armed units in forty-nine municipalities that persistently record 78–80 
percent of the total annual coca cropping area in Colombia during the second 
half of the decade ending in 2010. According to the location and estimated 
force of non-state illicitly armed units reported by the Ministry of Defense, 
the referred municipalities sheltered 36 percent of their estimated standing 
forces in 2004, 42 percent in 2006, and 73 percent in 2009.21 
Several hypotheses can be offered to interpret this trend. An obvious one 
has to do with the financial support provided by rents forcefully extracted 
from coca croppers and buyers. Another is the fact that municipalities where 
coca crops have persisted in the past usually have areas which are densely 
Figure 3. Illicit Armed Groups in Colombia: Estimated Standing Force 2004, 2006, 2009. 
(Source: UNODC/ Government of Colombia 2005; 2007; 2010; calculations and graph by 
author.)
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planted with landmines, mainly to resist manual crop eradication imple-
mented by the government since 2005, making them more defensible in the 
face of ground based counterinsurgent operations. Finally, areas where coca 
cropping persists over time are likely to have been affected by permanent 
forced displacement of their original tenant, and in many cases have been 
repopulated with households that are subordinated or loyal to the locally 
dominant illicit armed group. 
Complementing the counter-narcotic effort is the counter-insurgent 
National Territorial Consolidation Plan (PNCT), which aims to ensure 
sustainable security and peace in regions affected by illicit crops and the 
presence of illicit armed groups. Consolidation areas are selected based on 
the historic convergence of destabilizing factors such as fragile state pres-
ence, persistent illicit cropping and presence of illicit armed groups, high 
rates of forced displacement and victimization, as well as widespread en-
vironmental destruction. The implementation of the PNCT began in the 
Macarena region (Meta) in 2007 and is expanding to other keys areas such 
as Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Montes de Maria (Bolivar and Sucre), 
northern Antioquia, Córdoba, Putumayo and the Pacific Coast Lowlands in 
Nariño, among others. To achieve its goals the PNCT develops and maintains 
local legal economic activities supported on strategies designed to “ensure 
institutional presence with social development”.22 
Weighing the results of a decade’s worth of “war on drugs” in Colombia 
it seems that government policy makers and officials have helplessly painted 
themselves into a corner while leaving open room for non-state illicitly 
armed groups to carry on with their business. In effect, anti-narcotic and 
counterinsurgent efforts have pushed drug traffickers and non-state illicitly 
armed groups to find an extended number of locations within the country s´ 
vast and scarcely populated territory that offer them adequate conditions to 
continue pursuing their business, thus overextending the state military and 
police force capacity to sustain authoritative “legal” territorial governance 
structures on a permanent basis, even with troop densities in the high end 
of the range established by counterinsurgency doctrine in medium intensity 
operational scenarios. 
In the process of being displaced by counter-narcotic or counter-
insurgent operations from one location to another, non-state armed actors 
have figured out local governance arrangements that allow them to readily 
reestablish their cash flows by means of illicit coca crops in areas abandoned 
in the past by forceful pressure. Upon their return, fallow cropping areas 
and economically viable cropping extensions are easily reactivated on the 
159
bernardo pérez salazar
basis of past experience, as are sources for local labor and production input. 
Processing infrastructure is easily set up as well as commerce for produce. As 
the cycle repeats itself, traffickers and non-state illicitly armed groups have 
become more efficient in expanding coca cropping areas rapidly with the 
aid of previously trained locals that remain loyal or subordinated to them, 
as well as by exploiting other cash generating activities such as extracting 
rents from gold mining, timber, and land grabbing activities, together with 
certain local legal enterprises. In short, the “war on drugs” has taught them 
to adapt temporary governance structures to take advantage of an immense 
territorial extension (the combined area of the forty-nine municipalities in 
observation totals nearly 300,000 km2, roughly an area equivalent to the size 
of Poland), with quick access to cash and broad opportunities to momentarily 
gain military and political initiative in the pursuit of their businesses. 
In fact, after a decade of being targeted by combined counter-narcotic 
and counter-insurgent operations, Colombia’s non-state illicitly armed 
groups have successfully installed in their tactical book what Bruce Bagley 
has labeled the “cockroach effect.” That is, 
…the displacement of criminal networks from one city/state/
region to another within a given country or from one country 
to another in search of safer havens and more pliable state 
authorities.23
Nation-Building or Building Local Partnerships Between Political 
Entrepreneurs and Criminal Organizations?
In the framework of efforts directed to regain state control of territorial 
governance structures functioning under hybrid political orders, nation-
building initiatives represent the other side of the same coin of counterinsur-
gent and stabilization operations. Nation-building is promoted as a strategy 
for constructive state-society engagement.24 States often tend to legitimize 
counterinsurgent and stabilization operations as a necessary step in order to 
introduce democratization. Yet in many cases democratization unintendedly 
favors partnerships between political entrepreneurs and criminal organiza-
tions, delivering them control of “official” rule-making powers which can be 
used to benefit a few and to put the majority at graver risk than in previous 
social and political orders. 
Political entrepreneurs are usually figures specialized in leading 
struggles for legitimacy and recognition of a social group and its claims. 
They normally specialize in creating and manipulating political identity as a 
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
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powerful lever to encourage collective action. They also motivate and drive 
collective action by means of their connections with specialists in violence, 
such as non-state illicit armed groups or organized criminal structures, 
willing to provide their technical and professional skills. In sum, political 
entrepreneurs generally specialize in threatening to use violence in order to 
advance their claims.25
Thus “electoral” democratization in local contexts incentivizes polit-
icians to seek votes in poorer, “under-governed” districts by establishing 
relationships with local strongmen and exchanging personal or public assets 
for votes. The outcome is the development of complex relationships between 
local strongmen, some of whom dominate criminal structures, and public 
administration circuits. The resulting alliances usually gain incontestable 
position to manipulate local “electoral machines” and take over the local state 
apparatus through the corruption of political authorities eager for cash to fi-
nance their campaigns. In time, these relationships usually allow the former 
to accumulate enough influence on their own to shed their original political 
patrons, and substitute them putting up their own candidates in office.26 
Criminal activities thrive as local authorities are overwhelmed by the 
task of governing conflicting interests and claims, particularly in environ-
ments of inequality, exclusion, and progressive informalization. In the 
resultant hybrid political system, “law and order” emerge as a result of a 
variable symbiosis between officials (local government agents, police, and 
justice administrators), local “power players” (common criminality, non-
state illicitly armed groups), and “moral authorities” (local leaders, priests, 
evangelical pastors, and successful local entrepreneurs), in shifting alliances 
that oscillate between selective involvement, insulation, and abandonment, 
alternately seeking forms of accommodations and confrontation with the lo-
cal legal and illicit “power brokers”.27
Colombia provides an illustrative case of the political and institutional 
dynamic described above. As a result of political and fiscal decentralization 
reforms that were passed during the 1980s in the attempt to create meaning-
ful access to the political system, non-state actors gained and strengthened 
their grip on public budgets in territories and populations under their influ-
ence. In this manner a significant share of decentralized public resources 
were in fact made available to finance the expansion of armed clientelism by 
illegal groups on both the left and right.28 
Subsequently, in 2003 new political movements backed by right wing 
paramilitary groups were able to elect 251 mayors and nearly 400 town 
councilmen in different regions of the country.29 Over the past ten years, 
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many elected officials representing these movements have been brought to 
justice before Colombia’s Supreme Court, and legal electoral reforms have 
raised the voting threshold needed for a political movement or party to be 
officially recognized by the National Electoral Organization.30 
Yet in 2011 the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE), a non-government-
al organization monitoring local electoral campaigns on the ground in order 
to assess risks concerning use of political violence and electoral fraud, found 
the highest risk ratings in municipalities located in border areas associated 
with drug, firearms, and ammunition smuggling routes operating through 
Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as municipalities included in the National 
Territorial Consolidation Plan mentioned in the previous section. This, in 
spite of efforts and resources spent for more than a decade on major counter-
insurgency and antinarcotic operations in Colombia.
Even more alarming, the findings point to the fact that the overall risk 
of electoral fraud has not declined since 2006 and that most of the present 
risk is endorsed to corrupt politicians and public servants threatening to rig 
elections from within the Electoral Organization.31
Conclusions
This article began by considering the scope of the future outlook of the 
world in the next couple of decades, as recently proposed by the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC). According to the NIC the probable outcome will 
be shaped by the way in which tensions between governments and non-state 
actors are resolved in the different dimensions of development, including 
economic, social, political, and cultural issues. The result will depend on 
how each part proves able to adapt in order to harness change instead of 
being overwhelmed by it. 
The NIC’s framework offers a vantage point to consider governments’ 
concerns regarding security in today’s world. Presently government efforts 
in this respect are increasingly focused on non-state actors involved in drug 
trafficking, sex slavery, corruption, asset laundering, attacks to cyber security, 
and illicit trafficking in weapons, all of which have emerged in the globalized 
world as a multidimensional challenge to human and state security. Thus 
the “multidimensional security approach” argues for the need to develop 
appropriate hemispheric cooperation and multifaceted responses involving 
partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society in 
order to successfully deal with these complex challenges. 
Yet when considering concrete cases in which states are committed to 
fighting these new threats to security, as in the case of Colombia for the past 
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couple of decades, measures are clearly directed to warrant a state-centric 
model with evident underpinnings related to the standard doctrine of 
counterinsurgent and stabilization operations, bluntly reducing security pri-
orities to national security objectives. This perspective generally overlooks 
the security needs of people with particular identities, political values, and 
demands that may best be met by responses led by non-state actors. This 
omission is one of the main flaws of the counterinsurgent and stabilization 
doctrine that aims to impose democratic governance standards in a top-
down fashion, as is reflected in the unsatisfactory results obtained to the 
present with this type of operations in areas of the world labeled by the U.S. 
Department of state as “terrorist safe havens.”
Lack of nuance in this regard has led policymakers to characterize terri-
tories not under control of state-centered governance structures as potential 
threats to national security. Hence the concepts of “ungoverned” or “under-
governed” areas negatively express the preference of states for state-centered 
territorial governance structures, and legitimize international crusades 
to criminalize non-state actors that govern these territories not following 
proper “democratic governance standards.” 
Clearly some of these “safe havens” are under control of criminal organ-
izations and offer favorable conditions for criminal activity to thrive without 
detection and with impunity, and provide their perpetrators refuge from 
efforts to combat or counter them, making them convenient launching pads 
for terrorist attacks against nation-states and the interests they represent. Yet, 
universal contempt for territorial “vacuums” outside the control of a nation-
state may lead to wrongful demonization and criminalization of non-state 
actors that are able to legitimately deliver to a compliant social base adequate 
governance services and goods more effectively than the nominally “legal” 
territorial sovereign. Such policies may lead to more instability in the future 
without bringing the world any closer to resembling the simplistic, nation-
state based “political map of the world.” 
In 2030 it is probable that concerns related to the security needs and 
demands of people—that is, human security—as well as the security of the 
state, will still be linked to principles and institutions such as international 
law, the respect for state sovereignty and non-intervention, faithful compli-
ance of treaties and covenants, and acting appropriately in accordance with 
constitutional provisions of each state. However, the relevance and incidence 
that these principles and institutions will have in delivering governance 
goods and services—security among them—will depend on the ability of 
national and international policymakers to expand their understanding of 
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security beyond the state-centric conception, and to develop approaches that 
allow states to live with territorial governance responses that have non-state 
actors at their heart. 
References
Arias, Enrique D. 2010. “Understanding 
Criminal Networks, Political Order, 
and Politics in Latin America.” In Un-
governed Spaces: Alternatives to State Au-
thority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, 
edited by Anne Clunan and Harold 
Trinkunas. Stanford, CA.: Stanford 
Security Studies, 115-135.
Bagley, Bruce. Undated. “Drug Trafficking 
and Organized Crime in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean in the Twenty 
First Century: Challenges to Democ-
racy.” Accessed May 15, 2012. http://
lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/
congress-papers/lasa2012/files/696.
pdf. 
Clunan, Anne, and Harold Trinkunas, eds. 
2010. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives 
to State Authority in an Era of Softened 
Sovereignty. Stanford, CA.: Stanford 
Security Studies.
Dobbins, James, et al. 2007. The Beginner’s 
Guide to Nation-Building. Santa Monica, 
CA.: Rand Corporation.
Eaton, Kent. 2006. “The Downside of Decen-
tralization: Armed Clientelism in Co-
lombia.” Security Studies 15(4): 533-562.
GAO. 2011. “Combating Terrorism: U.S. 
Government Strategies and Efforts 
to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven.” Ac-
cessed on August 15, 2013. http://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-11-713T.
Goode, Steven. 2009. “A Historical Basis for 
Force Requirements in Counterinsur-
gency.” Parameters XXXIX Winter 10: 
45-57.
Hackett, James, ed. 2010. The Military Balance 
2010. London: Routledge /Internation-
al Institute of Strategic Studies.
Jackson, Robert. 1987. “Quasi-States, Dual 
Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: 
International Jurisprudence and the 
Third World.” International Organiza-
tion 41(4): 519-49.
Kaplan, Robert. 1994. “The Coming Anar-
chy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopu-
lation, Tribalism, and Disease Are 
Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric 
of Our Planet.” The Atlantic Monthly 
Feb. 273(2): 44-67.
Kruijt, Dirk, and Koonings, Kees, 1999, “Vi-
olence and Fear in Latin America.” In 
Societies of fear: The Legacy of Civil War, 
Violence and terror in Latin America, ed-
ited by Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. 
London: Zed Books, 33-62. 
Manwaring, Max G., et al. 2003. “Building 
Regional Security Cooperation in the 
Western Hemisphere: Issues and Rec-
ommendations.” Carlisle (PA): Strate-
gic Studies Institute.
MAPP/OEA. 2006. “Sexto informe trimes-
tral del Secretario General al Consejo 
Permanente sobre la Mision de Apoyo 
al Proceso de Paz en Colombia.” Bo-
gotá: MAPP-OEA.
McGrath, John J. 2006. Boots on the Ground: 
Troop Density in Contingency Opera-
tions. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Com-
bat Studies Institute Press.
MOE. 2011. Mapas y factores de riesgo electoral. 
Elecciones de autoridades locales, Colom-
bia, 2011. Bogotá: Misión de Observa-
ción Electoral.
Naylor, Robin T. 2004. Wages of Crime. Black 
Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Under-
world Economy. Ithaca (NY): Cornell 
University Press. 
NIC. 2012. Global Trends 2030. Alternative 
Worlds. Washington, D.C.: National 
Intelligence Council. 
OECD. 2011. Supporting Statebuilding in 
Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy 
Guidance. DAC Guidelines and Refer-
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
164
ence Series, OECD Publishing. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264074989-en.
Quinlivan, James. 1995. “Force Require-
ments in Stability Operations” Param-
eters Winter 25: 59-69.
Rabasa, Angel, et al. 2007. Ungoverned Ter-
ritories: Understanding and Reducing Ter-
rorism Risks. Washington D.C.: Rand 
Corporation / Project Air Force.
Rabasa, Angel, et al. 2010. Deradicalizing 
Islamist Extremists. Santa Monica CA: 
Rand Corporation, 2010.
Risse, Thomas. 2008. “Governance in Areas 
of Limited Statehood: How Far Do 
Concepts Travel?” Paper presented at 
the International Studies Association 
Annual Convention, San Francisco, 
March 26-30.
Romero, Mauricio, ed. 2007. Parapolítica. 
La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los 
acuerdos políticos. Bogotá: Corporación 
Nuevo Arco Iris/Intermedio.
SIMICI. 2000. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 1999.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2001. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísticas 
municipales censo 31 de diciembre de 
2000.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2002. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 2001.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2003. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 2002.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2004. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 2003.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2005. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 2004.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2006. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 2005.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2007. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísticas 
municipales censo 31 de diciembre de 
2006.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2008. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 2007.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2009. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísti-
cas municipales censo 31 de diciembre 
de 2008.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2010. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísticas 
municipales censo 31 de diciembre de 
2009.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SIMICI. 2011. “Cultivos de coca. Estadísticas 
municipales censo 31 de diciembre de 
2010.” Bogotá: UNODC.
SOUTHCOM. 2013. “Posture Statement of 
General John F. Kelly, United States 
Marine Corps Commander, United 
States Southern Command before the 
113th Congress Senate Armed Servic-
es Committee.” March 19. http://www.
southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/
SOUTHCOM%202013%20Posture%20
Statement%20FINAL%20SASC.pdf.
UNODC/Government of Colombia. 2005. 
“Colombia. Coca Cultivation Survey 
2004.” Accessed June 11, 2011. www.
unodc.org/pdf/andean/Part3_Colom-
bia.pdf.
UNODC/Government of Colombia 2007 
“Colombia. Coca Cultivation Survey 
2006.” Accessed June 11, 2011. www.
unodc.org/pdf/andean/Part3_Colom-
bia.pdf.
UNODC/Government of Colombia. 2010. 
“Colombia. Monitoreo de cultivos 
de coca 2009.” Accessed June 11, 
2011. www.unodc.org/documents/
crop-monitoring/Colombia/Colombia-
Censo-2009-web.pdf.
UNODC/Government of Colombia. 2011. 
“Colombia. Monitoreo de cultivos de 
coca 2010.” Accessed June 11, 2011. 
www.unodc.org/documents/crop-
monitoring/Colombia/Colombia-Cen-
so-2009-web.pdf.
Notes
1 NIC, Global Trends 2030. Alternative 
Worlds (Washington, D.C.: National 
Intelligence Council, 2012).
165
bernardo pérez salazar
2 Angel Rabasa, et al. Deradicalizing 
Islamist Extremists (Santa Monica CA: 
Rand Corporation, 2010), xv-xxiv.
3 James Dobbins, et al. The Beginner’s 
Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica, 
CA.: Rand Corporation, 2007), xxiv – 
xxviii.
4 GAO, “Combating Terrorism: U.S. 
Government Strategies and Efforts 
to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven,” Ac-
cessed on August 15, 2013. http://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-11-713T, 2011, 
5.
5 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anar-
chy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopu-
lation, Tribalism, and Disease Are 
Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric 
of Our Planet.” The Atlantic Monthly 
273, 2 (Feb. 1994): 58-60.
6 Robert Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual 
Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: 
International Jurisprudence and the 
Third World.” International Organi-
zation 41, 4 (1987): 519-49; Thomas 
Risse, “Governance in Areas of Lim-
ited Statehood: How Far Do Concepts 
Travel?” (Paper presented at the Inter-
national Studies Association Annual 
Convention, San Francisco, March 
26-30, 2008).
7 Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, 
eds. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives 
to State Authority in an Era of Softened 
Sovereignty (Stanford, CA.: Stanford 
Security Studies, 2010), 283-285.
8 OECD, “Supporting Statebuilding in 
Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Pol-
icy Guidance” DAC Guidelines and Ref-
erence Series, OECD Publishing. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264074989-
en.2011, 24-25.
9 Robin Naylor, Wages of Crime. Black 
Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Under-
world Economy (Ithaca (NY): Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 40-43; Clunan 
and Trinkunas, 277-282.
10 Naylor, 22-24.
11 Clunan and Trinkunas, 278-280.
12 John J. McGrath, Boots on the Ground: 
Troop Density in Contingency Operations 
(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat 
Studies Institute Press, 2006); Dob-
bins et al.; Steven Goode, “A Historical 
Basis for Force Requirements in Coun-
terinsurgency.” Parameters XXXIX, 10 
(Winter 2009): 45-57.
13 James Quinlivan, “Force Require-
ments in Stability Operations” Param-
eters 25 (Winter 1995): 59-69.
14 Quinlivan; McGrath.
15 James Hackett, ed., The Military Balance 
(London: Routledge /International In-
stitute of Strategic Studies, 2010), 74-77.
16 National Administrative Department 
of Statistics, DANE 2012.
17 The OAS Mission to Support the Peace 
Process in Colombia (MAPP-OEA) 
issued warnings that after demobili-
zation of the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC) between 2004 and 
2006, new criminal gangs linked to 
drug trafficking (CGLDT) emerged, 
with their standing force coming from 
“remobilized” or non-demobilized 
combatants, as well as newly recruited 
combatants (MAPP-OEA, “Sexto 
informe trimestral del Secretario 
General al Consejo Permanente sobre 
la Mision de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz 
en Colombia.” Bogotá: MAPP-OEA 
(2006): 6-11.
18 UNODC “Colombia. Monitoreo de 
cultivos de coca 2009.” Accessed June 
11, 2011. www.unodc.org/documents/
crop-monitoring/Colombia/Colombia-
Censo-2009-web.pdf.2010, 16-17.
19 UNODC/Government of Colombia 
“Colombia. Coca Cultivation Survey 
2004.” Accessed June 11, 2011. www.
unodc.org/pdf/andean/Part3_Colom-
bia.pdf. 2005, 40; UNODC/Govern-
ment of Colombia “Colombia. Coca 
Cultivation Survey 2006.” Accessed 
June 11, 2011. www.unodc.org/pdf/
andean/Part3_Colombia.pdf.2007, 68; 
UNODC/Government of Colombia 
2010, 71.
security, “ungoverned areas” and non-state actors
166
20 MAPP-OEA 2009, 3; UNODC/Govern-
ment of Colombia 2010, 71.
21 UNODC/Government of Colombia 
2005, 40; UNODC/Government of Co-
lombia 2007, 68; UNODC/Government 
of Colombia 2010, 71.
22 UNODC/Government of Colombia 
2011, 79.
23 Bruce Bagley “Drug Trafficking and 
Organized Crime in Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the Twenty 
First Century: Challenges to Democ-
racy.” Accessed May 15, 2012. http://
lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/
congress-papers/lasa2012/files/696.
pdf. undated, 20.
24 OECD Supporting Statebuilding in 
Situations of Conflict and Fragility: 
Policy Guidance. DAC Guidelines and 
Reference Series, OECD Publishing. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264074989-en, 
2011, 13.
25 Tilly, 2003, 30-35.
26 Kent Eaton, “The Downside of De-
centralization: Armed Clientelism in 
Colombia.” Security Studies 15, 4 (2006): 
549-559; Enrique Arias “Understand-
ing Criminal Networks, Political 
Order, and Politics in Latin America.” 
in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to 
State Authority in an Era of Softened 
Sovereignty, Anne Clunan and Harold 
Trinkunas, eds. (Stanford, CA.: Stan-
ford Security Studies, 2012), 120.
27 Dirk Kruit and Kees Koonings “Vio-
lence and Fear in Latin America.” in 
Societies of fear: The Legacy of Civil War, 
Violence and terror in Latin America, 
Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds. 
(London: Zed Books, 1999), 1-30)
28 Eaton, 549-559.
29 Mauricio Romero, ed. Parapolítica. 
La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los 
acuerdos políticos (Bogotá: Corporación 
Nuevo Arco Iris/Intermedio, 2007), 31.
30 MOE, Mapas y factores de riesgo electoral. 
Elecciones de autoridades locales, Colom-
bia, 2011 (Bogotá: Misión de Observa-
ción Electoral, 2011), 41.
31 Ibid., 43.
Iv: 
InsUrGenCIes and 
orGanIZed CrIMe

169© Centre for Military and Strategic Studies http://cmss.ucalgary.ca/
Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 9, 2013
Latin American Security Pages 169–172
The Background and Current 
Negations with FARC
Ambassador Alfonso López Caballero,  
Former Colombian Ambassador to Canada
When I was first elected to Congress, another junior congressman was Iván Márquez, who today heads the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) negotiating team in Havana, Cuba. He had been elected with the 
slate of the recently created Unión Patriótica. At the time, nobody knew he 
was a FARC Commander. We had a cordial relationship and on one occa-
sion I invited him and his girlfriend to have lunch at my home. One day, 
as the leaders of the Unión Patriótica started to get killed, he soon vanished, 
having gone underground. Some ten years later, I was appointed minister 
of the interior. As such, I was partly responsible for security in the country 
and the Ministry was the ward of the leaders of the guerilla groups that had 
demobilized, such as M-19 (Movimiento 19 de abril/19 of April Movement), EPL 
(Ejército Popular de Liberación/Popular Liberation Army) and ELN (Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional/National Liberation Army) during the Barco and Gaviria 
peace processes and with whom the government had made some commit-
ments. During this time, I got to know them and became friends with some 
of the former guerilla leaders who I occasionally consult on matters regarding 
security. A couple of years later, the new government made me part of the 
negotiating team in the peace process. As a government negotiator, I went to 
San Vicente del Caguán for a couple of days every other week to meet with 
the guerrillas. I then had the opportunity to again see Iván Márquez, who 
was one of the rising stars in the FARC. 
Regarding the ongoing peace talks, I am cautiously optimistic. 
Circumstances have changed substantially over the past years. I think there 
is an important incentive for FARC to negotiate on three levels: at the military, 
political, and international level. At the military level, the armed forces have 
been tremendously strengthened with over 7 billion dollars of American 
aid through Plan Colombia, with a very substantial increase in the number 
of professional soldiers (vs. recruits) and with a very effective intelligence 
service, especially on the part of the police. As a result, whereas the historic 
leaders of FARC died of old age while still in the leadership, their successors 
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were killed by the army after only a few years of assuming leadership. Mono 
Jojoy was bombed by the air force, and Alfonso Cano was followed by police 
intelligence and killed by the army in his camp. Of particular importance has 
been the fleet of war helicopters Sikorski Blackhawks that came with Plan 
Colombia. They are armored craft, equipped with intelligent missiles, and 
fly fast and quietly, including in poor weather conditions. The days when 
FARC could concentrate on over a thousand guerrillas and overrun an army 
base like Patascoy or Las Delicias are over. Now the rapid deployment force 
of these helicopters can reach any point in the country within hours and dis-
pose of attackers. As a result, FARC has had to revert to old guerrilla tactics: 
isolated ambushes, snipers, and attacks on infrastructure. Their offensive 
capability has been substantially reduced. Even though they have not been 
defeated and they continue to have the potential to cause substantial harm, 
they are contained and it is unrealistic that they are able to come to power 
through the force of weapons—and they know it. The only fate the leaders 
can expect, if they continue the war, is to end their days in the jungle running 
from the army (as was the case with Cano) until one day they are killed.
At the political level, the paradox is that FARC has become an obstacle 
for left-wing populism to gain power by the regular electoral process, as 
has been the case in most of Latin America. The former guerilla leaders, or 
sympathizers, are in office by popular elections. Such is the case with for-
mer guerrillas in Brazil, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Salvador, or persons close 
to that ideology, such as the leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, and 
Ecuador. FARC has had the effect of a vaccine against left-wing populism. 
As a result, the country, in contrast with most of Latin America, has turned 
right. The current progressive government is center-right and the strong op-
position comes from the hard right. 
At the international level, countries that might have supported FARC in 
the past have changed priorities. Russia and Eastern Europe are no longer 
communist, nor is China interested in guerrilla wars. Cuba, which in the 
1960s and 1970s, sponsored guerrilla groups and supported guerrilla inva-
sions in Colombia with the M-19, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and 
Bolivia with Che Guevara, who had vowed to turn the Andean Mountains 
into a new Sierra Maestra, is no longer interested in playing that role. Cuba’s 
priority today is to get the United States to lift the fifty-year old trade em-
bargo, which is strangling them especially after the end of the support of the 
Soviet Union. For that, Cuba needs the solidarity of the rest of the continent 
to pressure the United States. Consequently, the country is induced to play 
a constructive role and have done so. Fidel Castro declared not long ago that 
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guerilla war is no longer a valid option to reach power, and in the case of 
Colombia, his influence has been positive. When the brother of President 
Betancur was kidnapped by the ELN in 1983, it was through Castro’s inter-
mediation that he was freed (President Betancur had just reestablished re-
lations that had been broken after the M-19 invasion). When the brother of 
President Gaviria was kidnapped by a fringe guerilla group in 1996, President 
Gaviria appealed to Castro for assistance, who sent an envoy that managed 
to liberate him shortly before he was due to be executed. When, after the 
capture of Rodrigo Granda (now FARC negotiator) in the streets of Caracas in 
2004, Chávez broke off relations with Colombia and the two countries were 
on the brink of war. Subsequently, Castro sent his vice-minister of foreign 
affairs to Venezuela and another official from the Ministry to Colombia to 
normalize relations. Thus, for Cuba it is an advantage to play a constructive 
role and host the current peace negotiations. 
As for the Venezuela of Chávez, it is evident that to appear as an ally of 
FARC does not produce sympathy in Colombia. On the contrary, FARC is an 
obstacle for the expansion of chavismo in Colombia by electoral means, as has 
been the case in other countries. It is in their political interest also to support 
the peace process. 
There are clear indications that the current peace negotiations are mov-
ing in the right direction. The five point negotiating agenda agreed to by 
FARC closely mirrors the government’s program:
• Agrarian issues (Ley de tierras)
• Victims of the conflict (Ley de víctimas)
• Participation in politics (Marco jurídico para la paz)
• Drug trade
• End of the conflict
The government has declared emphatically that any major changes in 
the political or economic structure can only be brought about through the 
regular political process by obtaining the required majorities to pass the 
desired laws. 
What is really at stake is some form of amnesty for the guerrillas and 
the potential opportunity to participate in politics. In past peace processes 
with the M-19, the EPL, and a sector of the ELN, upon demobilizing they 
were not prosecuted and many quickly entered politics. The leaders of the 
M-19 became presidential candidates, governors and mayors, and one is cur-
rently the mayor of Bogotá. Several guerrillas from the EPL became mayors 
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of towns in the Urabá region, and one of them joined the Uribe government 
and was in charge of human rights in the vice-presidency. But now things 
are not so simple. On the one hand, there are international factors such as the 
International Criminal Court, and the fact that some of them have extradition 
requests from the United States. On the other hand, and more importantly, 
the climate of public opinion has changed and there is a very strong current 
against granting them impunity. 
There are many very influential voices that are against the peace process 
if it means impunity for the guerrillas. Among them the most popular polit-
ician in the country: former President Álvaro Uribe, as well as the Attorney-
General and the National Federation of Cattle Breeders, to mention only a 
few. The president has said that the agreements reached at the negotiating 
table require some popular validation, presumably a referendum, and it is 
not absolutely certain that it would be won. However, as previously men-
tioned, I am cautiously optimistic. 
If the peace process is successful, the political element will be withdrawn 
from the violence that affects some sectors of Colombian society. Presumably, 
it will mean the end of attacks by FARC on the armed forces and the country’s 
infrastructure (pipelines and power installations). It will not be translated 
immediately into increased security since, for the most part, violence in the 
main cities is due to common criminality. 
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In an extensive assessment written by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Research and Analysis branch back in 2000 on the sub-ject of international corruption and the rapidly growing global threats 
by various transnational criminal groups throughout various areas of the 
world, the Service noted the following in its initial preamble on this very 
tangible and growing threat:
In any nation where transnational criminal groups are extremely 
powerful, even though the state may have nominal control over 
its sovereignty, the reality is that criminal syndicates are likely 
holding the reins. This has security implications not only for the 
country itself, but also, given the borderless nature of crime in 
today’s world, for the neighbors of any such criminalized state. 
Unchecked transnational criminal activity can challenge a na-
tion’s sovereignty in other ways. Other nations may adopt (tactic-
al and strategic) measures designed to protect their country and 
citizens from transnational crime which may have (far-reaching) 
extra-territorial consequences...Given that transnational crime 
groups do not consider international borders as impediments, 
they are not only a threat to the nations where they are based, 
but threaten any society where they conduct their activities….in 
the case of less advanced nations with weak structures and/or 
tenuous legitimacy, the power wielded by transnational criminal 
organizations can even rival that of the state.1 
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In addressing the internal corruption problems even further, the Service 
went on to add that “cooperation among transnational criminal organiza-
tions, already a major factor in the new world order of crime, is expected to 
continue and expand. Partnerships, bartering arrangements and alliances, 
either short or long-term, allow these syndicates to better evade law enforce-
ment agencies, to share existing infrastructure and to improve risk manage-
ment (through corruption of existing state security organizations).”2 This 
intelligence assessment also noted that, in many regions of Latin America, 
extremely powerful organized crime groups (also sometimes referred to 
as “drug cartels”) have a stranglehold on local and regional economies and 
their various security institutions. Further, they have also become entangled 
with such terrorist organizations as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru 
and, to some extent, smaller domestic reactionary movements throughout 
the region. When there is close cooperation between the drug organizations 
and these various other reactionary forces that have long held sway in Latin 
America, an additional dimension is added to the corruptive issues already 
existing within weak national, state, and local security institutions.3
The Service also has previously assessed that “while the relationship 
between drug dealers and these groups has been contentious at times, insur-
gents are sometimes paid (in some form whether it is cash or the actual nar-
cotics itself) to provide security services for drug traffickers—they often ‘tax’ 
drug operations in areas they control and, in some instances, they are directly 
involved in narcotics cultivation.”4 In so doing, the organized crime group/
cartels and the insurgent organizations have clearly formed an important 
bond, which is central to their continued operations and which, together, can 
undermine the overall stability of the countries in which they operate often 
with impunity and freedom from investigation and/or attacks by the local, 
state, or national security agencies in the region that have been corrupted. It 
would not be incorrect to suggest the weaker developing third world coun-
tries in parts of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America are extremely 
susceptible to the corruptive influences of existing transnational organized 
crime groups and, unfortunately, this can also apply to even stronger Western 
countries as well. Fast-forward to 2013 and this critical assessment still holds 
true and, in many ways, is perhaps even more valid now in certain Latin 
American countries of note. For the purposes of this rather short and limited 
study, the two most maligned countries discussed are Mexico and Colombia, 
which have received the most notoriety of all the countries battling the drug 
cartels and corruption within Latin America as a whole.
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Mexico
Perhaps no other country in Latin America has been more pointedly tainted 
or perceived as being out-of-control with corruption and drug wars as Mexico 
where daily headlines of the ongoing pitched, violent battles between the se-
curity forces and drug cartels and inter-cartel battles have seemed unending. 
Mexico has been experiencing a tremendous upsurge in violence in recent 
years and to put a perspective on all of this, it is important to remember that 
of the numerous major drug cartels throughout the world today, eight are 
Mexican-based and they include the Sinaloa, Tijuana, Gulf, Beltran Leyva, 
Los Zetas, La Familia, Carillo Fuentas, and the Arellano Felix organiza-
tions. Other so-called “splinter groups” include the Cartel Pacifico Sur, New 
Federation and the Knights Templar. They all currently control a minimum 
of seventeen to eighteen of the thirty-two Mexican States with thousands los-
ing their lives since former President Calderón came to power and declared 
war on these gangs in Mexico, deploying more than 50,000 military troops 
and federal police into the battle. These statistics include more than 47,000 
people having been killed since Calderón launched his military offensive 
against the cartels back in 2006 and this figure is likely to climb higher as 
the new Peña Nieto administration continues its war on the cartels.5 With 
more than 90 percent of the cocaine now entering Canada from Mexico, that 
country has truly become a major source of concern for Canadian police au-
thorities with various news sources now reporting the growing influence of 
the Mexican cartels into the lower mainland area of British Columbia and the 
local organized crime groups operating there.6 
During a recent meeting with two former and current senior officials 
with the Mexican security establishment, the subject of internal corrup-
tion arose and one bluntly admitted that Mexican security institutions 
cannot even protect their own citizenry now, let alone foreigners who visit 
the country.7 His reasons were clear: the reach of the various drug cartels 
throughout the entire Mexican security apparatus is so pervasive and the 
corruption levels so high that to even consider successfully combating this 
well organized and clearly overwhelming threat must acknowledge the in-
herent failings and weaknesses of the state’s security institutions themselves, 
which continue to be unable to effectively battle the ongoing corruption from 
within. In February 2009, a U.S. government report warned that Mexico had 
certainly made significant inroads in the battle against its various domestic 
organized crime groups (cartels) but cautiously also noted that “the Mexican 
government’s progress…comes against a backdrop of continuing high levels 
of corruption and turmoil within Mexico’s security and judicial bodies…cor-
corruptive destabilizing influences of crime groups
176
ruption throughout Mexico’s public institutions remains a key impediment 
to successfully curtailing the power of the drug cartels.”8 Two years later, 
the Rand Corporation would state that in assessing the overall roots of cor-
ruption within Mexico, it would appear that while corruption levels in some 
security institutions have indeed fallen due to Mexico’s serious attempts at 
serious reform, which include heightened “continuity in elected officials and 
their policies, coordination within and between levels of government, and 
transparency and accountability,” unfortunately “police corruption (itself) 
has remained generally stable at a high level.”9
Of course, much of these problems can be traced to poor salaries, in-
adequate training, no accountability and non-existent “whistle-blower” 
mechanisms with which to report incidents of corruption and cooperation 
with organized crime groups by individual security officers. The National 
Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) has reported that these incidents 
include “police, especially at the state and local level, [being] involved in 
kidnapping, extortion, and in providing protection for, or acting directly 
on behalf of, organized crime and drug traffickers…. [with] local forces in 
particular being poorly compensated and directly pressured by criminal 
groups, leaving them most vulnerable to infiltration.”10 The CNDH goes on 
to note that the overall responsibility for investigation abuses at the fed-
eral police level rests with the Attorney General or the Secretariat of Public 
Administration, depending on the type of offense; but it is important to re-
member that corruption also extends into these latter two federal offices as 
well, thus complicating the entire question of official “oversight” both within 
and outside the Mexican government security apparatus.11
In January 2009, the government took a more stringent line to try and 
get a handle on the overall corruption problem by passing legislation that 
established a four-year deadline to (in essence) “vet” all the personnel 
then serving in Mexico’s roughly 2,600 police forces using what was then 
termed a series of “testing mechanisms.” This particular legislation, termed 
“Operation Cleanup,” required all police forces to not only meet certain 
“compensation and/or training standards” but also gave federal, state, and 
local authorities the power to fire corrupt or officers deemed unfit for duty. 
Following the commencement of “Operation Cleanup,” authorities began ar-
resting politicians, judges, and police officers and this included: the arrest of 
ten mayors, a judge, and sixteen police officers in Michoacán;12 the arrest of 
ninety-two police officers in Hidalgo; the takeover of the entire police force of 
Guadalupe; the arrest of senior officers (including the police chief) of Ciudad 
Juárez; the dismissal of some 3,200 federal police officers (or 10 percent) of the 
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federal force; the dismissal of an additional 465 state and local police officers; 
and the arrest of several prison guards and officials implicated in the mass 
prison escape of over 130 gang members in the State of Coahuila.13 Other 
arrests included federal migration officers, custom officers, and other private 
security officials working in the corporate sector. While this so-called “na-
tional vetting” process has been successful in weeding out some of the worst 
instances of police corruption, it is important to note that ten of the thirty-one 
states have not even evaluated half of their overall police forces yet and there 
is no indication exactly when the program can be considered completed and 
deemed a “success.”14 
Of course, this unprecedented effort to “clean house” within the nation’s 
police forces and other security institutions throughout the country also in-
volved the role of another key security institution: the Mexican Intelligence 
Service (CISEN). CISEN itself is relatively new in the intelligence world hav-
ing been established in 1989; however, this security institution has since its 
inception certainly progressed in a very positive and professional direction 
through the recruitment of trusted officers. Indeed, CISEN has long played 
a very strong role in trying to root out corruption within the various fed-
eral, state, and local government and security institutions throughout the 
country. Several years ago, CISEN and other trusted departments were al-
located a relatively new but important responsibility, namely the lengthy 
and time consuming task of polygraphing all individuals working in various 
key security sectors of the Mexican federal government. While a seemingly 
admirable and effective attempt to clean up corruption within the country, 
it unfortunately has only been successful in processing 10–15 percent of the 
designated personnel at various government levels throughout the country.15 
This is largely due to the sheer immensity of the task and the fact that Mexican 
public officials involved in ongoing security investigations are constantly 
moving around to different positions as the government changes every six 
years and the screening process is simply not designed to be conducted on a 
regular basis.
In many ways, it is a losing battle not so much because the effort is not 
there but more because the sheer power of the drug cartels, which have in 
so many ways destabilized an already weak Mexican security structure 
whether it be at the federal, state or local levels where poor salaries and al-
most negligible training have served to cripple the government’s war against 
the various organized crime groups throughout the country. Hillary Clinton, 
then U.S. Secretary of State, paid a visit to Mexico a couple of years ago and 
proclaimed before her official arrival that Mexico was looking more like 
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Colombia roughly twenty years ago when the narco- traffickers under Pablo 
Escobar controlled certain parts of that country.16 While good headlines, lit-
erally, nothing could be further from the truth. Mexico’s drug cartels are col-
lectively far more powerful than the old Escobar cartel ever was in Colombia 
and it could be said that there are perhaps nine or ten Pablo Escobars now 
running around in Mexico right on the very doorstep of the United States 
and each have the capability to destabilize certain regions of Mexico should 
they choose to do so. To date, these various violent groups have left the 
Mexican tourism industry alone although they have carried out attacks 
against security forces and other gangs within such tourist zones as Puerto 
Vallarta, Cancún, and Mazatlán. The Mexican government is extremely 
concerned about the impact that its public perception of being a dangerous 
country with corrupt security forces could have on its very vibrant and lucra-
tive tourist industry, and it has launched a very public campaign to reassure 
visiting tourists that it is a safe country to visit. The important difference to 
remember here is that the tourism industry in Mexico is still very strong but 
the various government departments linked to this industry are themselves 
open to corruption by the various drug organizations operating in the same 
tourist zones. With corruption running rampant throughout the police and 
security institutions, the new Peña Nieto administration is now reportedly 
intent on continuing an intensive and wide ranging policy review previously 
initiated by the Calderón government as to the best way to proceed from 
this point forward and get the country’s corrupted security institutions back 
under some form of manageable control.17 This now includes the creation of 
a new national police force that will seek to recruit some 10,000 newly vetted 
and screened police officers and the creation of a unified command of all 
state police forces throughout the country.18 
While much of former President Calderón’s counter drug cartel efforts 
have involved the use (and reliance upon) the military due to the seemingly 
systemic corruption within the ranks of the local, state, and even federal law 
enforcement agencies at the highest levels of the security bureaucracy, the 
situation is now becoming both very dire and increasingly urgent in Mexico. 
In a recent U.S. security publication, it was noted (in stating the obvious) that: 
Bribery/corruption has long been widespread throughout 
Mexican politics. Mexico is well known for its illegal drug trade 
and the corruption the industry fosters…Corruption is rooted 
in the national culture of Mexico. There is a deeply entrenched 
culture of impunity and corruption in Mexico’s government, 
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particularly at the state and local level….Mexicans view their 
police (and security agencies) as having the lowest legitimacy of 
all governmental functions due to corruption and lack of profes-
sionalism…Police corruption and involvement in criminal activ-
ity occurs in most parts of Mexico.19 
It is well known that the so-called “cartels” have successfully infiltrated 
most security agencies at all levels throughout Mexico. In 2008, the govern-
ment arrested its own Director of Counter Narcotics who had been recruited 
by one of the organized crime groups to pass along any and all critical oper-
ational intelligence related to the ongoing counter-narcotics activities in the 
country.20 Intelligence sources that advised this shocked U.S. drug enforce-
ment authorities and revealed just how high up within the Mexican security 
bureaucracy at all levels both the corruption and overall reach of the drug 
cartels had gone. Over the past two years, while the government has made 
its usual pronouncements of making positive headway against the various 
organized crime groups and corruption within even the highest ranks of its 
security institutions, these pronouncements did not factor in the combina-
tion of high levels of poverty, weak institutional security frameworks and 
increasingly powerful organized crime groups, which have created what the 
Guardian calls a “perfect storm” of increasing corruption and drug-related 
violence within Mexico.21 
The Latin America Monitor further noted in 2011 that “countries with 
weak institutions will (inevitably) fall victim to narco-trafficking with 
greater ease, and the lure of drug money has proved difficult to resist for 
many poorly paid army and police officers—and often higher ranking of-
ficials—across the Latin American region.”22 Fired police officers in Mexico 
often tend to join the criminal ranks (taking their training and information 
with them) thus only further complicating an already serious situation for 
all local, state, and national security authorities. President Calderón com-
mented on this fact as far back as March and October 2009 when he stated 
that corruption was an extremely serious problem within the various levels 
of police forces throughout Mexico and was thus a primary reason for his 
government’s decision to turn the counter-narcotics fight in Mexico over 
to the military adding that “the future of democracy in Mexico is at stake 
in the government’s fight against corruption and organized crime.”23 This 
despite continued reliance on U.S. security support which was outlined in a 
U.S. diplomatic cable back in 2009 (and “outed” by Wikileaks in 2010) which 
indicated the Mexican security apparatus was “fractured, ad hoc, and reliant 
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on U.S. support” to weather the high levels of corruption within.24 It has been 
the degree of U.S. support that has always been a contentious issue within 
Mexican political circles but it has also been accepted as a necessary evil and 
one which often receives unwanted publicity not only for Mexican secur-
ity officials but also their U.S. counterparts. In early August 2012, two C.I.A. 
officers were wounded in an Embassy vehicle travelling south of Mexico 
City. The vehicle, which also held a Mexican naval officer, was attacked by 
gunmen believed to be Mexican federal police officers. President Calderón 
had previously authorized a much larger role for U.S. counter-narcotics oper-
ations within Mexico but this latest incident (similar to the killing of an I.C.E. 
agent in 2011 in a U.S. Embassy vehicle), has again called into question the 
overall “quality” of the federal police force, with one observer stating that 
“we are seeing the unraveling of what was supposed to be the main achieve-
ment in the fight against Mexican organized crime, which is the creation of a 
trustworthy national police.”25
These latest incidents have only given added firm credence to one of 
President Calderón’s final public statements on the overall progress against 
organized crime in Mexico when he said that “after six years and 60,000 
deaths, it is impossible to stop the drug trade,” an ominous prediction for 
incoming President Peña Nieto and President Obama in dealing with what 
some analysts have characterized as a country which may currently be in the 
throes of a second Mexican Revolution with corruption within its security 
institutions at its very heart.26 As one U.S. “think-tank” stated back in 2010, 
Mexico has ironically become a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade 
and internal security corruption with some $35–$40 billion now flowing into 
the national economy each year, with the Mexican police and military almost 
unmotivated to take the necessary risks to stem this huge assault on its in-
ternal stability and security which, ironically, also provides jobs and added 
income to Mexican families throughout the country.27 This economic impact 
is another very important factor to consider when looking at Mexico’s inher-
ent inability to successfully combat corruption within its security ranks.
Colombia
With the longest running democracy in South America, Colombia has had 
a long and violent history with terrorist and criminal groups, which, at one 
point in the mid-1990s, gave rise to Colombia being characterized as likely 
the most dangerous and corrupt country in the world. As with Mexico, cor-
ruption within Colombia’s security institutions has been instrumental in 
its ongoing problems in dealing with these domestic threats to peace and 
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stability within the country. The major difference now is that the corrup-
tion is being increasingly driven by the power of the Mexican drug cartels 
that control both their Colombian counterparts and the degree of corruption 
within the Colombian security apparatus, particularly the recently disbanded 
Departamento Administrativo del Servicio (DAS) in 2011.28 This prompted 
the Peña Nieto administration to plan to increase its overall strategic and 
tactical ties with Colombia in the fight against crime and drug trafficking as 
it impacts their own respective security institutions in Mexico.29
Peter Reuter of the University of Maryland asserted in 2002 that Colombia 
is the only instance where a criminal group has directly attacked a modern 
government through successfully exploiting the corruption issues within 
a country’s security institutions and the power of narcotrafficking.30 This 
certainly sets Colombia apart from other countries in Latin America where 
attacks upon security forces and intelligence agencies, rather than the foun-
dations of government, have been the norm. Most discussions with security 
officials within the Colombian government tend to center on how the federal 
government itself will engage the hostile FARC and its related tentacles in 
so-called “peace negotiations” rather than how the government can tackle 
internal corruption, which is acknowledged as “self-evident” throughout 
even the most recent history of Colombia.
Throughout the years, Colombia’s security forces have consistently been 
deemed to be one of the most challenged, sophisticated, and yet problematic 
institutions in that particular region of Latin America as a whole. Indeed, it 
would not be incorrect to say that the primary concern for Canadian security 
interests is less the FARC, ELN (National Liberation Army) or paramilitaries 
per se, although we have always been concerned about any members of these 
terrorist “entities” being able to successfully enter Canada via an already 
swamped immigration visa process. The real concern is how our own intel-
ligence and police agencies deal with an organized crime and narcotics traf-
ficking network in Colombia whose activities often reach well into Canada 
and are supported by corrupted security forces throughout the region, the 
least of which is Colombia itself. Most foreign security forces operating 
within Colombia do so in the context of cooperation and trying to counter the 
flow of drugs and weapons that transit that country to/from various destina-
tions around the world. Both the United States and the United Kingdom are 
the first and second largest donors of security assistance to Colombia, which 
comes in various forms such as military equipment, advisors, training, and 
intelligence sharing to select Colombian security departments. As with U.S. 
military help, this British assistance has included SAS training to the nar-
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cotics division within the Colombian National Police, military advice to the 
Colombian army’s counter-insurgency forces, additional military hardware 
and intelligence equipment, and assistance in setting up an elite “intelligence 
center” and a joint intelligence committee.31 In addition to contributing to 
these pro-active measures and further to the concerns about known corrupt 
elements within Colombia’s overall security apparatus, this security assist-
ance has also had to deal with any links it may have with violations of human 
rights activities by domestic security forces within the country as a whole.32 
These combined factors provide an extremely difficult and challenging oper-
ating environment for all Western foreign police and intelligence services 
presently working in Colombia.
Evidence of Russian, Irish, Asian, and other organized crime groups as 
well as Mexican drug gangs cooperating with the FARC have been detected 
for years and this influence has added to the whole corruption scene within 
Colombia’s security environment. As evidenced in other past and publicly 
available reports, Colombia has struggled for years with corruption within 
the old DAS itself with at least three of the former Directors being arrested 
on various charges. In response to this fact, foreign security and intelligence 
services had tended to rely more on the military and Colombian National 
Police (CNP) intelligence directorates for key liaison and operational pur-
poses, although certainly dealing with the DAS was still a requirement in the 
interests of overt diplomatic cooperation with Colombia in the ongoing fight 
against the organized crime groups throughout Latin America. 
The ongoing requirement for foreign agencies to liaise with the DAS in 
Bogotá was complicated by the high turnover rate within the intelligence 
service that included key individuals right up to and including the Director 
of the DAS itself. In this regard, it is important to note that unlike Mexico, 
which uses its intelligence service to root out corruption within the nation’s 
security bureaucracy, Colombia had exactly the opposite situation where its 
former intelligence service was one of the major security institutions to be 
distrusted. This had tremendous ramifications for those foreign intelligence 
services operating in the host country where daily operational requirements 
necessitated close liaison with the very agency that was suspected of being 
corrupt. In such an operating environment, ongoing efforts to maintain a 
cooperative and trusted relationship between Colombian and various for-
eign security forces as a whole often was very problematic to the detriment of 
all joint counter-narcotic/terrorist operations in the country. 
Allegations that the DAS was corrupt are not new and have come from 
a range of sources including those within the DAS itself. This included an 
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allegation in 2009 by a former DAS official, Rafael Garcia, that the Colombian 
intelligence services as a whole have facilitated paramilitary drug traffick-
ing.33 This also covered ongoing suspicions that the DAS had both supported 
the paramilitaries in their anti-FARC and narcotrafficking activities as well 
as defended the prevailing governing political party against its political 
opponents. The latter allegations took on major implications in 2008 when 
information surfaced that María del Pilar Hurtado, a former Director of the 
DAS, may have cooperated with the prevailing President Uribe administra-
tion in spying on the political opposition and court judges through the use of 
unauthorized wiretaps.34 
Ms. Hurtado’s actual role and whether President Uribe knew what was 
going on may never be known as she defected to Panama in 2010 causing a 
brief flurry of protests from Colombia to the Panamanian government, an 
issue which continues to occupy the new Santos administration but which 
will likely not receive any firm resolution anytime soon. Ironically, Panama’s 
own Attorney General at the time, Ana Matilde Gómez, had been earlier 
suspended and banned from travelling abroad for having allegedly illegally 
authorized wiretaps against some of that country’s political opponents.35 
Without question, the Hurtado/DAS scandal was a major one for the 
Colombian government of the day and it is one which continues to impact 
the credibility of all Colombian security institutions to this very day. Even 
as far back as 2000 during the Pastrana administration, the FARC and ELN 
were making comments that the entire Colombian government was so cor-
rupt that “only a revolution” would resolve the situation, a claim that clearly 
was self-serving but certainly brought the issue even further into the political 
spotlight.36 In 2010, The Economist published an article entitled Spying and 
Corruption in Colombia - The Dark Side that essentially dealt with corruption 
within Colombia’s political and government structure as a whole noting that 
even the nation’s presidents had been complicit in the ongoing web of deceit 
and lies all in the name of “national security.”37 
As noted earlier, the influence of the Mexican organized crime groups 
cannot be overestimated when dealing with their strong influence over both 
the power of the Colombian organized crime groups and the actual level of 
corruption within the Colombian security apparatus throughout all sectors 
of government. One of the major Mexican cartels, Los Zetas, has combined 
its operations in Colombia with a Colombian group known as Los Rastrojos 
and together they control much of the territory within Colombia’s La Guajira 
department.38 It is important to remember in this discussion of the weak-
nesses of the Mexican and Colombian security structures that the level of 
corruptive destabilizing influences of crime groups
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sophistication and depth of the various organized crime groups in both 
countries is extremely effective and the capabilities of their own respective 
intelligence networks should never be under estimated. It is both extensive 
and professional and includes counter-intelligence operations, covert sur-
veillance (including electronic), false flag and undercover operations against 
government security forces, rival cartels, and other targets of interest. These 
are operational capabilities that work in the favour of these crime groups at 
all times. In the mid-1990s, a key member of the Cali Cartel was recruited 
by U.S. and Colombian security authorities and was instrumental in the 
destruction of the cartel, which was making over $7 billion per year at that 
point. Jorge Salcedo would go on to write a tell-all book entitled At the Devil’s 
Table and briefly noted the following: 
Drug cartels, whether in Colombia or Mexico, cannot function 
without massive assistance from compromised officials at all lev-
els. Corruption is the oxygen that keeps organized crime alive….
the Colombian (and Mexican) public needs to…sweep out offi-
cials at all levels who have sold their souls to organized crime…
neither country can succeed against its drug gangs without chok-
ing off much of the bribery and intimidation that sustain them.39 
Salcedo’s primary job was overseeing “security” for the Cali cartel and 
was directly paying bribes to hundreds of high-level Colombian security and 
political officials. This included one chief of staff to a military commander 
who received $20,000 a month, paying off justice officials and prosecutors 
to lose evidence, misplace paperwork, block search warrants or release pris-
oners before they could be arrested. He added that “some judges became 
overnight millionaires ….while politicians were considered a long-term 
investment… (and) a total of $6 million in secret donations made Ernesto 
Samper our President.”40
Having effective and timely advance intelligence about internal police, 
intelligence, and rival gang operations is a primary objective for each of the 
organized crime groups in Mexico and Colombia and they have shown to 
date that they are not only very good at securing that information but getting 
it at any cost. The Zetas are particularly adept at this particular activity as 
many of their members are ex-military and/or ex-police previously trained in 
intelligence functions for the Mexican government. This “specialty” has been 
passed along to their Colombian counterparts including the FARC and ELN. 
Coopting informants within a host country’s intelligence and/or police forces 
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is a major preoccupation of the organized crime groups in Colombia, Mexico, 
and elsewhere in Latin America and that process is greatly enhanced when 
there are already problems within the host country’s security apparatus that 
make potential informants susceptible to a recruitment approach (i.e. poor 
salaries, inadequate training, and threats to family members).
Conclusions
Clearly, corruption reigns supreme in both Mexico and Colombia and this 
short paper only begins to touch on both the extent and depth of this prob-
lem for most, if not all, of the security institutions within this large region. In 
addition to those noted above, most other Latin American countries notably 
Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, and Argentina have been wrestling with cor-
ruption within their own domestic security agencies for years. This battle has 
taken on added complexity as the Mexican drug cartels have extended their 
influence further down into those particular countries in South America. In 
many ways, the Mexican drug cartel problem has become a Latin American 
problem as a whole from a corruptive destabilizing standpoint. The power 
and the reach of the Mexican cartels are both far-reaching and overwhelm-
ing for the vast majority of security officials who are extremely susceptible to 
these forces for a variety of reasons already stated. This is particularly true 
for the smaller countries, which have little resources and even less money 
to employ in any protracted counter-narcotics war in Central and/or South 
America as Mexico and Colombia have done in recent years. Unfortunately, 
the respective drug cartels operating throughout Latin America are also 
very aware of this deficiency. Indeed, it has only reinforced their own efforts 
to pursue any and all corruptive actions to both undermine every facet of 
police, intelligence, and military security operations being employed against 
them and bring instability to many countries in this particular region of the 
world.
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In March 2010, Guatemalan authorities arrested the national police direc-tor and the chief of the police anti-drugs unit on charges of drug-traffick-ing, abuse of authority, and obstruction of justice. Those detentions came 
only six months after the preceding head of the Guatemalan national police 
had been also linked to drug cartels and criminal networks operating inside 
the police.1 Two years later, in March 2012, another former director of the 
Guatemalan police, the first woman leading a law-enforcement institution 
in the country, was also arrested for her involvement in a number of extra-
judicial killings in 2009.2 
These cases exemplify the extent of the infiltration of criminal networks 
within Central American state institutions. Guatemalan institutions are a 
particularly egregious case but similar events also appear in other Central 
American countries besieged by criminal violence. In the last five years, top 
law-enforcement officials in Honduras and El Salvador have been linked 
and prosecuted for criminal activities ranging from murder to connections 
with criminal organizations. The cases of top government officials regularly 
involved in illegal activities reflect an important aspect of the current crisis 
of public security in Central America: the participation of state agents as 
perpetrators and partners in criminal structures. 
The northern triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras) stands as one of the most violent in Latin America and the world. 
According to the latest official statistics on crime in the region, by 2010 these 
three countries had a combined average murder rate of 62 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants.3 In the last decade, the countries of Central America 
have experienced an increase in homicidal violence and an unrelenting 
process of penetration of the security forces by criminal organized groups. 
Most literature has explained the current security crisis as a direct result of 
the proliferation of youth gangs known as maras,4 as well as an ever deeper 
penetration of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Central America 
following the Mexican drug on wars launched in 2007.5 According to these 
views, there are two factors that explain the emergence and rise of the main 
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security threats mentioned above. One, the shifting routes of drug flows in 
the 1990s from the Caribbean to Central America and Mexico; and two, the 
policies of deportation that led to the arrival of thousands of gang members 
from the United States to northern Central America at the end of the 1990s.6 
While these phenomena have indeed contributed to the increase of violence 
in the region, I contend that the current security crisis cannot be understood 
without looking at the history of policies and political decisions that have 
repeatedly ignored the importance of strengthening criminal justice institu-
tions. These strategies have derailed efforts to develop comprehensive ap-
proaches to fight corruption and the penetration of organized crime in local 
institutions while pumping up the heavy hand approaches in tackling crime.
During the last decade, security policies have swung back and forth be-
tween suppression-only approaches and well intentioned overreaching, but 
haphazardly implemented, policies of security. The result has been that the 
governments of the northern triangle of Central America have neglected the 
development of security policies that incorporate long-term strategies aimed 
at mitigating the structural causes of violence, while tackling at the same 
time the situational and contingent precipitants of crime. Governments, 
furthermore, have neglected the creation and enforcement of accountability 
mechanisms within the security and justice apparatuses. Corruption and 
lack of accountability are, arguably, the main obstacles to implement a crim-
inal-justice system capable of dealing with the crisis of security in Central 
America, especially in the northern triangle. As such, they are also one of 
the most important causes of the current security governance crisis in the 
region. 
In light of this, the decision of the governments to authorize and priv-
ilege the use of military forces in their fight against criminal organizations 
has had negative, even if unintended, consequences for the states’ institu-
tional capacities to confront crime and to maintain (and in some cases attain) 
citizens’ trust in its institutions. As pointed out by Santamaría and Cruz 
(2013), the use of the armed forces and law-enforcement tactical teams has 
been justified under two interrelated premises. First, the persistence of weak, 
corrupted, and poorly coordinated police forces at the local and national lev-
els; and second, the upsurge of criminal organizations which proliferating 
levels of violence and state penetration have demanded a rapid and alterna-
tive security apparatus capable of articulating effective responses to crime. 
Based on these two premises, the governments of the region launched a set 
of militarized strategies under emergency decrees followed by a declaration 
of war against gangs and criminal organizations. The most famous decrees 
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revolved around the so-called mano dura plans, which became popular in 
northern Central America between 2000 and 2007. These strategies constitute 
what Santamaría and Cruz (2013) have referred to as “the new wars,” that is, 
wars directed against criminal actors whose main objective is not to attain 
and/or transform political power but maximize profits from criminal and 
illegal activities. 
The aim of this paper is to describe the security crisis in Central America 
and examine the institutional efforts that have been implemented to address 
the issue of insecurity in the region. This paper has four sections. First, it 
delineates the current security crisis in the region. Second, it reviews the 
main strategies adopted by the governments of these countries in order to 
confront criminal organizations, particularly criminal organizations and 
the maras. In the third section, the paper discusses the main contributions 
in terms of regional cooperation with particular emphasis on the Security 
Commission of the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the 
Regional Initiative for Central America’s Security (CARSI). Finally, the paper 
concludes with a fourth section where potential policy recommendations are 
presented in order to improve current sub-regional cooperation strategies on 
issues of security.
The Security Crisis
According to different sources, the countries of the northern triangle of 
Central America are now considered the most violent region of the world. 
In the late 2000s, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
entertained the idea that Central American nations “may have recently sur-
passed the traditional world leaders in the number of murders committed 
per 100,000 members of the population”.7 By 2011, there is little doubt that 
countries such as Honduras and El Salvador have gone well beyond the his-
toric threshold established by other Latin American countries. Police figures 
indicate that in 2011 Honduras topped the homicide rate of 86 per 100,000 
inhabitants mark, whereas El Salvador reached more than 70 murders per 
100,000 populations.8 According to unconfirmed official data from 2011, only 
Guatemala has experienced a relatively stable trend in homicides (42 per 
100,000 inhabitants), although the northern region of Petén might see rates 
above 90 per 100,000.9 Still, the Guatemalan rate of homicides is noticeably 
high, even for Latin American averages. 
Homicide rates are just one of the most dramatic indicators of the recent 
security crisis in the sub-region. Equally important are the high levels of 
perception of crime and insecurity amongst Central Americans. According 
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to the 2012 Americas Barometer, in Guatemala and El Salvador, more than 
30 percent of the population feels insecure due to crime.10 In Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica, perceptions of insecurity are also high, although their levels of 
homicidal violence do not reach the soaring levels of the northern neighbors. 
Besides victimization itself, the role played by criminal organizations 
of different sort in the production and reproduction of higher perceptions 
of violence cannot be underestimated. Extensive networks of youth gangs 
and domestic criminal organizations linked to Mexican and Colombian 
drug cartels constitute an important variable of this crisis in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras. These organizations are responsible for extor-
tions, kidnappings, arms trafficking and hit-men networks. Youth gangs 
are perhaps the most prominent among these groups. Estimates for gang 
membership reach 28,000 in El Salvador, 20,000 in Honduras, and more than 
15,000 in Guatemala.11 There are conflicting data about the extent of gangs’ 
participation in homicides in those three countries, but a review of the most 
consistent data collected in El Salvador shows that the participation of gang 
organizations in homicidal violence has been mounting throughout the 
2000s. Figure 1 shows the percentage of murders attributable to youth gangs 
in El Salvador since 1999.
According to an internal report of the Investigation Division of the 
Salvadoran police, 76 percent of extortions committed in that country were 
Figure 1. Percentage of Gang-Related Homicides Recorded by the IML per Year in  
El Salvador, 1998–2008.
(Source: Author’s research based on data from Instituto de Medicina Legal, 1999, 2002, 
2009.) 
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perpetrated by youth gangs, primarily the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 
Barrio 18.12 The same report indicates that in those cases investigated by 
the police, street gangs demanded nearly $4 million from their victims in 
2011. Guatemalan police reported that local maras collected an estimated $2 
million in the suburban community of Villanueva.13 Youth gangs have also 
become an indispensable labor force for criminal activities conducted by 
stronger cartels in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Street gangs pro-
vide security to the corridors of drugs in Central America, conduct retalia-
tion operations against other groups, and control some of the street markets 
for narcotic leftovers. 
In the case of Nicaragua, street gangs had, up until recently, retained 
a much more “traditional” profile. That is, they had operated in atomized 
groups whose main goal was to create a sense of cohesion, solidarity, and 
respect amongst their members. What is more, they were characterized by 
a rather marginal presence in the production of violence and their partici-
pation in criminal activities, limited regularly to robberies and other minor 
offenses, was aimed at getting resources for drug and alcohol consumption 
within the gang but did not appear as a main driver of the organization.14 
However, Nicaraguan youth gangs have become more closely associated 
with drug trafficking organizations in recent years, participating in the local 
distribution of drugs and providing illegal arms for these groups. Among 
other things, Nicaraguan gangs have lost their connection with the commun-
ities in which they operate, integrate less and more disciplined members, and 
their organization is oriented towards the sale of drugs, particularly crack.15 
Nonetheless, it is important to say that in the case of Nicaragua, more than 
the street gangs of the urban centers of the countries, it is the local criminal 
organizations working in the economically and socially neglected region of 
the Caribbean Coast who have developed a greater role in the transnational 
trafficking of drugs and arms from Nicaragua to other countries in the 
Americas.16 This penetration of DTOs is even more ostensible in the Atlantic 
coasts of Honduras and Guatemala.17
The current landscape of violence and insecurity is mainly driven by 
the increasing and overpowering presence of transnational DTOs, but in 
reality, drug trafficking organizations have been operating in Honduras and 
Guatemala long before the end of the political conflicts of the 1980s, when 
they established drug transshipment routes in Central America with the help 
of government officials and military personnel.18 However, the deranging of 
the drug flows in the Caribbean in the 1990s and the drug wars in Colombia 
and Mexico during the 2000s led to the consolidation of transnational crime 
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in the institutionally weak states of Central America. DTOs in Guatemala 
and Honduras have effectively taken control over wilderness areas along the 
Atlantic coast and used them as safe havens and launch pads for internation-
al drug trafficking. Groups such as the Mexican Zetas, the Sinaloa cartel, and 
the scraps of former large Colombian criminal organizations have introduced 
new conflicts over the control of territories and drug routes, and contributed 
to the growing death toll. The increasingly transnational character of Zetas 
in the sub-region deserves closer attention. In contrast to other Mexican 
DTOs that have established collaborative networks in Honduras, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala through alliances with local criminal organizations (mostly 
engaged in smuggling of drugs, firearms, and contraband products),19 the 
Zetas have actually decided to recruit nationals from Guatemala that report 
directly to their organization without the use of intermediaries. In particular, 
building on their own experience as former Mexican Special Forces units, 
there is evidence of Zetas having been able to recruit former members of 
the Kaibiles, an elite counter insurgency unit of the Guatemala army.20 The 
expansion of the Zetas, through the recruitment of former Guatemalan of-
ficials, further illustrates the level of vulnerability of Guatemala’s institutions 
in regards to DTOs and organized crime. It also highlights the need to work 
towards cooperation initiatives that can strengthen this country’s institu-
tional and accountability capacities and should serve as a cautionary tale in 
regards to the inclusion of Kaibiles in counter-narcotics operations along the 
Guatemalan-Mexican border.21
The Security Strategies 
Since the mid-1990s in Central America, security policies have constantly 
swung back and forth from zero tolerance, heavy handed all-out-war-
against-crime campaigns, to rather vague initiatives along some notions of 
community policing and prevention. The mano dura plans implemented with 
different degrees by the three countries of the northern triangle constitute 
the best example of the zero tolerance type of programs in vogue during most 
of the 2000s. Mano dura policies revolved around new laws and penal codes 
that dictated the criminalization of youth by banning any “street group,” the 
expansion of police power by providing them with discretionary faculties, 
and the limitation of civil rights.22 They allowed police intervention based 
heavily on military-type strategy. 
Honduras and El Salvador both approved laws or legal reforms allowing 
security forces to pursue and capture youths suspected of belonging to a 
gang without evidence. In doing that, governments moved to reclaim the use 
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of national armies in operations against gangs, and developed operations 
that allowed for the capture and mass incarceration of gang members, thus 
saturating and overpopulating inadequate penitentiary systems. In fact, one 
of the first controversial results of the zero tolerance programs in Central 
America was extreme prison overcrowding. In El Salvador, the National 
Civilian Police captured nearly 31,000 gang members from 2003 to 2005, 
although most of them were released immediately after.23 In Honduras, 
operations aimed at incarcerating gang members resulted in a much smaller 
number of gang members in prison. Approximately 5,000 persons were 
incarcerated in a two-year span, accused of forming part of “illegal asso-
ciations,” a legal category under which gang members could be jailed.24 The 
intensity of operations in Honduras, which legal system permitted longer 
prison sentences for gang members, reduced the number of gang members 
on the streets during the first months and, along with them, the number of 
later arrests. However, human rights conditions deteriorated as these policies 
were implemented.25 Guatemala never reformed or enacted a special anti-
gang law as part of a zero tolerance plan, but under the Alfonso Portillo ad-
ministration (2000-2004), this country was the first in allowing the police to 
use artifices in the existing laws to carry out massive crackdowns on gangs. 
Between 2003 and 2000, more than 22,000 persons were detained for gang-
related crimes. However, the operations frequently returned poor results in 
sending all detainees to prison, as judges did not find sufficient evidence for 
indictment or determined that the evidence was collected illegally.26
Mano dura programs yielded mixed results in Central America. In 
Honduras, homicide rates remained high but relatively stable (around 45 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) during the implementation of President 
Maduro’s zero tolerance program. However, homicides increased rapidly 
during Zelaya’s administration and skyrocketed following the 2009 coup 
d’état. By 2010, murder rates had increased by nearly 190 percent in compari-
son with 2004.27 In Guatemala, rates increased from 26 murders per 100,000 
people in 2000 to 36 per 100,000 during Portillo’s tenure and continued to 
climb to 46 by 2009 .28 Nonetheless, it is in El Salvador where the mano dura 
programs seem to have produced a significant increment in the levels of 
crime. Rates went from 36 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2003, the 
year of the implementation of the first mano dura plan, to 49 murders per 
100,000 people in 2006, when a new phase of the plan was announced by the 
administration of President Antonio Saca. By 2006, rates reached 65 murders 
per 100,000 populations. The explicit heavy-handed plans were abandoned 
in 2007. Although murder rates experienced important declines during 2007 
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and 2008, the last two years of the Saca administration, violence soared again 
in 2009, the first year in the government of President Funes (see Figure 2).
In sum, zero tolerance programs left the region not only with more homi-
cidal violence but also with pressing problems in the penitentiary systems, 
human rights crises, and stronger street gangs. Post mano dura initiatives have 
been characterized by tensions between continuing with aggressive crime-
suppression approaches and designing more comprehensive approaches that 
include intelligence gathering, prevention, and accountability. For instance, 
the failure of the heavy hand plans in El Salvador prompted President Saca 
to declare in a summit of the Central American Integration System (SICA) 
in 2007 that crime prevention should be the most important element in the 
regional initiatives against crime. 29
In Honduras, after the zero tolerance years of President Maduro, 
President Zelaya adopted a preventive approach, which nevertheless turned 
out to be more rhetorical than real. After some time, security programs under 
Zelaya slipped back to more traditional law-enforcement-only approaches, 
while increasingly using the police and army for political tasks. The growing 
political conflict and the economic crisis of 2008 ended up diverting the main 
attention of Zelaya’s government on security. Public security issues and the 
fight against organized crime were then almost completely neglected dur-
ing the 2009 coup d’etat and during the Micheleti’s government. The police 
Figure 2. Number of Homicides in El Salvador, 1998-2011.
(Source: Policía Nacional Civil de El Salvador, 2012.) 
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as well as the armed forces devoted most of their attention to control the 
political opposition and the pro-Zelaya movement. 
After the restoration of constitutional order with the general elections 
of 2009, President Porfirio Lobo refocused government’s efforts on security. 
He increased the urban police patrols, enacted an emergency decree in order 
to send military troops to perform public security tasks, and promoted laws 
to increase accountability over drug seizures.30 However, these efforts did 
not stop the spiraling levels of violence, the infiltration of international drug 
cartels, and, more importantly, the involvement of law-enforcement officers 
and top government officials in organized-crime activities. Scandals that 
unveiled the vast networks of corruption within the Honduran police ended 
up pushing the civilian security apparatus back to the military.
Guatemala, as noted in the introduction, is an interesting case for reveal-
ing the conflictive relationships within the governments when enacting and 
implementing policies against criminal violence. It is also a cautionary note 
about the spins of the extreme reliance on repression to combat crime. By the 
mid-2000s, during the administration of President Oscar Berger, top officials 
in the social and economic cabinets were not inclined to repressive approach-
es to gangs, but favored preventive plans. In 2005, the government enacted 
a comprehensive National Policy of Youth Violence Prevention as part of an 
effort to implement a broader approach to crime. However, law-enforcement 
officials, including the minister of the interior and the chief of the police, 
promoted a harsher line to the crime problem. The prevention policy was 
never fully implemented and the police continued cracking down on crim-
inal groups supported by the public opinion. Some crackdowns degenerated 
into extralegal cleansing operations, such as the extrajudicial execution of 
seven inmates in the top-security prison of Pavón.31 Top government officials 
were later indicted and imprisoned for their involvement in illegal oper-
ations. Given the levels of corruption and chronic weakness of Guatemalan 
institutions, this country approved the creation of an in-situ international 
body capable of conducting investigative and prosecutorial activities within 
the country. The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
(CICIG) was sanctioned by the Guatemalan Congress in 2007 and started its 
operations in January 2008. Although mired in controversies during the first 
years of the mandate given its faculty to participate as an external comple-
mentary prosecutor in criminal proceedings against Guatemalan public offi-
cials and organized crime, the Commission has quickly produced significant 
results. It has successfully conducted investigations regarding high-profile 
cases, against organized-crime organizations, and against corrupted offi-
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cials. In some way, CICIG has become the underpinning of the Guatemalan 
criminal justice system. It has contributed to the professionalization of rule 
of law institutions, and has pushed for regulations, policies, and institu-
tional reforms that advance the capability of the government to fight against 
crime.32 Yet, critics point out that such advances would fade away as soon as 
CICIG ceases operations in 2013, as institutional transformations have not 
taken root across the system.33
In El Salvador, after the cessation of the Super Mano Dura plan, the gov-
ernment turned to a more balanced approach against crime, and devoted 
significant efforts to promote regional cooperation in the fight against or-
ganized-crime groups. The new government of Mauricio Funes pledged to 
a comprehensive anti-crime program. The president backed his approach by 
reshuffling his security cabinet and creating high-cabinet commissions that 
would oversee the advances in the areas of law-enforcement and prevention. 
He also proceeded to the formulation of a national policy of public security 
and mid-term institutional strategies in every area of public security. These 
strategies included the strengthening of the investigation capabilities in 
the police, the underpinning of accountability mechanisms within the law-
enforcement institutions, reforms in the penitentiary system, and a signifi-
cant increase of funds for prevention programs to 14 percent of the security 
budget. 
However, the latter were also characterized by tensions between con-
tinuing with aggressive crime-suppression approaches and designing more 
comprehensive approaches that incorporate intelligence gathering, preven-
tion, and accountability. In El Salvador, for instance, a new government 
initiative has promoted the creation of municipal committees for violence 
prevention. These groups aim to increase citizen participation in crime pre-
vention activities. However, a survey conducted by Vanderbilt University’s 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) showed in 2012 that only 20 
percent of Salvadorans have heard of those initiatives.34
Despite these changes, law-enforcement agencies were unable to prevent 
crime rates from ascending, and the effort to enact a comprehensive preven-
tion strategy stalled as a result of internal disputes at the different levels of 
the government. In late 2011, Funes responded to the security crisis by re-
organizing his security cabinet. He appointed a military general as the new 
minister of security and an army colonel as the new director of the National 
Civilian Police. As a result, another reshuffle in the police ranks brought 
the old guard to the forefront of the law-enforcement institutions and the 
government turned again to the traditional suppressive approach. However, 
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in a startling policy turn in 2012, the Salvadoran government engaged in a 
process of talks with the leaderships of the major gang organizations in the 
country. Those negotiations yielded a truce between the chapters of MS-13 
(Mara Salvatrucha) and the Eighteenth Street Gang (Pandilla 18) in exchange 
for the decision of the government to transfer gang leaders to less-restrictive 
prison facilities and some concessions to the gang organizations.35 The pact 
abruptly reduced the number of killings, and the average murders went 
down nearly 45 percent from 2011 to 2012. While government officials have 
refused to disclose the details of the negotiation process to the public, and 
important sectors of the Salvadoran society remain skeptical about the impli-
cations of the truce for the rule of law in a country already affected by weak 
institutions and poor governance, the truce has received credit and support 
from the Organization of American States (OAS), and has been promoted as 
a model for reducing violence in the region.36 
Regional Cooperation
Since the end of the civil conflicts in the 1990s, Central American govern-
ments have stated their willingness to work together on security issues and 
to form a unified block when approaching external donors to fund regional 
initiatives. However, their integration has been more symbolic than factual.37 
The Security Commission of SICA led the efforts to prepare a regional secur-
ity strategy that was adopted by the Central American governments in 2007. 
Such strategy addressed eight threats to regional security: organized crime, 
drug trafficking, deportees with criminal records, street gangs, homicide 
rates, arms trafficking, terrorism, and corruption. However, the 2009 coup 
in Honduras and the difficulties to secure enough funds upset the oper-
ational development of the strategy. In 2011, after a significant revision of 
the strategy and the involvement of new international actors, SICA secured 
the promise of nearly US$1.1 billion in additional funding for the regional 
security initiative. 
External cooperation has been instrumental in advancing security initia-
tives in Central America. Since the 1990s, international organizations, such 
as the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United 
Nations, USAID, and the World Bank have significantly supported security 
efforts by investing and funding criminal-justice reform programs, especial-
ly in the areas of law-enforcement, prevention, and justice administration. 
According to a study conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank 
and the Washington Office on Latin America, between November 2009 and 
June 2010, Central American countries benefitted from 375 internationally 
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funded security programs that added up to nearly US$1.6 billion. Ninety 
percent of those funds were allocated to national governments, whereas 
only 7 percent of the recipients were local governments and municipalities. 
However, most prevention programs are conducted from city halls, not 
national governments, and that has contributed to scattered efforts in the 
implementation of preventive measures. 
The United States stands as the most important single source of inter-
national cooperation for the Central American countries with a total of 
US$377.9 million (33.4 percent of total funds), whereas the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the World Bank, and Spain have each contributed with 
a little more than US$140 million (12.5 percent each). Other donors are the 
European Union, the United Nations, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Canada. 
Nearly thirty-five percent of the funds are channeled to institutional 
strengthening; that is, the development of institutional capacities related 
to citizen security and management. Twenty percent of the international 
funds for security are aimed to support prevention programs. Projects for 
enhancing the institutional capacity to fight against organized crime receive 
nearly 13 percent of the cooperation funds, and only 0.6 percent is devoted to 
strategic information development.38 
The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) represents 
the most important cooperation program on matters of security between 
Central America and the United States. CARSI was created originally as part 
of the Merida Initiative, an anti-drug trafficking program developed by the 
Bush Administration focused on Mexico in 2008. As conditions of crime and 
insecurity have worsened in most Central American countries during the 
last years, the Obama Administration decided to strengthen the capacities of 
the seven countries of the isthmus to address the security challenges as well 
as the underlying economic conditions that contribute to them. From 2008 
to 2012, Central America has received more than US$460 million in security 
assistance from the United States through the CARSI package. Although an 
important share of the funds has been devoted to economic development 
programs, more than 62 percent of the assets have been oriented to narcotics 
control and law enforcement, in addition to foreign military funds—which 
represent less than 7 percent of the appropriated funds. In any case, these 
resources are heavily oriented to support drug interdiction operations and 
enhance law-enforcement capabilities of the Central American institutions. 
However, not all U.S. security assistance is channeled through CARSI. 
In 2011, the United States announced another program called the Central 
America Citizen Security Partnership, which would add nearly US$200 mil-
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lion to security assistance in the region through other bilateral and regional 
programs.39 While most of those funding programs have revolved around 
tackling drug-trafficking and suppressing criminal organizations by step-
ping up manpower capabilities, weapons, and military resources, most re-
sulting strategies have neglected the necessity of dealing with the problems 
of corruption and crime inside Central American institutions. Consequently, 
criminal justice institutions remain chronically pervaded by criminal organ-
izations and crooked officials. 
Some Policy Recommendations
The security strategies adopted by most Central American countries have 
privileged heavy handed and all-out-war approaches to criminal violence. 
Considering the limited results that such policies have brought in, how could 
the current security strategies and cooperation initiatives in the region be 
strengthened? The institutional reforms developed to date have focused on 
improving the professional and technical capabilities of the criminal-justice 
systems while they have neglected the enforcement of accountability mech-
anisms and of preventive measures, which are urgently needed to secure 
sustainable effects in combating crime and violence. However, any success-
ful security strategy requires state institutions and operators that are robust 
and accountable enough to fulfill their mandates without violating the rule 
of law. Regional efforts and international cooperation should put this issue at 
the top of the list of initiatives to be implemented in the short term. 
It is possible to consider three different potential ways in which inter-
national cooperation agencies can contribute to reinforce institutional 
capabilities and transparency mechanisms in the region. These options go 
from the characterization of institutional strengthening as an essential goal 
for security reform to a more refined redirection of funds to accountability 
institutions. Firstly, in many cases, international cooperation agencies can 
advance significant institutional reform if they are willing to affirm and de-
mand unrestricted transparency and political commitment to institutional 
accountability on the side of recipient countries. This course of action means 
a reconsideration of the institutional structure of the security apparatuses, 
and is, perhaps, the most radical among the set of choices available to actors 
involved in reform process. In addition, it is also highly politically sensitive. 
But it also should be one of the options that has to be put on the table as 
recourse to address the problems of lack of transparency and institutional 
weakness. Often, in the absence of a strong political commitment on the side 
of the international community, local institutions continue tolerating ineffec-
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tual structures and illegal practices that reproduce the problems of security 
from the same government operatives.
Secondly, cooperation agencies can lobby for the creation of external 
independent commissions responsible for investigating abuses, crim-
inal involvement, and impunity in institutions. The implementation of the 
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) by the 
United Nations, with the support of the Guatemalan government, is an im-
portant case in point. The CICIG has been operating in the country since 
2007 and aims to support and consolidate Guatemala’s investigative and 
prosecuting capacities against clandestine security organizations and state 
agents participating in illegal forms of violence. Although some observers 
claim that the CICIG is supplementing but not necessarily strengthening 
Guatemala’s institutions, it is important to underscore the fact that the com-
mission has taken steps in the right direction. Some authors have suggested 
that this model could be followed by Honduras and El Salvador, which share 
some of the challenges that Guatemala’s security and justice apparatuses 
have. As in the case of Guatemala, however, a political coalition would be 
needed in order to be able to “invite” this initiative. Up until now, there seems 
to be an ongoing dialogue in both of these countries in order to consider a 
Honduran or Salvadoran commission, and some have even suggested that 
a sub-regional commission could be created. In any case, this path of action 
involves a strong sense of intervention from external actors, and a solid en-
gagement from the international community to see the commission become 
operative and its recommendations implemented. 
Finally, international cooperation agencies can redirect an important 
share of their assets to the development of comptroller’s offices and account-
ability mechanisms in the criminal-justice institutions of the region. This is 
no easy task. In the seemingly insurmountable need to tackle the extreme 
levels of insecurity and crime, international cooperation gets caught in the 
never-ending urgencies of blocking the latest threat, and institutional reform 
is pushed back in the queue of tasks. Thus far, most of the programs directed 
to institutional strengthening, such as CARSI, have been concentrated in 
equipment and training of public security forces, in the hope that better 
equipped and skilled personnel will yield more professional and transparent 
institutions. Except for some early programs supporting the creation of inter-
nal affairs units in the Central American police organizations, very little has 
been done to underpin accountability mechanisms within law-enforcement 
institutions. Even so, international cooperation can play a significant role in 
reducing the problems of institutional weakness and corruption by concen-
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trating key assistance funds to programs of vertical and horizontal account-
ability, and by raising the overall political importance of these programs.
Although the intervention of international cooperation agencies in the 
support and implementation of needed anti-corruption reforms in the region 
can be perceived as an unacceptable course of interference, it may be a pol-
itically helpful strategy in order to sidestep the common internal resistances 
and hurdles that every reform process faces. Under a regional commitment 
to institutional reform, in which all countries participate and establish a 
common set of goals, policy makers and reform stakeholders may garner not 
only political support and legitimacy for their efforts, but also set the basis 
for other constructive cooperation across the region. The seeming success 
of countries such as Colombia and Brazil in exporting their security reform 
models to other Latin American countries has gone hand in hand with the 
promotion made by third-party cooperation agencies, who understood the 
importance of using their leverage to bestow legitimacy to some local and 
previously overlooked initiatives. 
In Sum
The levels of transnational crime and violence present a significant challenge 
to Central America, especially its northern triangle. The expansion of DTO’s, 
the evolution of youth gangs, and the skyrocketing rates of local crime 
demand comprehensive responses. Given the regional and transnational 
character of the problems, policy makers and stakeholders should corres-
pondingly incorporate concerted cross-national responses to those challen-
ges. This paper has focused on the magnitude of the crime problem in the 
region and the extant international cooperation around it. Although massive, 
most of the cooperation has neglected the need to address the problems in a 
regional perspective and the importance of local institutional strengthening 
beyond training and equipment of criminal justice institutions. Hence, in 
addition to the initiatives that are already in place across the region, it is es-
sential to put institutional reform to boost accountability mechanisms at the 
top of policies to confront violence in Central America. These countries have 
already devoted a significant amount of resources, manpower, and equip-
ment to beef up institutions and programs that are nonetheless flawed and 
ridden with corruption. It is time to use the political capital that international 
organizations, cooperation agencies, and the countries themselves have 
when they work in tandem, as well as when they engage in the creation of 
models that can be used by their closest neighbors. International cooperation 
agencies have an essential role in such tasks. They cannot only create the 
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incentives and spaces for this enterprise to happen, but they also can help to 
ease the tensions that every effort of institutional transformation produces 
by creating regional consensus and local responsiveness.
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The Problem
Latin America is arguably the most violent region in the world.
1 More 
people die as a result of armed—mostly criminal—violence in Latin 
America than as a result of civil wars in Africa, the next most violent 
continent.2 Arguably the most visible face of this problem of violence and 
insecurity are gangs and drug trade related violence (i.e. violence produced 
as a result of states’ efforts to curb drug trade activities or as a result of 
rivalries between drug cartels). A common assumption is that the criminal 
and state spheres are two separate domains without significant interaction 
other than repression by the state in order to maintain its monopoly on the 
use of violence. However, this paper challenges this view and argues that 
the relationship is more complex than commonly assumed. There are two 
types of complexities that need to be understood. The first is that criminal 
actors and the state are not always antagonistic to each other, but often 
have an organic, complex, and at times mutually beneficial association. In 
such cases, the state may not have a clear interest in eliminating or even 
antagonizing criminal organizations. Second, the organizational structure 
of criminal organizations such as gangs is itself complex. This means that 
traditional policies of repression and force toward gangs may not be effect-
ive, and different types of tactics may be required. Some Central American 
states have already begun implementing innovative strategies beyond sim-
ply applying force in their dealings with criminal organizations, with some 
level of success. 
The first section of this paper provides a brief illustration of the crime 
problem in Latin America, especially as posed by gangs and drug trafficking 
organizations. The second section discusses the kind of complex interaction 
and relationship between states and criminal groups, and suggests why it 
may undermine traditional state approaches to containing violence. The 
third section considers these traditional approaches in more depth, and fo-
cuses on some innovative new approaches to dealing with gangs. 
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The Gang Problem
Although gangs have long featured in Latin American societies, they have 
grown in the past few decades. Reliable information on the scale, dynam-
ics, and demographics of gangs is scarce.3 Estimates of the total proportion 
of contemporary regional violence attributable to gangs vary wildly from 
10 to 60 percent, while they have been accused of a whole slew of crimes 
and delinquency, ranging from mugging, theft, and intimidation, to rape, 
assault, and organised/petty drug dealing.4 Reports from Central America 
estimate anywhere from 70,000 (official figures) to 200,000 (academic figures) 
gang membership.5 Even a lower estimate suggests that the numbers of 
gang members rivals the armed forces of most countries in Central America: 
Nicaragua and Honduras each have armies of about 12,000 active soldiers, 
while El Salvador and Honduras have about 15,000 each.6 In other words, 
even though gangs do not aim to take over the state, such as a rebel group 
might, they are a serious challenge to the state’s ability to enforce the rule of 
law and maintain sovereignty.
There are two main types of gangs in Central America: the pandillas and 
the maras. Maras have transnational roots, while the pandillas originate dur-
ing the transition from war to peace in the region during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. During this period, demobilised youth combatants in Nicaragua, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala returned to their home communities and faced 
situations of heightened uncertainty, insecurity, and socio-economic flux 
within a broader context of weak and fragile states unable to enforce the rule 
of law. Some of these young men formed localised vigilante-style self-defence 
groups in an attempt to provide a measure of order and predictability both 
for themselves and their local communities.
The maras, on the other hand, are groups that can be directly linked to 
specific migrations. Formally, there are just two maras, the Barrio Dieciocho (18) 
and the Salvatrucha (MS). They originate especially in Los Angeles, dating 
back to even the 1960s. 18 and MS rapidly became bitter rivals, and frequently 
fought each other on the streets of Los Angeles. During the 1990s the State 
of California implemented strict anti-gang laws and prosecutors charged 
young gang members as adults instead of minors, sending hundreds to jail 
for felonies and other serious crimes. By 1996, the U.S. Congress established 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which 
ensured that non-U.S. citizens sentenced to a year or more in prison were to 
be repatriated to their countries of origin. Even foreign-born U.S. naturalised 
felons could be stripped of their citizenship and expelled once they served 
out their prison terms. As a result, between 2001 and 2010 the United States 
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deported almost 130,000 convicts to Central America.7 Deportees rapidly 
began to found local chapters of their gang in their communities of origin, 
which in turn rapidly began to attract local youth and either supplanted or 
absorbed local pandillas. 
In Brazil, the gangs have somewhat different origins, dating especially 
to the prison populations of 1970s-80s. During this time, when Brazil was 
under authoritarian rule, political and criminal prison populations were held 
together in the same Brazilian jails. Originally small-scale and loosely organ-
ized criminal gangs grew in scale and organizational sophistication when 
their leaders learned operational and organizational tactics from the political 
prisoners with whom they were jailed.8 Today a number of sometimes well-
organized gangs operate throughout Brazil, especially in some of the largest 
cities. They maintain close connections to the prison population, but extend 
their reach into many sectors of society, and even the upper echelons of the 
economic and political hierarchies.
The Drug Trade Problem
Drug trade organizations are not only an illegal economic activity, but have 
proven to be a threat to Latin America security. In Colombia drug cartels 
resorted to terrorism in their efforts to continue to freely pursue their eco-
nomic activities, sometimes including the murder of state officials, judges, 
military officers, and politicians. In Mexico, drug cartels have also resorted 
to terrorist practices against the civil population and regularly engage in 
gruesome public violence against their competitors and enemies. In addi-
tion, these organizations are capable of co-opting judicial forces thanks to 
the profitable business that the drug trade represents, as well as branching 
out into other illegal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, and human 
trafficking. 
Initiatives such as the Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative illustrate 
the amount of resources governments need to enlist as well as the limited suc-
cess of such initiatives in trying to establish security in the region. Initiatives 
of this kind, aimed at fighting organized crime, terrorism, and drug trade 
organizations, focus on the transfer of technology, intelligence, and military 
assistance in the war against drugs. Colombia, considered during the 2000s 
one of the most dangerous places in the world due to drug-related violence, 
has been in the centre of U.S.-led efforts to combat drug-trafficking organ-
izations in the region. Almost US$8 billion during the ten year period from 
2000 to 2010 were provided by the United States and used primarily for the 
disruption of paramilitary involvement in drug trade.9 Under the Merida 
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Initiative, Mexico and Central America have received nearly $1.4 billion from 
the United States to be used to provide equipment, training, and technical 
assistance in the fight against organized crime and in the promotion of the 
rule of law.10 
In spite of initiatives such as the Plan Colombia and the Merida 
Initiative, drug-related violence in Latin America has not been eradicated in 
the last decade. Whereas in the 1990s and early 2000s governments faced 
mainly hierarchical drug cartels (such as the Cali and Medellín cartels in 
Colombia, and the Tijuana and Juárez cartels in Mexico), as a result of such 
efforts, drug organizations have undergone a process of fragmentation and 
decentralization.11 The vacuum left by the disappearance of large centralized 
organizations such as the ones mentioned, has been occupied by a larger 
number of smaller groups, in which members have more autonomy and less 
control from the upper cadres. This mode of organization has made drug 
cartels, albeit smaller and less capable of openly confronting the state, much 
more resistant to law enforcement and dismantling. Given the proliferation 
of drug trade organizations, Latin America is subject to the violence and 
criminality caused by the fight for drug routes and markets by these smaller 
cartels. Populations in slum neighbourhoods from Medellín to Ciudad Juárez 
are subject to violence as drug traffickers fight for control of routes and access 
to consumers. Here, the gang phenomenon becomes intertwined with the 
drug-trade; gangs such as MS, 18, Barrio Azteca or La Línea, act as protection 
and enforcers for these new smaller drug cartels. 
For example in Mexico, the government has pursued a strategy of “dis-
articulation” by capturing cartel leaders. This strategy has, however, had 
the consequence of creating intra cartel violence as members seek to become 
leaders, resulting in internal splits, and the creation of additional cartels.12 
Thus, for example, while in 2007 drug cartels were present in twenty-one 
Mexican states, by 2010 they were present in all except but one state.13 While 
in 2006 there were six major cartels operating in Mexico, the number of active 
cartels increased to sixteen by 2011.14 As the Mexican government increased 
the arrests of major cartel leaders, individuals in middle management, usu-
ally jefes de plaza and jefes de sicarios, obtained more autonomy to establish 
their illegal activities such as extortion and kidnapping. In addition, a cartel 
leader’s sudden departure creates a vacuum, resulting in internal conflict for 
control, and usually in the fragmentation of the organization.15 To illustrate 
the decentralization of Mexican cartels, the Sinaloa cartel has come to be 
known as “The Federation,” as control of a territory is delegated to a different 
chief.16
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States and Criminals
The connections between the state and criminals have been noted in recent 
literature.17 Some authors have focused on uncovering the connections be-
tween criminal groups and state formation in Latin America, or more spe-
cifically how formation and solidification of the state was advanced thanks 
to the association between state officials (as well as political parties) and 
criminals. In the case of Mexico, for example, Knight (2012) argues that the 
Mexican state of the early twentieth century depended on practices such as 
corruption and rent seeking from illicit activities. As the post-revolutionary 
state attempted to regulate the life of its citizens more comprehensively and 
systematically but without strong judicial institutions, rent seeking and cor-
ruption became institutional strategies. Rent seeking from illicit business is 
fundamentally different from that of licit activities; illicit business is particu-
larly vulnerable to rent seeking because the state has an obligation to close it 
down. This leads Knight to state that, “in the relationship between políticos 
and narcos, the real Mafia was found among the former”.18 What Knight 
suggests is that the Mexican state operated like a Mafia, in that it provided 
protection (from itself) to drug organizations in return for high payments. It 
is important to notice that for Knight, politicians sought personal rents from 
this kind of practice, while preferring traditional forms of clientelism to gain 
mass political support. 
In the case of Colombia, Schulte-Bockholt (2006) argues that political 
elites have used violence in their efforts to contain insurgent groups, not-
ing, “the Colombian state is part of a protection racket that employs violence 
against the excluded to maintain the supremacy of the oligarchic struc-
tures”.19 Schulte-Bockholt argues that politically and ideologically, drug car-
tels and political elites are much more integrated, and their goal is virtually 
the same: both are interested in containing guerrillas to protect, in the case 
of the former, their economic investments and political advancement (what 
he terms narcoburguesía), and for the latter, a stable economy for Colombia 
and to maintain the political structures created after the civil war. In sum, in 
the mutually beneficial relationship between drug cartels and political elites 
in Colombia, elites provide drug cartels with political and economic power, 
in return for drug cartels’ application of violence (through paramilitary and 
counterinsurgent groups) to “the enemies of the regime”.20 
Other analyses focus on more contemporary interactions between the 
state and rival criminal groups. For example, Arias (2006) does not subscribe 
to the view advanced by O’Donnell (1993), which derives criminality from 
the state’s incapacity to penetrate certain social and geographic areas, or 
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brown areas, where in turn the rule of law does not operate systematically. 
Instead, Arias argues, the case of Rio’s favelas points not to the absence of 
state or democracy, but to a “particular articulation of state, social and crim-
inal relations which actively deploy state power in the service of criminal 
interests”.21 According to Arias, the predominant view that criminality is 
caused by state failure fails to analyze the interactions between the full range 
of actors (criminals, society, and state officials) which make criminality and 
violence possible. On the one hand, traffickers depend on the residents of 
their favela for protection, thus, they must maintain good relationships with 
the community. Thus, once civic leaders have entered into an arrangement 
with a politician for specific resources, criminal organizations appropriate 
the distribution and access to such resources by the community. On the other 
hand, politicians need the support of criminals in order to secure votes; it 
is not enough for politicians to pact with civic leaders, because traffickers 
control the distribution of selective incentives. For Arias, this relationship 
becomes mutually reinforcing and beneficial for criminals and politicians. 
The former need politicians who will bring in funds for community develop-
ment; by appropriating distribution of funds and resources, they maintain 
their status as benefactors of their favelas, thus, ensuring protection by the 
community. The latter need criminals in order to secure access to votes; 
however, civic leaders broker the negotiations and in this way, politicians do 
not have to appear to be making concessions to criminal groups. According 
to Arias, such networking arrangements are highly sustainable, thus, sup-
porting the ongoing criminal and violent context.
Thus, the literature converges on the idea that the arrangements and 
cooperation between criminal groups and the state is not accidental. While 
at times either may have a political, military or economic advantage over 
the other, both groups actively seek arrangements that are mutually bene-
ficial, because they depend on each other to fulfill their goals. The second 
finding is that this mutually beneficial and reinforcing relationship occurs 
within a democratic state. While the state may maintain its presence and 
reach, its authority need not be confronted by criminals, but may be sup-
ported by them, in mutual support of each other’s goals. Democratization 
has advanced in Latin American countries, with the weakening of one-
party hegemony or the end of authoritarian regimes, and the establishment 
of relatively free and fair elections. For the foreseeable future, criminality 
and violence will likely coincide with democracy. Against this backdrop of 
sometimes close connections between the state and criminals, in the next 
section we discuss the broad range of policies—ranging from force to dia-
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logue—that states in the region have resorted to in addressing the problem 
of criminal violence.
Policies to Combat Crime
States have traditionally adopted three broad sets of policies to deal with 
armed actors that challenge them, whether political or criminal groups: 
force, public goods, and dialogue.
Often the first response to the problem of insecurity is the use of force. 
There are many examples of such policies throughout the continent, espe-
cially in areas such as Central America, where the crime and insecurity 
problem has been most acute. For example, in 2003, El Salvador adopted 
a Mano Dura policy to combat the threat posed by criminal gangs. Under 
this policy, gang members who flashed signs in public or bore gang tattoos 
could be immediately jailed for up to five years. Between 2003 and 2004 about 
20,000 gang members were arrested, although most were eventually released 
without charge when the Mano Dura law was declared unconstitutional by 
the Salvadoran Supreme Court for violating the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).22 
A new Mano Super Dura package of anti-gang reforms was rapidly ap-
proved, which respected the provisions of the UNCRC but stiffened the pen-
alties for gang membership to up to five years in prison for ordinary gang 
members, and nine years for gang leaders. Although under the new law the 
police are required to demonstrate proof of active delinquent behaviour in 
order to arrest an individual, El Salvador’s prison population has tripled 
from 4,000 to 12,000, a large portion of whom are gang members.23 Similar 
policies have been adopted elsewhere in the region (e.g. Cero Tolerancia in 
Honduras, Plan Escoba in Guatemala, similar programs in Brazil and of 
course many places in North America, especially major U.S. cities), usually 
with wide public support. Yet at the same time, the use of force—especially 
indiscriminate force that results in human rights or humanitarian law viola-
tions—also carries a significant risk, especially to a state’s legitimacy. 
One of the consequences of the increasingly connected world we live 
in is that states need to be concerned not only with domestic but also with 
international legitimacy, including how they treat their own citizens. Fewer 
and fewer states around the world can brutalize their own citizens with im-
punity. In Latin America, where democratic regimes are the norm, the use of 
indiscriminate force is politically more difficult than it was a generation ago, 
when authoritarian regimes were the norm. Yet such use continues, despite 
the fact that mano dura policies have failed to curb the rise in violence; and 
214
(in)security in latin america: three policy options
there is evidence that these interventions have been generating significant 
changes in gang dynamics, with increasing reports that the widespread 
heavy-handed repression of gangs is leading to their becoming more organ-
ized, more adept at evading government authorities, and more violent.
When force fails or proves counterproductive, states sometimes try a 
second approach, to provide public goods, or “carrots” as incentives to get 
armed actors to move out of gangs, or to prevent them from joining gangs 
in the first place. In Central America some states have shifted from a “first 
generation” of mano dura policies to a second generation of mano extendida 
policies, which include a range of activities, e.g. environmental design in 
slums, targeted education and public health initiatives focusing on “at 
risk” youths, gun-free zones, neighbourhood watch or public awareness 
programs.24 While it is difficult to generalize about such a varied range of 
programs and policies, it is safe to say that they are visible throughout the 
region, directed either by governments, non-governmental organizations or 
both in cooperation. 
It is perhaps too early to say whether these policies have resolved the 
problem of gang violence. This kind of second generation or public goods 
approach is part of an emergent new framework that stresses an “integrated” 
approach to violence prevention and reduction, which aims to address the 
root causes of violence. What we can say, however, is that these policies are 
often accompanied by what can be distinguished as a third approach, which 
is different from simply providing public goods such as education or health 
programs: dialogue.Dialogue involves direct engagement with an armed 
actor: talking to them. This is part of some—not all—public goods policies. 
In many cases, non-governmental organizations or other actors (even states) 
directly engage gang members, for example to persuade them to leave the 
gang and move from violence to peace. Although such direct engagement is 
a central component of other policies (such as disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration programs), it bears considering as a separate policy instru-
ment because it has its own challenges. 
First, it poses a political challenge, insofar as many of the critical actors 
that need to be engaged are by definition outside the law, and states espe-
cially are as unwilling to “talk to criminals” as they are to “talk to terrorists.” 
Yet we know that notwithstanding such bluster, direct engagement is as 
commonplace with criminal organizations as it is with political groups. If 
force fails to defeat the group in question, states in many cases move from 
a “we don’t talk to criminals or terrorists” position to directly engaging the 
same actors they previously demonized.
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One example of this is the innovative experiment in dialogue in El 
Salvador in 2012, where leading political and civil society authorities—in-
cluding the Salvadoran government, the Church, and even the Organization 
of American States (OAS)—helped broker a truce between the country’s two 
major gangs, the 18 and the MS. While gangs have always negotiated with 
each other (in addition to fighting each other), what is significant here is the 
involvement of the government and the OAS, which have provided good 
offices for the dialogue. In December of 2012, the gangs accepted a plan, in 
which the maras promised not to commit crimes in ten violence-ridden mu-
nicipalities, and to hand their guns over to the authorities to prove that their 
intentions were sincere. Under the plan, the gangs would work with non-
governmental organisations, churches, the government, and local mayors, to 
create the conditions necessary for the social reinsertion of gang members. 
This example shows that the security threat posed by gangs in El Salvador is 
such that a desperate state is willing to think outside the box and experiment 
with an innovative policy.
The second and probably the most critical challenge involved in dia-
logue with armed actors is that it is easier to engage an organization with a 
clear central command than one that is more loosely organized. If an NGO 
or even the government engages with the leaders of a hierarchical and cen-
trally organized group, they can reasonably expect their counterparts to be 
able to “deliver” their organization’s compliance with an agreement they 
reach. But notwithstanding the fact that political leaders such as the OAS’s 
Secretary General met the gang leaders, the maras themselves, and certainly 
many other gangs in the region and elsewhere, are really networks of actors 
and organizations, lacking such a hierarchical central command, or complex 
blends of hierarchies and networks. Who does one talk to, and how?
When a decentralized group lacks a coherent central command, dialogue 
and engagement are possible but need to be decentralized. What engagement 
means needs to be redefined: it is not necessary to engage the core of the net-
work in order to engage its periphery, and it is not necessary to address the 
whole of the issues dividing the state and its challengers in order to address 
some of them. This can be called decentralized and dispersed engagement.25 
At the same time, it is more difficult and easier than centralized engagement 
with an organization’s leadership. On the one hand, multiple peripheral 
parties and players matter and may need to be engaged. On the other, such 
engagement often involves a series of local problems and concerns that may 
be more amenable to resolution than the single overriding conflict between 
the state and the group in question. 
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Decentralized engagement may be more time-consuming and involve 
more transaction costs (because more people may need to be engaged), and 
it may be more ambiguous (because there are likely to always be holdouts, 
meaning it is harder to reach a decisive “end” to the problem). But at the same 
time it has lower start-up costs, because it is possible to engage a part of the 
network, and address some very local issues or concerns without having to 
address all of them.
This network and decentralized system perspective is consistent with 
what we are coming to understand about the dynamics of insecurity in the 
region. A common assumption about the problem of insecurity in the region 
is that it is caused by the absence of the state. Guillermo O’Donnell distin-
guished between blue areas of strong institutions and high presence of the 
state, and brown areas of state absence in Latin America, where only “low 
intensity citizenship” is possible.26 Framing the problem this way immedi-
ately suggests the solution: to reinforce the state and the rule of law. While 
this view certainly has a great deal of merit, others dispute this approach. 
E. Desmond Arias (2006), for example, notes that criminal and public 
interests are deeply linked; that the rise of crime occurs not in the absence of 
but in partnership with state agents. Criminal activity emanates from state 
actors themselves. Referring to the favelas in Rio, he writes: 
Persistently high levels of violence… result not from the failure 
of institutions, [but] rather, from networks that bring criminals 
together with civic leaders, politicians, and policemen… Rather 
than creating “parallel states” outside of political control, these 
networks link trafficker dominated areas with Rio’s broader pol-
itical and social systems.27 
In other words, there is a complex network of connected state and 
criminal actors and activities, not a hierarchical state pyramid versus strictly 
separated criminal groups.
Conclusion
The seriousness of the security crisis in the region, and the failure of force to 
address it, has forced a reassessment of failed policies, and innovation with 
sometimes very counterintuitive ideas. But this crisis—especially in light of 
a complex networked system with multiple actors with overlapping bound-
aries and jurisdictions—also forces us to engage in a broader reassessment: 
this is not only a security crisis but a governance crisis. 
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In a hierarchy, the top of the state pyramid makes policies, and the rest 
of the organization implements them. In a complex networked system, even 
hierarchically organized states cannot necessarily do this. The system con-
tinuously evolves as different actors innovate and adapt to changing circum-
stances. The nature of the problems that need to be addressed also changes. 
Solutions to past problems no longer work, and can create new problems 
of their own. Governance in such a system requires flexibility, adaptation, 
experimentation, and continuous re-evaluation: learning by doing and by 
monitoring what others are doing.28 Governments in this system are not 
necessarily the final deciders, but key coordinators and facilitators. In Latin 
American societies historically accustomed to hierarchical governance, this 
conceptual shift may be the greatest policy challenge.
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The Anti-Femicide Movement in 
Ciudad Juárez, Mexico
Zulma Y. Méndez,  
The University of Texas at El Paso, United Sates
The work described in this paper is part of a larger project on which Dr. Kathleen Staudt at the University of Texas at El Paso and I have collaborated. It focuses on the topic of activism and resistance in the 
Mexican border city of Ciudad Juárez, across from the Texas town of El Paso. 
That larger project documents and analyzes the last five years of activism in 
Ciudad Juárez, a city with a long tradition of organizing and activism across 
a wide range of issues. In particular, Staudt and I focus on the emergence of 
what we identify and recognize as an “anti-militarization” movement and its 
convergence with the anti-femicide movement, the latter with a much longer 
history that may be traced back to the last two decades. 
Our analysis of these two social movements also considers the bi-na-
tional character (across the U.S.-Mexico border) that they have acquired as 
activists and organizations have strategically sought and efficaciously built 
coalitions with their counterparts in the United States but especially in the 
city of El Paso, Texas, where organizations and activists have effectively visi-
bilized and exerted pressure on social issues that many view as binational in 
their origins and in their possible solutions such as gun control, drug policy 
reform, and immigration. 
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I will focus on the description of the anti-femicide movement and a part 
of that ample organizing process in which activists and women’s groups 
especially have engaged in the city of Ciudad Juárez. I describe it and show 
our analysis of how activism within the anti-femicide movement has played 
a key role in the work towards a more equitable, non-violent society. In par-
ticular, I describe the ways in which the anti-femicide movement has: 
1) visibilized gender violence against women; 
2) monitored, documented, and denounced the problematic or 
lack of implementation of security policy; 
3) shaped and re-shaped policy aiming at the eradication of vio-
lence from women’s lives.
This work abbreviates and responds to a body of literature that is multi-
disciplinary. We have looked into this literature to understand the political, 
social, cultural, and economic environment, but also the local, national, and 
bi-national context in which activism and the anti-femicide movement we 
have witnessed in Ciudad Juárez operates.
Thus, our look into and review of the literature is extensive, as is our pro-
ject. It moves between narratives that frame and describe the city of Juárez as 
a chaotic space, violent and lawless, implying a future of hopelessness1 in a 
“failed state”,2 to work representing the city and the U.S.-Mexico border from 
a state-centric approach by focusing on the relative easiness of commercial 
trade and transit.3 The literature also advances a narrative about the border 
that characterizes it as an interdependent region4 and hybrid5 with dynamic 
and shared cultural and social ties in a context of common political and eco-
nomic issues that make the region and its inhabitants highly complex. 
Moreover, an important segment of the literature inquires into the al-
ready complex U.S.-Mexico border region by examining it through a theor-
etical frame that draws from social constructions of gender to provide a more 
nuanced analysis of the social context in the Mexican border city.6
Other research offers rich descriptions and analyses of the Juárez/El 
Paso border region as one that is highly surveiled,7 or at war (against and 
among drug cartels),8 but also one where activism has flourished and grown 
at the local city level,9 and at a transborder, bi-national level10 to visibilize 
gender violence and femicide.
Our review of the literature allowed us to understand the context in 
which the anti-femicide movement unfolded in the last twenty years. For 
instance, Fregoso and Bejarano (2012), Pérez (2011), and Staudt (2008) focus 
on documenting the political work and networks women have developed 
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locally, nationally, bi-nationally, and internationally to denounce and situate 
gender violence and femicide as a public issue. However, there less is said 
on the ways in which they have organized to influence, shape, and reshape 
policy. For as it is true that mobilization has provided them with political 
leverage with which to demand governmental response, it is important to 
recognize and detail how they network and develop a policy agenda around 
various issues of interest. One in particular, which I will discuss further, 
concerns a policy on security.
To understand and document how the process of influencing policy 
occurred, we employed an ethnographic approach. Guided by Edward 
Schatz’ (2009) work on political ethnography, we recognized the reach and 
power of cultural immersion—a cornerstone of ethnography as a method—to 
provide a first-hand understanding of the dynamics and processes shaping 
certain actions within the anti-femicide movement. That is why, in this work, 
participant observation is privileged as well as the collection of documents 
and other artifacts that we have managed to gather in the last five years. 
Participating since the year 2009 in some of the actions called by some 
women’s groups in Ciudad Juárez, we had the opportunity to attend meet-
ings, talk formally and informally with the leadership and membership of 
NGOs and grass-roots organizations within the anti-femicide movement. We 
also generated and had access to visual materials such as photos and videos 
of meetings and activities, and we were able to collect—with their consent—a 
series of documents that include flyers, public pronouncements, newspaper 
clippings, and documents such as technical reports that NGOs produced as 
part of their work. 
Access to and the production of our own qualitative data during field-
work was possible as Staudt and I are academics and activists. We have lived, 
taught, and conducted research at the U.S.-Mexico borderlands throughout 
our professional trajectory, but in addition, we have witnessed and have act-
ively participated in some of the organizing processes that we narrate in our 
work. Our analysis, in fact, draws from that experience and funds of know-
ledge. In doing so, we assume our academic endeavor as one that, as Agar 
suggests, moves away from assumptions or presumptions of objectivity or 
subjectivity, to achieve reflexivity. Thus, the experiences we document and 
densely describe, following Geertzian tradition, are analyzed systematically 
as they are sifted through our use of method and theory.
We believe that a method should not just guide the interpretation of ex-
periences, but also document and intervene; that is, to document, record, and 
memorialize, as Riaño-Alcalá (2006) suggests in her ethnographic work in 
Colombia. For, as Ruth Behar (1996) asks in her book The Vulnerable Observer, 
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in the face of horror—such as the horror that the anti-femicide movement 
has confronted—shouldn’t the observer who cannot stop it, at least try to 
document it? And in our case as scholars, in the face of a complex social 
and political context, shouldn’t we, as Barsalou and Baxter (2007) contend, 
document the efforts of the surviving communities to eradicate violence and 
femicide through mobilization and efforts at shaping policy?
What we experienced and witnessed makes up the bulk of our qualita-
tive data; qualitative data that we organized and have begun to analyze, not 
just following the ethnographic convention, but also guided by theory. In 
this case, we analyze the anti-femicide movement guided by Tarrow’s (1998) 
theory of structural political opportunity in which he affirms that the pro-
cesses that are exhibited in a particular social movement reveal much about 
the political structure as these—movements and structure—exist in conson-
ance with the political environment. That is, social movements are a reflection 
of a given state’s political structure and of a given institutional environment, 
though movements are not constrained or determined solely by it. 
Thus, using Tarrow’s (1998) theoretical lens, we have begun to analyze 
the ways in which women groups within the anti-femicide movement have 
visibilized gender violence against women, as well as monitored, docu-
mented, and denounced the problematic or lack of implementation of a 
policy of security; and shaped and re-shaped policy aiming at the eradica-
tion of violence from women’s lives in the last ten years.
But before I go into the description of the anti-femicide movement and a 
preliminary analysis of their contributions to policy on security, let me first 
briefly describe the social and political context that shapes it. 
Anti-femicide movement emerged at the end of the peak years of the 
transnational manufacturing industry that had settled in Ciudad Juárez in 
the early 1960s given its strategic proximity to the Unites States. Initially, 
this industry attracted and employed young female labor that until then 
had remained unemployed. As the transnational manufacturing industries 
expanded in the city, they demanded more and more labor and so males 
became a significant part of its labor force too. By the 1970s and 90s, manu-
facturing plants contributed to the huge demographic explosion in the city 
as it created and promoted migratory flows into an urban space that grew 
chaotically and without any planning. Most maquila workers, with less than 
nine years of education, settled in non-developed land or colonias that lacked 
basic services such as water, electricity, and transportation and earning less 
than ten dollars a day. The economic and social precariousness of this grow-
ing population added a layer to a sociocultural context that was already 
characterized by unequal relations across gender, class, region, and ethni-
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city. In this complex environment, drug cartels also found the border region 
strategic, and political elites and their economic interests all contributed, 
according to various analyses, to a socioeconomic content that propitiated 
violence and impunity.11
Between 1993—the year when civil organizations and scholars at aca-
demic institutions began to record and document the cases of disappearance, 
sexual torture, and murder of women in that border city—and 1997, Juárez 
civil society organizations recorded 180 femicides. However, it was not until 
after five years of monitoring and documentation from women’s organiza-
tions that authorities began to recognize the problem, if only symbolically 
and partially; that is, by calling for a minute of silence for the murdered 
women of Juárez and by forming a legislators’ committee to inquire about 
the state of investigations of those murders, which organizations denounced 
as remaining in absolute impunity.
Notwithstanding the legislators’ committee, it took another year, in 
1998, to create the first Office of the Special Prosecutor for the investigation 
of murders of women in Ciudad Juárez—just a month prior to the ratifica-
tion by the Mexican State of the Convention of Belém do Pará (1994) which 
requires that governments prevent, sanction, and eradicate all forms of vio-
lence against women. By 1999, the political pressure was such that President 
Ernesto Zedillo requested assistance of U.S. authorities and experts in the 
investigations. Yet in Juárez, at the turn of the millennium, local authorities 
had embarked in full-fledge campaigns and programs that addressed the 
disappearances and murders of women in discriminatory and misogynous 
ways; that is, blaming the victims by stating that they were killed as a conse-
quence of their “lifestyle” and going out at night, walking the streets alone, 
or being provocatively dressed.
Table 1. Femicides and Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 1993–1999. 
Year #
1993  24
1994  20
1995  50
1996  45
1997  41
1998  39
1999  25
Total 244
(Source: Femicide and murder data from Julia Monarrez’s data base at Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte.)
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From 2000 to 2007, a total of 257 women were added to the list for a grand 
total of 501 murdered women since 1993—again, the year when organiza-
tions started to document the murder of women in Juárez.
Table 2. Femicides and Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 2000-2007. 
Year #
2000  38
2001  41
2002  41
2003  30
2004  20
2005  34
2006  23
2007  30
Total 257
(Source: Femicide and murder data from Julia Monarrez’s data base at Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte.)
However in the period between 2000 and 2007, a series of important 
events in women’s activism and anti-femicide movement took place begin-
ning in 2001 when eight bodies of women who had disappeared one to two 
months earlier were found with clear signs of sexual torture on what had 
been a cotton field prior to the expansion of the manufacturing transnation-
als. The finding of these bodies represented to some observers the ways 
in which women in Juárez—a city devoted to mass production—were con-
strued as disposable. Public outcry and anti-femicide groups’ pressure was 
such that within a few days two men were arrested and later confessed to 
the rape and murder of the eight women. Yet, as it has been the case with 
other cases that produce such public outcry, the men stated that they had 
self-incriminated under torture. With this development, further exacerbating 
social indignation, the federal congress approved and established a Special 
Commission to monitor the investigations of the murders of women and girls 
in Ciudad Juárez. 
However, advised by women’s groups with binational networks, in 
2002 mothers of three of the femicide victims at the cotton field presented a 
petition to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. By 2005, the 
Inter-American Commission admitted the three cases to be tried by its court, 
which finally condemned the Mexican State for human rights violations in 
the cotton field in 2009. 
The Cotton Field case, as anti-femicide groups recognize it, was a key 
catalyst for much of the policies and programs that emerged between 2002, 
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when a petition was first presented to the Inter-American System of Justice, 
and 2009 when it finally found the Mexican State responsible and required 
that it establish no repetition mechanisms. Among those changes were: the 
creation of a joint agency for the attention of women’s murders in 2003; the 
creation of the Special Prosecutor for the attention of crimes relating to the 
murders of women in Juárez; supervised by the Attorney General’s office in 
2004, the creation of the Commission for the Prevention and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women in Ciudad Juárez; also in 2004, the creation of a 
special commission by the Federal Congress for the awareness and monitor-
ing of investigations relating to femicides in Mexico and the procuration of 
justice; and the promulgation of state law on the right of women to a life free 
from violence in the state of Chihuahua where the municipality of Juárez 
was established in 2007. In 2009, the authority of the Commission on the 
Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women was extended from 
exclusively Ciudad Juárez to national jurisdiction. 
Despite the fact that the bureaucratic response in the form of commis-
sions and the creation of offices and posts to attend to the gender violence 
that never ceased was suspended in 2010, in the face of extreme social vio-
lence caused by militarization authorities once again began to minimize and 
distort the extent of femicide in Juárez.
Though the number of women killed seemed to vary slightly, it was 
stable until 2008 when former President Felipe Calderón launched what he 
called inter-changeably “a war against drugs” or a “war against cartels.” The 
latter involved the militarization of the city with the deployment of more 
than 2,000 troops, and 2,500 federal police as part of what became known as 
Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua which aimed, according to federal authority, 
to combat organized crime, most specifically drug cartels that had purport-
edly launched a war for the control of the distribution routes. Juárez was a 
strategic location given its vicinity to the United States. Towards the end of 
2009, according to the various journalistic accounts12 it was estimated that 
more than 10,000 military and federal police elements patrolled the city, in 
addition to the 2,000 municipal policemen. 
The Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua that the federal government 
launched as part of its security strategy in the so-called war against drug 
cartels was implemented with the endorsement and support of the state and 
local authorities, thus generating a highly tense political and social environ-
ment as highly armed, face concealed, military personnel and policemen 
patrolled the streets with their weapons aimed at people and their fingers on 
the trigger. This display of force escalated the climate of fear and insecurity 
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that was perceived as a result of the violence that stemmed from criminal 
organizations’ disputes throughout the streets of Juárez. Between 2007—at 
the beginning of President Calderón’s war—and 2012, when the military 
and federal police were returned to their military posts and removed from 
the city, 935 women were killed. So, 935 women were killed in a period of 
five years of militarization, versus 501 in a period of fifteen years prior to 
militarization. 
Table 3. Femicides and Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 2007-2012. 
Year #
2007  30
2008 131
2009 201
2010 304
2011 216
2012  83
Total 965
(Source: Femicide and murder data from Julia Monarrez’s data base at Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte.)
Between 1998 and 2000 a number of governmental actions were taken, 
none of them can be said to formally constitute a policy of security. Instead, 
there were scattered efforts with little input from women’s groups who, at 
the time, continued to protest, march, and were very present on the streets of 
Juárez. Notwithstanding the absence of a clearly articulated security policy, 
women’s groups have insisted on the importance of public policies, and in 
particular, of security policies that emphasize a gender perspective. A nota-
ble case has been Red Mesa de Mujeres with the launching of the European 
Community funded project Seis Ciudades. 
SeisCiudades13 is an initiative involving six cities in Mexico with the pur-
pose of monitoring, evaluating, and influencing security policy with a gender 
and human rights perspective. The initiative is an important and promis-
ing attempt to bring governmental authorities, including those in charge of 
security, and human rights advocates and organizations in Ciudad Juárez, 
Guadalajara, Chihuahua, Culiacán, Tijuana, and Monterrey into monitoring 
and evaluation of security policy. Most importantly, Seis Ciudades seeks to 
influence the definition of policies and programs of security that are sensible 
to women’s issues and their right to a life—and cities—free of violence. Thus, 
despite the long struggle, women’s groups continue to work and contribute 
to the construction of viable communities. 
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The National Security Policies of 
the Felipe Calderón Administration: 
Toward a Human Security Dimension?
María-Cristina Rosas, 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 
Introduction
In 2006, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa was proclaimed winner of a highly disputed presidential election in Mexico. In December of that year, he became President and shortly after he announced a security strategy to 
fight criminal organizations, particularly those involved in drug trafficking. 
This policy was the priority of his administration. 
In order to secure the cooperation of the United States in this endeavor, 
the Felipe Calderón administration (2006-2012) opened the doors of its se-
curity bodies to their American counterparts. This was done, mostly, in a 
pragmatic way, without a national security doctrine capable of contributing 
to better use of the material and human capital available to fulfill the ultimate 
goal of fighting organized crime. It was not until 2008 that the Felipe Calderón 
government announced a National Program of Public Security (2008-2012)1, 
and a year later, the National Security Program (2009-2012) (Diario Oficial 
2009). Previously, his administration had endorsed a very general security 
policy, as defined in the National Development Plan (2007-2012).2
Despite the policies endorsed by Mexican authorities, between 2007 and 
2012 violence perpetrated by organized crime, particularly drug trafficking 
organizations, was perceived as a threat to citizen security and governance 
in some parts of Mexico. Even though Mexico is not a failed state,3 there are 
areas and regions within the country where the absence of governance is a 
reality. This was also a point of concern for Canada, since violence in Mexico 
during the Felipe Calderón administration created a negative perception 
of the country in the eyes of Canadians at a moment when the profile of 
Mexico-Canada relations had deteriorated.4
Violence in Mexico has increased U.S. and Canadian concerns about sta-
bility in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the possibility 
of violence spilling over into the United States. As it has been demonstrated, 
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Mexican criminal organizations control the U.S. illicit drug market and are 
considered the greatest drug trafficking threat the United States faces.5 On 
July 25, 2011, the Obama administration even endorsed a Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime in which the prevailing situation in Mexico 
is considered of concern, and criminal organizations such as the Zetas are 
targeted as major threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere.6
Security and Violence in Mexico, 2006-2012
In general terms, violence in Mexico has in fact declined since late 2011 
(Luhnow 2012). However, analysts estimate that it may have claimed between 
60,000 and 70,000 lives over the presidential term of Felipe Calderón.7 As sug-
gested before, as soon as his term began in 2006, President Calderón launched 
a large-scale crusade against organized crime, especially drug trafficking. 
To do that, the administration faced several shortcomings both in material 
and human capital, being of particular concern the absence of honest, profes-
sional, and well-qualified civilian police and law-enforcement agencies, as 
well as technological obsolescence of intelligence capabilities, among other 
problems. Thus, the Calderón administration decided to increase the budget 
as well as the human capital for national security tasks (see Figure 1).
Given its weak capacity to face the threat of organized crime, the Mexican 
government decided to use the military as the leading force to deal with the 
monumental challenge. The use of the military to confront organized crime 
has been considered an “understandable” yet “risky” decision, since the toll 
includes deaths of military officials, corruption, desertions, and presumed 
human rights violations. Also, the fact that the military has taken the lead 
in public security matters raises concerns about diminished and limited ca-
pabilities of these bodies to face additional national security threats. 
Figure 1. Public Security Ministry: Human Resources by Category, 2001-2012.
(Source: Presidency of Mexico.) 
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In Mexico there is no consensus about national security, threats, risks or 
vulnerabilities. Each government body in charge of security issues, such as 
the National Defense Ministry (SEDENA), the Naval Secretariat (SEMAR), 
the Ministry of the Interior (SEGOB), and the General Attorney’s Office (PGR), 
has its own concept of national security (Rosas 2011), and there are import-
ant differences among them. The same applies to the existing legislation on 
national security. For instance, the National Security Law (2005)8 provides a 
standard definition of national security that does not even address drug traf-
ficking as a threat. This law was enacted during the government of Vicente 
Fox (2000-2006). In the Calderón administration, the National Development 
Plan (2007-2012) did include drug trafficking as a threat. Despite this signifi-
cant difference, important overlaps do exist when it comes to national and 
public security issues.
Probably the most important achievement in defining threats to national 
security was accomplished in the National Security Program (2009-2012) in 
which a broad concept of security and specific threats and risks are identified. 
This program was announced in the context of the A H1N1 flu outbreak that 
started in April 2009. Yet, both the National Development Plan (2007-2012) 
and the National Security Program (2009-2012) are governmental initiatives 
valid only for the Calderón administration, meaning that under Peña Nieto, 
new programs and plans are being created with specific emphasis on those 
that could be accomplished in the 2013-2018 period.
During the Felipe Calderón administration, several members of criminal 
organizations were arrested, while many others were killed. It seems that 
the effort of the Calderón administration has contributed to a more favorable 
perception about security within the country; however, his national security 
policy was perceived as one in need of adjustment and reconsideration under 
his successor, particularly in dealing with the resulting death toll.
Achievements of the National Security Strategy, 2007-2012
In 2006, five criminal organizations dominated drug trafficking in Mexico 
and the surrounding region. They were strong, well organized and had 
important transnational connections. By the end of the Felipe Calderón ad-
ministration, the situation had changed dramatically due to a “decapitation” 
strategy. As a result,
• between 2008 and 2010, the Sinaloa Cartel witnessed the de-
mise of two important branches; one led by Nacho Coronel 
and the other by Beltrán Leyva;
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• the Gulf Cartel and its army wing, the Zetas, was severely 
damaged after the leader, Heriberto Lazcano, was captured;
• the Tijuana Cartel, once dominant in the 90s, was unable to 
deal with the ascendance of the Sinaloa Cartel in the new cen-
tury and, as a result, is presently very weak;
• the Juárez Cartel faced a similar fate as the Tijuana Cartel; and
• la Familia from Michoacán, following the capture of leader 
Nazario Moreno, split into two rivals factions, los Caballeros 
Templarios and a smaller la Familia.9
This does not mean that criminal organizations disappeared from the 
Mexican landscape. Rather, small and medium-sized groups became prom-
inent, fighting each other and taking advantage of some institutional weak-
nesses. For instance, problems in cooperation and coordination between 
the several security bodies in charge of fighting organized crime increased. 
Also, the fact that the American security bodies could work openly with 
any of the Mexican institutions, such as the Naval Secretariat, contributed 
to a perception in Mexico that the “war on drugs” was conducted entirely 
from Washington D. C., meaning key decisions on strategy were not even 
discussed with their Mexican counterparts.
Other achievements of the Felipe Calderón administration include the 
initiative to create a proactive, as opposed to the current reactive, Federal 
Police to anticipate the moves of criminal organizations. To do that, the 
government implemented a strategy to recruit and incorporate members of 
the armed forces to serve with the Federal Police, whilst current police of-
ficers were being trained and subjected to confidence controls to determine 
whether they were capable of accomplishing the required tasks. Intelligence 
was another area that was reinforced within the police, so that it could antici-
pate the strategies of criminal organizations. At the same time, the Calderón 
administration initiated a judicial reform so that crime could be better and 
more efficiently prosecuted.
Yet, these achievements required a long term approach, that is, beyond 
the Calderón administration, since organized crime is very dynamic and 
changes on a daily basis. Criminal organizations function as networks by 
taking advantage of the globalization and communications revolution. In 
other words, this means that,
the diverse groups of a movement [criminal or not] are not iso-
lated from each other. Instead, they form an integrated network 
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or reticulated structure through nonhierarchical social linkages 
among their participants and through the understandings, iden-
tities, and opponents these participants share. Networking en-
ables movement participants to exchange information and ideas 
and to coordinate participation in joint action.10 
To the contrary, the security structures of governments tend to be hier-
archical, from top to bottom, less dynamic and thus less capable of anticipat-
ing the strategies of criminal organizations. In order to face the challenge of 
organized crime, government security bodies may need to think, organize, 
and act, at least partially, as networks for the sake of efficiency.
In Mexico, criminal organizations have taken advantage of globaliza-
tion in terms of obtaining the required resources to operate. They possess 
advanced weapons, financial logistics, human capital, and, in many cases, 
social support to carry out their activities. This explains some of the chal-
lenges the authorities face in succeeding in the “war on drugs.”
The Role of the United States
The Calderón administration’s policy against drug trafficking was initially 
met with enthusiastic praise by the United States. In fact, the most important 
cooperation program between the two governments has been the so-called 
Merida Initiative, an assistance package that started in 2008 consisting 
of counterdrug and anticrime programs for the benefit of Mexico, Central 
America, plus Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Beyond the resources that 
the United States allocated to finance the Merida Initiative, this program is 
important because it engaged Washington in an effort that was largely pur-
sued by the Mexican authorities alone at great material and human resources 
costs. The fact that the Bush and the Obama administrations have pushed the 
U.S. Congress to approve the initiative shows a significant change in attitude 
on the part of U.S. authorities in dealing with organized crime. 
This is not so say that counter-narcotics and anticrime initiatives did 
not exist between the two countries before the Merida Initiative. Yet, it is 
expected that similar programs with improved funding will be supported 
by the United States, which is the country with the largest market for drug 
consumption in the world.
The United States began providing Mexico with equipment 
and training to eradicate marijuana and opium poppy fields in 
the 1970s, but bilateral cooperation declined dramatically after 
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Enrique Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) agent, was assassinated in Mexico in 1985. From the mid-
1980s through the end of the 1990s, bilateral cooperation stalled 
due to U.S. mistrust of Mexican counterdrug officials and con-
cerns about the Mexican government’s tendency to accommodate 
drug leaders. At the same time, the Mexican government was 
reluctant to accept large amounts of U.S. assistance due to its 
opposition to U.S. drug certification procedures and to concerns 
about sovereignty. The Mexican government also expressed 
opposition to the DEA carrying out operations against drug 
trafficking organizations in Mexican territory without author-
ization. Mexican military officials proved particularly reticent to 
cooperate with the U.S. military due to concerns about past U.S. 
interventions in Mexico.11
The context, however, dramatically changed by the end of the twentieth 
and beginning of the twenty-first century. Once Colombian cartels were 
“decapitated” and weakened, Mexican drug lords became prominent in de-
livering drugs to the U.S. market.
The Merida Initiative was born due to the escalation of violence in Mexico 
as part of the national security policies of the Felipe Calderón administra-
tion. From the point of view of the United States, a possible “spill-over” effect 
into American soil was of concern, and thus Washington was convinced that 
something needed to be done. 
The Merida Initiative consists of four pillars:
• Disrupting the operation capacity of organized criminal 
groups;
• Institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law and re-
spect of human rights;
• Creating a twenty-first century border; and
• Building strong and resilient communities.12
The Merida Initiative needs approval from the U.S. Congress on a yearly 
basis. Thus, the U.S. Congress has played a major role in determining the 
level and composition of the Merida Initiative funding for Mexico. From fiscal 
year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $1.9 
billion for Mexico to finance the Merida Initiative. In the first years the U.S. 
Congress contemplated funding for Mexico in supplemental appropriations 
measures in an attempt to hasten the delivery of certain equipment. The U.S. 
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Congress has also allocated funds in order to ensure that certain programs 
are prioritized, such as efforts to support institutional reform. In fiscal year 
2012—the last of the Felipe Calderón administration—funds provided for pil-
lar two have exceeded all other aid categories and has become a key concern 
moving forward.13
A key concern of the U.S. Congress is the human rights situation and, as 
a result, it has encouraged efforts to combat abuses and impunity in Mexico 
by placing conditions on the Merida Initiative assistance. The American 
Congress stipulated that 15 percent of certain assistance provided to Mexican 
military and police forces would be subject to certain human rights condi-
tions. However, most recently, the Peña Nieto administration has changed 
the way Mexican security institutions cooperate with their American 
counterparts, namely by concentrating dialogue and responsibility under 
the Mexican Ministry of the Interior. This development has not been well 
received by the Obama administration, and may lead to delays in delivering 
the assistance to Mexico.
The National Security Priorities of Peña Nieto
In December 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto became President of Mexico. On 
December 17, 2012, he outlined a strategy that aims to achieve a “Mexico in 
Peace” where human rights are respected and protected by implementing a 
“state” security policy that involves binding commitments from all levels of 
government and civic participation. The six pillars of the strategy include: 
Table 1. Fiscal Years 2008–2014 Merida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and Appro-
priation Measure.
(Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Opera-
tions, 2008-2014.) 
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; INCLE = Inter-
national Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.
a. $6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State 
Department.
b. Beginning in FY2012, FMF assistance is not included as part of the Mérida Initiative.
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• Planning; 
• Prevention; 
• Protection and respect of human rights; 
• Coordination; 
• Institutional transformation; and 
• Monitoring and evaluation. 
As suggested before, President Peña Nieto has centralized the structure 
of Mexico’s security apparatus under the authority of the Ministry of the 
Interior and pledged to replace military forces engaged in public security 
efforts with a gendarmerie (militarized police). Although President Peña 
Nieto has said that his government will not abandon the fight against organ-
ized crime, the primary goal of his security strategy is to reduce violence in 
Mexico. He insisted that its success will be measured in reductions in homi-
cides and other crimes, rather than in drugs seized or kingpins arrested. 
In mid-2013 President Peña Nieto presented its National Development 
Plan (2013-2018) in which these pillars are included under the “Mexico in 
Peace” label. However, the project to create a gendarmerie is not even men-
tioned, despite the fact that it has been considered a key component of the 
current administration security strategy. 
Peña Nieto implemented some changes to the institutions in charge of 
security. One of the most important decisions, for instance, is that the Federal 
Police, that under the Felipe Calderón administration was a very powerful, 
well-financed, and autonomous body, has been put under the authority of 
the Ministry of the Interior. Also, new provisions to prevent money laun-
dering were enacted. Another visible change is the media coverage of vio-
lence in Mexico, which tends to be more discrete as opposed to the previous 
administration.
Final Remarks and Concerns
Mexico is a developing country facing national security threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities. The nature of threats and risks has changed over time. 
During the Felipe Calderón administration, the National Security Program 
(2009-2012), the most comprehensive security policy coined at that time, iden-
tifies the following as threats:
• Organized crime;
• Drug trafficking;
• Armed groups;
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• Terrorism; and
• Border vulnerabilities.
The same document defines the following as risks to Mexican national 
security:
• Political and social conflicts;
• Lack of social cohesion;
• Migration;
• Epidemics and pandemics;
• Global warming and environmental degradation; and
• Inequalities in national development.
The National Security Program (2009-2012), however, lacks an approach 
on addressing vulnerabilities. As a developing country, Mexico faces de-
velopmental problems that would allow certain vulnerabilities to contribute 
to an already unstable environment in which serious threats to national 
security could potentially develop. Vulnerabilities relate directly to develop-
ment problems such as poverty and income distribution. Thus, a compre-
hensive national security policy may have to include vulnerabilities as a key 
point due to the fact that security should go hand in hand with development.
As suggested before, Mexico needs a long-term approach to national 
security. One of the reasons for the National Security Program (2009-2012) 
was the flu outbreak (A H1N1) that badly hit Mexico starting in April 2009. 
Before the flu outbreak, the Felipe Calderón administration focused mostly 
on organized crime as a threat to national security by considering that the 
survival of the Mexican State was being challenged by the actions carried 
out by criminal offenders, particularly drug lords. Yet, a disease challenged 
this view and forced the authorities to redefine threats to national security. 14
At that time, Mexico received international support in combatting the 
flu outbreak. A H1N1 was a new version of the 1918 influenza virus. It de-
veloped when a previous triple assortment of bird, swine, and human flu 
viruses combined with a Eurasian pig flu virus. This disease is contracted 
via person-to-person transmission through respiratory droplets. It was first 
considered an outbreak in Veracruz, a state located in the Gulf of Mexico. It 
then spread throughout the country and the rest of the world. In Mexico City, 
the authorities decided to close public and private places to prevent the dis-
ease from spreading further. By June, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
had declared the otutbreak a pandemic because it was present in all regions.
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In the case of Mexico, the flu epidemic demonstrates that threats to 
national security are diverse and that a wider and more comprehensive 
approach is needed. Since 1994, human security has been discussed in 
international circles as such an approach. This human-centered concept 
is endorsed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which 
considers threats to security to be those that harm primarily people, since for 
societies to be secure, people need to be free of fear—such as human rights 
violations and violence—and free of want—such as hunger, epidemics, un-
employment, and environmental degradation.15
In Mexico and Latin America in general, human security has been 
endorsed with reservation, and only the governments of Chile and Costa 
Rica have defined policies under that label. Due to the Special Conference 
on Security sponsored by the Organization of American States in 2003 in 
Mexico, the western hemisphere has adopted a “multidimensional” security 
approach, a concept strongly influenced by, and similar to, human security.16
One of the risks of the concept of human security, according to academ-
ics and politicians, is the possibility that all issues become “security” issues. 
Moreover, every country is different and has distinctive capabilities and 
vulnerabilities. For instance, for the Caribbean countries, natural disasters, 
such as hurricanes, are a threat to national security. For Panama, vessels 
transiting through the Panama Chanel may pose risks to national security if 
they are to capsize or incur severe damage, especially if carrying toxic waste 
or weapons. For the United States, of course, terrorism is the most import-
ant threat to its security. Thus, multidimensional security carries different 
meanings for countries and the 2003 conference in Mexico was successful 
in including in the security agenda not only terrorism but also a wide range 
of threats that are of concern to the western hemisphere. Yet, for many 
countries both human security and multidimensional security should be 
endorsed with caution so that problems are faced according to their nature, 
such as specific vulnerabilities, risks or threats, so that human and material 
resources are properly used.
In the National Development Plans endorsed by Mexican governments 
since the times of Miguel de la Madrid (1980-1986) when the first plan was 
implemented, security has become a broader concept, at least on paper, which 
goes beyond police and military assumptions. Previously, national security 
was intentionally linked to the government, so that “threats,” such as dissent 
from social movements and students, demonstrations by trade unions, and 
guerrillas were of concern to the authorities. The new concept of security was 
the result of a democratization process that started from the mid-1980s until 
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today. The current Peña Nieto administration, and the previous Calderón 
administration as well, however, do not use the concept of human security 
in reference to national security and/or its threats. Yet, many developmental 
issues are included in the National Development Plans, though not under the 
security-development label, but rather as separate goals. Only in Mexico City 
is there a special report on human security published in 2008, in which the 
concept is introduced to provide a better understanding of threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities that the capital is facing.17
At the national level, however, there is the need for a comprehensive ap-
proach, including areas such as education, culture of law, health issues, crop 
substitution, confidence in the police force, and the demilitarization of security 
tasks and law enforcement. There is recognition in both Mexico and the United 
States of the high human and financial costs that Mexican society is incurring 
in dealing with the current approach to combatting organized crime.
Another issue of concern, of course, is the emphasis placed by the cur-
rent Obama administration on organized crime. The strategy, endorsed in 
July 2011, suggests that criminal gangs are now a top priority in his national 
security policy. For many academics and politicians on both sides of the bor-
der, this endorsement comes too late, given that Washington has kept terror-
ism and Osama Bin Laden at the top of its security concerns. Had the United 
States placed more attention on organized crime and its “spillover effect,” it 
is believed that criminal gangs in Mexico today would not be as prominent 
as they have been since the beginning of the century.
There is another concern in this respect. The Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime clearly states that,
transnational organized crime (TOC) poses a significant and 
growing threat to national and international security, with dire 
implications for public safety, public health, democratic institu-
tions, and economic stability across the globe. Not only are crim-
inal networks expanding, but they also are diversifying their 
activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once 
distinct and today have explosive and destabilizing effects. This 
Strategy organizes the United States to combat TOC networks 
that pose a strategic threat to Americans and to U.S. interests in 
key regions.18
This means that in many respects, after the “decapitation” of Al-Qaeda, 
terrorism remains a threat but has been given a lower profile, and could be re-
244
national security policies of the felipe calderón administration
placed by organized crime gangs as the top security concern. This raises con-
cerns about what the United States is willing to do to “decapitate” the leaders 
of criminal organizations, especially those based in Mexico. On July 15, 2013, 
Mexican marines captured one of the most wanted criminals, Miguel Ángel 
Treviño Morales (also known as Zeta 40), one of the leaders of the organiza-
tion the Zetas operating in Mexico. At first, this was seen as an achievement 
of the Peña Nieto administration despite the fact that cooperation with 
Washington on security issues had apparently changed in terms of the access 
U.S. security institutions used to have to their Mexican counterparts under 
Felipe Calderón. Later, it was revealed that it was thanks to the logistics and 
information provided by American security institutions that the capture of 
Treviño Morales was possible, which leads to questions about how much 
cooperation on security matters really has changed between Mexico and 
the United States under the current administration. Furthermore, President 
Peña Nieto took the opportunity to explain that there are no longer rivalries 
between Mexican security bodies in dealing with national security threats.19
In the end, there is the general feeling that the current Peña Nieto admin-
istration is pursuing a policy not so different from that of Felipe Calderón, 
even though the general consensus is that there is a need for a change of 
strategy so that the security-development binomial becomes the cornerstone 
of a policy towards a more secure and prosperous country. To do that, a na-
tional security doctrine is needed so that human and material resources are 
channeled properly. The ultimate goal is that Mexico finds its own formula to 
deal with the security challenges posed by organized crime, whilst develop-
ment is conceived as a vacuum to deal with vulnerabilities and risks that 
may, otherwise, turn into threats to national security. 
References
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. 2001. 
Network and Netwars. The Future of Ter-
ror, Crime and Military. Santa Monica: 
RAND.
Brown, Hayes. 2013. “Report: Mexico’s 
Drug Cartels Increasing U.S. Pres-
ence.” Think Progress, April 1. 
h t t p : // t h i n k p r o g r e s s . o r g / s e c u r i -
ty/2013/04/01/1802711/mexico-cartel-
united-states/?mobile=nc. 
Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Dis-
trito Federal. 2008. Informe especial sobre 
seguridad humana en el Distrito Federal. 
México, D. F.: CDHDF.
Hope, Alejandro. 2013. Peace Now? Mexican 
Security after Felipe Calderón. Washing-
ton D. C.: Inter-American Dialogue, 
Working Paper.
Diario Oficial. “Programa de seguridad na-
cional 2009-2012.” August 20, 2009.
El Universal. “Hoy no hay rivalidad entre 
agencias de seguridad.” July 17, 2013. 
Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexica-
nos. 2007. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
2007-2012. México: Presidencia de la 
República.
Johnson, Tim. 2013. “Mexico’s war on crime 
now ranks among Latin America’s 
245
maría-cristina rosas
bloodiest conflicts.” The Miami Herald, 
February 21. http://www.miamiherald.
com/2013/02/21/3246629/mexicos-war-
on-crime-now-ranks.html.
Luhnow, David. 2012. “Mexico Drug Vio-
lence Shows Decline.” The Wall Street 
Journal, June 14.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52702303822204577464821699025772.
html. 
Organization of American States. 2003. 
Final Declaration. Special Conference of 
Security. Washington D. C.: Organiza-
tion of American States.
Secretaría de Seguridad Pública. 2008. 
Programa Nacional de Seguridad Pública 
2008-2012. México: SSP.
Ribando Seelke, Clare and Kristin M. 
Finklea. 2013. U.S.-Mexican Security 
Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and 
Beyond. Washington D. C.: Congres-
sional Research Services.
The White House. 2011. Strategy to Com-
bat Transnational Organized Crime. 
Accessed July 5, 2013. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_
Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf. 
UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 
1994. New Dimensions of Human Securi-
ty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Notes
1 Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, Pro-
grama Nacional de Seguridad Pública 
2008-2012 (México: SSP, 2008).
2 Gobierno de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
2007-2012 (México: Presidencia de la 
República, 2007).
3 In general terms, the concept of failed 
state is often used by political com-
mentators and the media to describe 
a state perceived as having failed at 
some of the basic conditions and re-
sponsibilities of a sovereign entity. The 
Fund for Peace (www.fundforpeace.
org) has proposed the following cri-
teria to determine whether a state has 
“failed”:
 • Loss of physical control of its ter-
ritory, or of the monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of physical force therein;
 • Erosion of legitimate authority to 
make collective decisions;
 • An inability to provide reason-
able public services; and
 • An inability to interact with 
other states as a full member of the 
international community.
 The term is highly controversial since 
the declaration that a state has “failed” 
may carry significant economic, politi-
cal, and even military consequences.
4 At the beginning of 2006, relations 
were at a relatively high level. Canada 
had identified Mexico as a strategic 
partner; the Canada-Mexico Partner-
ship had just been founded; and the 
language, at least, of trilateralism was 
still in fashion in Ottawa. Within the 
Canadian business community, a 
gradual realization that North Amer-
ica extended south of the Rio Grande 
had taken place, so that a progressive 
“discovery of Mexico” by Canadian 
firms was steadily underway. This 
was the result of a series of economic 
reforms developed by Mexico in pre-
vious years, as well as the signing 
of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) that paved the 
way for closer economic, investment, 
and trade relations between the three 
“amigos,” and certainly between Mex-
ico and Canada. Then a series of nega-
tive factors affected the relationship. 
First, the election of Stephen Harper as 
prime minister of Canada in February 
2006 brought concerns that Canada 
would refocus its attention on bilateral 
relations with the United States at the 
expense of Mexico. This was previous 
to the presidential elections in Mexico 
(July 2006) when Felipe Calderón 
Hinojosa was proclaimed the winner 
amongst accusations of fraud by the 
246
national security policies of the felipe calderón administration
other leading presidential candidate 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 
Second, Mexico’s catastrophic drug 
violence severely damaged Mexico’s 
image in Canada, and Canadians be-
gan to fear that the situation in Mexico 
would expand to Canadian borders. 
Third, the handling of visa applica-
tions for Mexican citizens created a 
negative reaction among Mexican 
political and social elites, and strained 
relations at the diplomatic level. Lastly, 
the Harper government’s cancelling 
of Canadian studies funding globally 
decimated what was one of the world’s 
most active and enthusiastic Canadian 
studies communities in Mexico. Sub-
sequently, it was difficult to reestablish 
strong and active relations between 
Mexico and Canada.
5 Hayes Brown “Report: Mexico’s 
Drug Cartels Increasing U.S. Pres-
ence.” Think Progress, April 1. http://
thinkprogress.org/security/2013/ 
04/01/1802711/mexico-cartel-united-
states/?mobile=nc. 2013)
6 The White House, Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2011. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_
Transnational_Organized_Crime_
July_2011.pdf. Accessed July 5, 2013.
7 Tim Johnson, “Mexico’s war on crime 
now ranks among Latin America’s 
bloodiest conflicts.” The Miami Herald, 
February 21, 2013.
8 This law was endorsed by the Vicente 
Fox Administration (2000-2006).
9 Alejandro Hope, “Peace Now? Mexi-
can Security after Felipe Calderón,” 
Working Paper 2013 (Washington D. C.: 
Inter-American Dialogue, 2013), 4-5.
10 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 
Network and Netwars. The Future of Ter-
ror, Crime and Military (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2001), 295.
11 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. 
Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Coop-
eration: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond 
(Washington D. C.: Congressional Re-
search Service, 2013), 5.
12 Ibid., 6-7.
13 Ibid.
14 The United States faced a similar 
scenario after the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks. As a result of the threat posed 
by terrorism, the new Department of 
Homeland Security considered terror-
ism a major threat to national security. 
Yet in 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused 
massive loss of human lives and in-
frastructure, and the Department of 
Homeland Security included natural 
disasters as a threat to national secu-
rity.
15 UNDP, Human Development Report 
1994. New Dimensions of Human Se-
curity (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994).
16 OAS, Final Declaration. Special Confer-
ence of Security (Washington D. C.: Or-
ganization of American States, 2003).
17 (Comisión de Derechos Humanos del 
Distrito Federal, Informe especial sobre 
seguridad humana en el Distrito Federal 
(México, D. F.: CDHDF, 2008).
18 The White House, 5.
19 El Universal “Hoy no hay rivalidad 
entre agencias de seguridad.” July 17, 
2013.
247© Centre for Military and Strategic Studies http://cmss.ucalgary.ca/
Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 9, 2013
Latin American Security Pages 247–257
Contributors
adam Blackwell is currently the Secretary of Multidimensional Security at 
the Organization of American States (OAS). Prior to this, Mr. Blackwell held 
a number of positions in the OAS as Secretary for External Relations and 
as the Assistant Secretary of Finance and Administration (Treasurer). From 
2002 to 2006, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipoten-
tiary to the Dominican Republic. In 2006, Ambassador Blackwell returned to 
Ottawa to act as the Director General of Strategy and Services in the Bilateral 
Relations Branch of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. He is 
also an international Commissioner on the Committee to Reform Public 
Security in Honduras.
abstract: Ambassador Blackwell’s paper focuses on the work of the 
Secretariat of Multidimensional Security, which was created in 2005 by the 
Organization of American States to coordinate political, technical, and prac-
tical cooperation among member states as well as other inter-American and 
international organizations concerned with threats to national and citizen 
security. Its work in the region has produced positive results; for instance 
helping countries establish drug treatment ports as an alternative to incar-
ceration, countering money laundering, strengthening detection techniques 
for identifying suspicious cargo and exposing human trafficking. Blackwell 
argues that the solution to the problem of security is not more security and 
that mano dura policies have not proven successful. He suggests that over 
the next decade solutions will likely hinge on such concepts as “shared sover-
eignty” and “resilient communities.”
thomas C. Bruneau is a Distinguished Professor of National Security 
Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. In addition to his position as 
Professor in the NSA Department, he was the Academic Associate for the 
curriculum in International Security and Civil-Military Relations. Bruneau 
has published extensively in English and Portuguese in numerous journals 
and has published several books. Professor Bruneau was a Fulbright Scholar 
to India (1962-63) and to Brazil (1985-86), and has been awarded fellowships 
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the 
International Development Research Centre, the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Gulbenkian Foundation, and the Luso-American Development Foundation. 
abstract: This paper explores civil-military relations in Latin America 
in an international comparative perspective, drawing particular comparison 
248
contributors
with NATO-member countries. Bruneau deals with civil-military relations 
in terms of both traditional war-fighting roles and peacekeeping as well as 
internal security, including counter-terrorism, organized crime, and human 
and natural disasters. He outlined a range of conditions which tend to be 
preconditions for successful civil-military relations, including: the establish-
ment of professional norms for conduct; effective oversight mechanisms; rea-
sonable levels of resource allocation; a clear strategy or plan; the use of civil-
ian instructors in professional military training; and ministries of defense 
controlled by civilians. The paper concludes that only Colombia and Chile 
among Latin American countries have effective civil-military structures. He 
notes as well that one of the factors that accounts for success is having a clear 
incentive, such as the detection of an identifiable threat which results in the 
mobilization of resources.
José Miguel Cruz is currently a visiting assistant professor at the Department 
of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University. He 
has worked as a consultant for the World Bank, the IADB, the Pan-American 
Health Organization, and the UNDP. As Director of the University Institute 
of Public Opinion (IUDOP) at the University of Central America (UCA), he 
supervised more than fifty national public opinion polls and conducted 
several survey-based research projects on political behavior, criminal vio-
lence, and human rights. He has been working on Central American gangs 
since 1996. He holds a Doctoral degree in Political Science from Vanderbilt 
University and a Master degree in Public Policy in Latin America from 
Oxford University, England. 
abstract: This paper presents a review of the security initiatives during 
the last decade in Central America. It provides an overview of the public 
security crisis in the region and how that is intertwined with regional se-
curity, particularly regarding the penetration of organized crime groups 
across borders. The paper highlights the disparate trajectories followed by 
the governments in the region to tackle the rising levels of organized crime. 
The paper also briefly examines the international efforts directed to security 
cooperation. In doing this, the paper underlines the importance of creating 
and enforcing accountability mechanisms in the criminal-justice institutions 
of the Central American countries.
lucía dammert was an Associate Researcher at the Center of Security and 
Society at the National University of General San Martín and Academic 
Coordinator of Universidad Empresarial Siglo XXI in Córdoba. In Chile, 
she directed the Civil Society and Security area of the Center of Citizens 
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Security Studies at the University of Chile and the Program of Security 
and Citizenship at FLACSO-Chile. Currently, she is an Associate Professor 
at Universidad de Santiago de Chile. Dr. Dammert has been an advisor for 
the governments of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, and the Department of 
Public Security of the Organization of American States. She received aca-
demic fellowships and grants from the Tinker Foundation, the University of 
Pittsburgh and the Government of Argentina. 
abstract: Dammert’s paper stresses the extent to which Latin American 
countries, in spite of differences, have increasingly turned to the military to 
address problems of criminal activity, especially narcotics trafficking. She 
notes that high homicide rates are not in themselves an adequate measure of 
the level of insecurity in the region since a high percentage of people report a 
general sense of insecurity in their daily lives. Individual citizens have thus 
pressed for mano dura policies in responding to general levels of violence. 
She observes as well that one of the factors that has led to an increased use 
of the military for what are normally considered police responsibilities has 
been the high incidence of corruption and inefficiency among police forces. 
Dammert notes that the increasing use of the military for policing operations 
has contributed to some problems, one of which has been human rights 
abuses, another of which has been less transparency.
Major-General d. Michael day has been the Director General International 
Security Policy since July 2012. Major-General Day has served in the Chief 
of Defence Staff’s Professional Development Section as the Chief of Staff and 
Acting Director - Counter Terrorism Special Operations. Following the events 
of 9/11 he deployed to Afghanistan as part of Canada’s initial response. In 
July 2005 Major-General Day returned to Ottawa as Commanding Officer 
JTF 2 and in June 2007 assumed Command of Canadian Special Operations 
Forces Command. Promoted to his present rank in April 2011, he deployed 
again to Afghanistan serving as the Deputy Commanding General of the 
NATO Training Mission where he was directly responsible for the develop-
ment of all Afghan Security Forces.
Gary Finley is currently the Director Corporate Security, Petrominerales 
Ltd. for Colombia, Peru, and Brazil. He is retired from the RCMP/CSIS and 
previously worked in Security Management for Canadian oil and service 
companies in Yemen, Africa, Ecuador, Mexico, and Argentina. 
abstract: Gary Finley, Director of Corporate Security for Petrominerales, 
a Calgary-based oil company which operates primarily in Colombia but also 
has start-up operations in Peru and Brazil, focuses his analysis on the com-
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pany’s security management programs. The paper outlines the challenges 
that the company faces in dealing with both criminal organizations, which 
are often tied to narcotics trafficking, and the two main guerrilla insurgen-
cies, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National 
Liberation Army (ELN). The author indicates that the company’s security 
operations focus on the development of a structure and process that provide 
protection for personnel and assets. He notes the role of security contractors 
in the company’s security structure and the ways in which the company 
engages the Colombian armed forces. 
Peter Hakim is president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American 
Dialogue. From 1993 to 2010, he served as the organizations president. Mr. 
Hakim writes and speaks widely on hemispheric issues and has testified 
more than a dozen times before the U.S. Congress. Prior to joining the 
Dialogue, Mr. Hakim was a vice president of the Inter-American Foundation 
and worked for the Ford Foundation in New York, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru. He taught at MIT and Columbia, and served on boards and ad-
visory committees for the World Bank, Council on Competitiveness, Inter-
American Development Bank, Canadian Foundation for Latin America 
(FOCAL), Partners for Democratic Change, and Human Rights Watch.
Hal Klepak’s research covers a wide spectrum from Latin American security 
and the region’s diplomatic and military history to Canadian and Cuban for-
eign and defence policy. In addition to teaching at the Royal Military College 
of Canada, he advises the Departments of National Defence and Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade on hemisphere issues. Professor Klepak has 
authored numerous books and articles and his most recent scholarship fo-
cuses on Cuba. Professor Klepak also is a retired infantry officer who served 
with and commanded in the Black Watch Regiment. 
abstract: This paper traces the evolution of inter-American security 
cooperation from the early nineteenth century in the aftermath of independ-
ence from Spain through the end of the Cold War. Other than the failed at-
tempt to establish a regional organisation at the 1820s Panama conference, 
the first formal effort to institutionalize cooperation came with the formation 
of the Pan American Union at the end of the nineteenth century. The author 
stresses that the presence of an external enemy, whether it was European 
efforts to regain control of lost colonies, fascism and Nazism in the 1930s and 
1940s, or Communism and Soviet-Cuban challenges in the region during the 
Cold War, tended to be the single most important factor in encouraging inter-
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American cooperation. In the absence of such an external threat and with 
the evident decline in U.S. interest and influence in Latin America, major 
countries in the region, in particular Brazil, have looked to other regional 
groupings such as UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas).
ambassador alfonso lópez Caballero started his professional career in 
the economic sector, first as Assistant Manager of CitiBank in Colombia, and 
then as a consultant for Arthur Young & Co. He received a Master of Business 
Administration from the European Institute for Business Administration 
and a Master of Economics from Columbia University. He was ambassador 
to France, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and served as minister of 
agriculture and minister of the interior. Mr. López was appointed one of the 
government’s negotiators during the peace process with the FARC guerrillas. 
abstract: This paper focuses on the Colombian government peace 
negotiations with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). As a 
former peace commissioner, the author draws a comparison between the 
earlier negotiations, which ended largely in frustration, and the current ne-
gotiations about which he is far more positive. He notes that the internal and 
international pressures on FARC to reach a peace agreement are far more 
difficult for the FARC leadership to resist now than they were a decade ago. 
Some of the factors which have changed the context in which the negotia-
tions are taking place include the professionalization and modernization of 
the Colombian armed forces and their more effective counter-insurgency 
operations; the dwindling support for FARC from Cuban and Venezuelan 
governments; and the effective “decapitation” of FARC’s leadership. He notes 
that there is still opposition in Colombian political circles to any agreement 
with FARC which would appear to be lenient, and in some circles opposition 
even to negotiation with terrorists.
ambassador tim Martin joined the Canadian International Development 
Agency in 1983 as a project officer in the Leeward and Windward Islands 
Program. After serving abroad in Bridgetown as second secretary (de-
velopment), and subsequently at Headquarters as a senior project manager 
in the Central America Division, Mr. Martin moved to the Department of 
External Affairs and International Trade in 1992. He has since served in 
Buenos Aires, as ambassador to Argentina and Paraguay. At Headquarters, 
he has served as political-economic officer for the Horn of Africa; deputy 
coordinator, Middle East peace process; director, peacebuilding and hu-
man security; and senior director and deputy head of the Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Task Force. 
252
contributors
abstract: Ambassador Martin’s address outlines current trends in the 
Colombian security environment, the successes the country has had in the 
past decade in meeting its challenges and the contributions the nation is 
now able to make to multinational efforts to address similar problems on 
security and violence in Central America. He notes that there is optimism 
about the current negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), and that the Santos government is making progress in 
such difficult areas as anti-personnel mine clearance, poverty reduction, and 
land restitution, following several decades in which several million people 
were displaced by conflict. The presentation outlines the range of Canadian 
involvement in the country, from the extensive investment in the oil and gas 
sector to Canadian foreign aid projects to promote peacebuilding, assist vic-
tims of violence, and alleviate poverty.
Zulma y. Méndez received her PhD in Education from the University of 
California-Riverside and her MA in Sociology from the University of Texas 
in El Paso. She is currently the Coordinator for the Centre for Inter-American 
Border Studies and is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational 
Leadership & Foundations at the University of Texas at El Paso. Research 
interests include violence, activism, and resistance in the U.S.-Mexico border-
lands, particularly that of Juárez, Mexico, and El Paso, Texas.  
abstract: In this paper Zulma Méndez examines the development and 
impact of the movement in Ciudad Juárez which has sought to address the 
high level of violence, including homicide, against women. She traces the 
violence back to the early years of the maquiladora expansion when thou-
sands of young women moved to the region to provide a workforce for the 
burgeoning new industries. She also places the violence in the context of the 
militarization of the war against the narcotics cartels in the area, a militariza-
tion that intensified significantly during the presidency of Felipe Calderón. 
Her paper demonstrates a clear correlation between the intensified military 
campaign and female homicides. She notes that the anti-femicide movement 
has had a longer history in the Juárez area than the anti-militarization move-
ment that arose in reaction against Calderón’s policies.
Frank o. Mora, Ph.D., is Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center 
and Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations in the 
School of Public and International Affairs at Florida International University. 
He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, under the first Obama Administration. From 2004 to 2009, Dr. Mora 
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was Professor of National Security Strategy and Latin American Studies at the 
National War College, National Defense University and Associate Professor 
and Chair in the Department of International Studies, Rhodes College (2000-
2004). Dr. Mora received his M.A. in Inter-American Studies (1989) and a 
Ph.D. in International Affairs from the University of Miami (1993). 
John W. G. noyes has been the Director of Corporate Security at Goldcorp 
since January 2011, following a 25-year career with the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (1978-2003). From 2008 to 2011 he was Regional Director of 
Security and Risk for Central and South America. Prior to joining Goldcorp, 
he was Regional Director of Risk for Guatemala with Glamis Gold. In 1997/98 
he was seconded from the RCMP to the United Nations Verification Mission 
in Guatemala. He is the recipient of the Canadian Peacekeeping Medal, the 
RCMP Long Service Medal, and the United Nations Peacekeeping medal.
abstract: This presentation outlines the challenges faced by one pri-
vate sector mining company and the ways in which the company seeks to 
respond constructively to those challenges. The author notes that the rise of 
transnational criminal organizations particularly in Latin America has con-
siderably increased security threats to company personnel, property and the 
communities in which the company operates. He observes that companies 
such as Goldcorp recognize that they have to ensure that security operations 
are conducted in conformity with international standards and the protection 
of human rights. One of the specific issues which confront such companies 
is the lack of enforced regulations for private security contractors in many 
Latin American countries, with resulting low levels of training not only in 
the technical aspects of security but also in human rights issues. Noyes also 
notes that there are often “disconnects” between what national governments 
contend will be the benefits of mining projects and the expectations of local 
communities. 
Bernardo Pérez salazar is a senior policy adviser on urban safety and secur-
ity issues. He regularly contributes to research projects with the Instituto 
Latinoamericano de Altos Estudios and the recently established Fundación 
Paz & Reconciliación in Bogotá, Colombia, as well as with UN-HABITAT in 
South and Central America.
abstract: In this article Bernardo Pérez Salazar explores and explains the 
issues associated with multinational security in the Americas. He suggests 
that the principles and goals articulated in the Organization of American 
States 2003 Mexico City Declaration on hemispheric security have not been 
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successful in making significant inroads in reducing hemispheric security. 
He stresses that this ineffectiveness has been especially apparent in dealing 
with organized crime operating in “under-governed” areas, a challenge that 
has been especially persistent in the case of weak states where either or both 
political and military/police presence and credibility have been lacking.
Brigadier General anthony WJ Phillips-spencer, Vice Chief of Defence 
Staff, is a military officer with thirty years of professional experience since 
his enlistment in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force in 1981. In addition 
to his professional training, Brigadier General Phillips-Spencer has success-
fully completed undergraduate study in Economics and post-graduate study 
in International Relations, both at the University of the West Indies. He was 
awarded the degree of Master of Science in International Relations from the 
University of the West Indies, and is currently pursuing a Master of Arts, 
Security and Defence Management and Policy at the Royal Military College 
of Canada. 
abstract: The paper outlines the security challenges faced by the countries 
of the Caribbean, many of which suffer from a culture of dependence and the 
legacy of colonial rule. Phillips-Spencer stresses that many of the small island 
nations of the Caribbean do not have the resources to address such problems 
as narcotics, arms and human trafficking, and the high levels of violence 
that plague some of the countries in the region. The paper identifies prob-
lems of weak leadership and poor planning along with inadequate capacity 
to meet security challenges, and concludes that the CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community) region, due to its structural security challenges and insufficient 
capacity to meet security threats, is likely to remain inextricably trapped in 
its dilemma. The author suggests that the opportunity for reform will require 
the assistance of outside nations like Canada and the United States, but he also 
calls for more engagement of civil society and the private sector.
elizabeth Pando-Burciaga is currently a doctoral student in the Department 
of Political Science at the University of Calgary. Her studies are in the fields 
of Comparative Politics and International Relations. Elizabeth obtained an 
M.A. (Interdisciplinary Studies) and a B.A. (Philosophy) at the University of 
Texas at El Paso. Her research interests include policies on violence against 
women in Latin America, Mexico’s war on drugs and its gendered dimen-
sions, as well as policies of transnational domestic and care work. Elizabeth 
is originally from Chihuahua, northern Mexico.
abstract: In this paper the authors explore the complex relationship 
between the state and criminal gangs, with particular focus on Central 
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America, Mexico, and Colombia. They note that the main policies pursued 
by governments in the region, the mano dura and the mano super dura ap-
proaches, have proven less than effective in reducing either criminal activity 
or levels of violence, and have been subject to considerable critique for the 
violations of human rights, which have been associated with their implemen-
tation. They suggest that given the complexity of the state-gang relationship, 
governments and the gangs need to engage in dialogue, and governments 
need to adopt flexible, adaptive policies in which governments are not neces-
sarily the final deciders.
Pablo Policzer, a Chilean by birth, specializes in comparative politics, with 
a focus on Latin America. His research focuses on how democratic and 
authoritarian regimes regulate armed actors—including militaries, police 
forces, and non-state armed groups. He holds a Canada Research Chair in 
Latin American Politics, and is a Fellow at the University of Calgary’s Latin 
American Research Centre, and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. 
He obtained his PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, and his BA (Honours, First Class) in political science from the 
University of British Columbia.
abstract: See Pando-Burciaga.
Greg Purdy joined CKR Global as their International Risk Advisor after 
approximately thirty-three years with the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security 
Service. He worked in the Service’s foreign liaison, counter-terrorism, and 
counter-intelligence departments, and was previously Deputy Chief of 
CSIS Headquarters’ Foreign Liaison Department in Ottawa as well as First 
Secretary at the Canadian Embassies in Mexico and Colombia. He is a mem-
ber of the Canadian International Council (CIC), Canadian Council for the 
Americas (CCA) and currently holds a Fellowship with the Latin America 
Research Center (LARC) at the University of Calgary.
abstract: This paper focuses on the transnational nature and impact 
of organized criminal groups in Latin America with a particular focus on 
the narcotics cartels in Mexico and their expansion into other countries 
in Central America. The paper notes particular concern that such organ-
ized criminal groups as the Mexican-based narcotics cartel, the Zetas, are 
composed of former military and have been able to infiltrate or gain the 
cooperation of the militaries in other countries. The author notes that the 
narcotics industry in Mexico alone generates revenues of some $40 billion 
per annum, as well as generating high levels of corruption among govern-
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ment and law enforcement officials. The paper suggests that the Mexican 
situation continues to deteriorate, that the militarization strategy pursued by 
former President Felipe Calderón was not effective in containing the cartels 
and resulted in increased violence. He observes that although Colombia has 
made considerable progress in the past decade in containing narcotics and 
guerrilla insurgency, problems remain.
stephen J. randall, FRSC, PhD (Toronto), is Professor of History and 
Director of the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary. 
He served as Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences (1994-2006) at the University 
of Calgary. He served as director of the Institute for United States Policy 
Research in the School of Public Policy (2006-2009). In Calgary he was the 
founding director of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (West) and a 
founding member of the Canadian Council of the Americas. He is an elected 
member of the Royal Society of Canada as well as a fellow with the Canadian 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, and he holds the Grand Cross, Order 
of Merit from the Presidency of Colombia. 
María-Cristina rosas is a full-time professor and researcher in the 
International Relations Center at the National Autonomous University 
of Mexico (UNAM), where she obtained her doctorates in International 
Relations and Latin American Studies. Dr. Rosas has worked as a consultant 
for Mexican and foreign governments, the private sector and international 
organizations in topics related to economics and international relations. In 
1993, 1995, and 1998, she received the “Maestro Jesús Silvia Herzog” prize 
for her economics research from the Institute for Economic Research at 
UNAM. Currently she chairs the Olof Palme Center for Peace, Security and 
Development based in Mexico City.
abstract: This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Mexican govern-
ment of President Felipe Calderón in attempting to curb the influence and 
impact of organized crime in the country, in particular the major narcotics 
cartels. The author suggests that the administration approached the chal-
lenge without a clearly developed national security strategy, and the decision 
to use the army to confront the cartels was not only controversial but also 
resulted in a significant escalation of violence. She argues that the strategy 
nonetheless did weaken the power of the main cartels: Sinaloa, Gulf, Tijuana, 
Juárez, and Michoacán, even if it resulted in the diffusion of smaller criminal 
organizations. The paper notes the relationship with the United States on 
narcotics and border security and Canadian concerns with the high levels 
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of violence in the country and its impact on trade, investment, and tourism. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the national security strategy 
pursued by Calderón’s successor, Enrique Peña Nieto from the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), with his administration’s stronger commitment to 
human rights and socio-economic development.
Hector luis saint-Pierre holds a PhD in Political Philosophy from the 
State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil. He is currently Adjunct 
Professor of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in History and 
International Relations at the Paulista State University (UNESP) in São 
Paulo, Brazil, and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Inter-
institutional San Tiago Dantas. He is a researcher of the National Research 
Council in Brazil and acts as advisor to several national and international 
scientific organizations. He founded and coordinates the Study Group 
for Defence and International Security and directs the Center for Latin 
American Studies at UNESP. He is a member of the Academic Board of the 
Inter-American Defense College (OAS). 
abstract: Saint-Pierre in his paper draws an important distinction 
between concepts of security and defence and how those differences have 
impacted policy in Latin American countries. He notes that non-traditional 
security threats, rather than traditional threats to the state from outside 
forces, have moved to the fore, with the result that the military has increas-
ingly found its role shifted from defence of the state against external enemies 
to domestic issues normally considered the responsibility of police. The com-
plexity of the security challenges, he suggests, led governments to introduce 
the concept of “multidimensionality” of threat to security and to argue that 
the challenges had to be met by a range of state institutions. Saint-Pierre 
argues that the military and the police should have more clearly delineated 
and separate roles in addressing security challenges.

